United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge.
Ravenna alleges that the Village of Skokie violated the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation
Act in their decision to, and in the manner in which, it
arrested her. The parties have cross moved for summary
judgment. R. 101; R. 102; R. 105. Those motions are
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Court
considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all of
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir.
2018). To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce
more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” and come
forward with “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Johnson v. Advocate
Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894, 896 (7th
Cir. 2018). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if
a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the
nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
early as August 2014, Ravenna began to call the Skokie police
department to complain that her next-door neighbor had broken
into her house. R. 118 ¶ 1. The record reflects that
Skokie police either responded to calls from Ravenna or had
conversations with her at her home on at least 41 separate
days (on some days more than once) through August 1, 2015.
See R. 118. The frequency of these interactions
increased, with 23 occurring between June 1 and August 1,
2015. See id.
police never found any evidence to support Ravenna's
allegations against her neighbor. Rather, the police reports
note that Ravenna's claims were “delusional,
” see, e.g., id. ¶ 8,
frequently involving Ravenna claiming either that her dog
“told” her that the neighbor was entering the
house, or that the dog had opened the door for the neighbor.
For instance, in a report of a visit with Ravenna on May 28,
2015, the responding officer reported:
Ravenna then continued to explain how her dog (Leyla) has
conversations with [the neighbor] and that Leyla gives items
such as clothing, jewelry, and food to him. Ravenna stated
Leyla knows how to unlock the dead bolt lock on the door and
turn the door knob to let [the neighbor] in when Ravenna is
not in the residence.
R. 118 at 5.
deposition Ravenna denied making many of the statements
recorded by Skokie police. But she stood by her report of May
25, 2015, see R. 118 at 10, that her neighbor had
anally raped her dog:
Q. Did you ever see [the neighbor] rape your dog?
A. I saw him run out of the house the day of the rape. It was
Mother's Day that year, May-the third Sunday in May, I
Q. Of 2015?
Q. You saw him run out of the house?
A. He ran out the back while I pulled in the driveway.
Q. So you never saw him rape your dog?
A. No. I came in and she wouldn't walk.
Q. Who is she?
A. My dog.
Q. What is your dog's name?
Q. Do you still own Leila?
Q. And she wouldn't ...