United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Reona J. Daly, United States Magistrate Judge
matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge
Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge Nancy J.
Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a)
for a Report and Recommendation on the Motions for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendants. It is
RECOMMENDED that the District Court
ADOPT the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment (Docs. 51, 54) be GRANTED.
Andrew Walker, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated
at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).
Following threshold review, Plaintiff proceeds on the
Count 1:McGlorn, Lang, and Walls were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical
needs when they persisted in a course of treatment known to
be ineffective with regards to Plaintiff's
gastrointestinal and estrogen symptoms in violation of the
McGlorn filed a motion for summary judgment arguing she saw
Plaintiff on only one occasion and provided appropriate
medical care. Defendants Walls and Lang filed a motion for
summary judgment asserting they were not deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. Specifically,
Defendant Lang asserts she was present for only one of
Plaintiff's medical appointments where he was seen by a
nurse practitioner. Defendant Walls, as Health Care
Administrator, never treated Plaintiff but asserts she
properly responded to his letter and grievance. Plaintiff
timely filed a Response (Doc. 61) arguing Defendants refused
to test him for a soy allergy and that he was not provided
alternative treatments when a non-soy diet was unavailable.
relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate at Menard
(Plaintiff's Deposition, Doc. 55-1 at 4). In early 2015,
Plaintiff began experiencing gastrointestinal problems,
including bloating, cramping, and constipation (Doc. 1 at 4).
Plaintiff believed his medical problems were due to the
presence of soy in the diet served at Menard (Doc. 55-1 at
5). Plaintiff has never been diagnosed as being allergic to
soy (Id. at 9).
January 12, 2016, Plaintiff saw Defendant McGlorn, a nurse
practitioner at Menard (Doc. 55-1 at 6, Doc. 52-3 at 1-2).
Defendant Aimee Lang was present when Plaintiff first walked
in to see McGlorn on January 12, 2016, but was not present
for the entire visit (Doc. 55-1 at 12-13). McGlorn discussed
with Plaintiff his gastrointestinal problems and reviewed his
medication (Id. at 7-8). Plaintiff requested a
soy-free diet (Id. at 8). McGlorn stated that she
would submit Plaintiff for a soy-free diet but that he would
not get it (Id.). The medical records indicate
McGlorn did not conduct a physical examination because of
Plaintiff's escalating anger (Doc. 52-3 at 2). McGlorn
continued Plaintiff on the medications Colace and FiberCon
which he reported helped with his symptoms, but were not
resolving the problem (Id. at 8, Doc. 52-3 at 2).
McGlorn also recommended Milk of Magnesia as necessary (Doc.
52-3 at 2). McGlorn ordered Plaintiff a therapeutic soy-free
diet for one year pursuant to his request and his subjective
complaints (Id.). Plaintiff only saw Defendant
McGlorn on the one occasion (Doc. 55-1 at 6). Plaintiff did
not have any other interactions with Defendant Lang regarding
his gastrointestinal symptoms other than the January 12, 2016
visit with McGlorn (Id. at 12). Plaintiff testified
he was seen by several other medical staff concerning his soy
issues (Doc. 55-1 at 7).
January 20, 2016, McGlorn was contacted by her Wexford Health
Sources Director and told that a dietician with the IDOC
reviewed the soy-free diet request, and instructed the
soy-free diet be discontinued and that soy-free diets were
not available at Menard (McGlorn Affidavit, Doc. 52-2 at
Walls was the Health Care Administrator at Menard during the
events alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 55-1 at
13). Walls never treated Plaintiff and Plaintiff never spoke
directly to Walls regarding his complaints (Id.).
Walls responded to one handwritten letter sent by Plaintiff
and responded to his grievance (Id.).
testified that the symptoms he suffered from not being
prescribed a soy-free diet were five or six pounds of weight
loss, cramping, bloating, and constipation (Doc. 55-1 at 9).
Plaintiff did not report swelling of lips, tongue, or throat,
nor did he report any wheezing or difficulty breathing
(Id. at 10). During the relevant timeframe at
Menard, Plaintiff would play basketball and lift weights
(Id. at 4). If Plaintiff experienced cramping, he
would sit out and not play (Id.). Plaintiff
testified he is still experiencing some slight cramping, but
otherwise is no longer having symptoms (Id. at 9).
judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate
of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In determining
a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences
in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted).
Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; see also Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). As the Supreme
Court has recognized, “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order
to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must first show
that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently
serious” and second, that the “prison officials