United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Calvin Hempstead, a former inmate in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),
filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting that his constitutional rights were violated while
he was incarcerated at Vienna Correctional Center
(“Vienna”). Specifically, Hempstead alleges he
informed officials at Vienna that he had enemies there who
attempted to kill him before he was in prison, but the
officials failed to take any action and, as a result, he was
attacked. Hempstead is proceeding in this action on an Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Brett
Campbell, Randy Davis, Aubrey Edwards, Brian Harner, Blane
Holloman, LaRue Love, and Chad Myers.
matter is now before the Court for consideration of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 97).
Hempstead filed a response (104). For the following reasons,
Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
Calvin Hempstead was incarcerated at Vienna Correctional
Center from August 2013 to February 6, 2014 (Deposition of
Calvin Hempstead, Doc. 98-1 at 14, 20; see Doc. 1-1
at 38). Shortly after he arrived at Vienna, Hempstead saw
some of his “enemies”, including Terrell Mackey,
Tony Trumel, Antoine Banks, and “Little Ben”
(Doc. 98-1 at 4). Soon thereafter, Hempstead advised Warden
Randy Davis that he had enemies at Vienna, but Davis failed
to take any action and merely asked Hempstead if he was
“trying to move up north” (Id.).
Hempstead was involved in some altercations with Terrell
Mackey while at Vienna, but he is not sure when the
altercations occurred (Id. at 3, 6).
September 20, 2013, Hempstead spoke to Sergeant Chad Myers
and requested protective custody (Id. at 8).
Hempstead explained that he had seen several enemies and that
he feared for his life and safety (Id.). He again
identified Terrell Mackey, Tony Trumel, Antoine Banks, and
“Little Ben, ” as well as the Latin Kings
(Id. at 9, 11). Myers immediately took Hempstead to
internal affairs where Hempstead spoke to Brett Campbell and
Blane Holloman (Id.). Sergeant Aubrey Edwards was
also present during this time (Id.). Hempstead told
the officers about his enemies at Vienna (Id.).
was ordered to return to his assigned location, but he
refused to follow the order (Doc. 1-1 at 62). He was issued a
disciplinary ticket for disobeying a direct order (Doc. 98-1
at 9; Doc. 1-1 at 62). He was then placed in segregation for
approximately one month (Doc. 98-1 at 11). At some point,
some of the internal affairs officers told Hempstead they
spoke to his identified enemies, who indicated they did not
have a problem with him (Id. at 12).
December 3, 2013, Hempstead was involved in an altercation
with another inmate, “Wilson” (Id.;
see Doc. 98-3). Hempstead was told by other inmates
on his wing that Wilson only fought him because he was paid
off by Terrell Mackey (Doc. 98-1 at 12). Hempstead did not
sustain any injuries during this fight (Id. at 13).
was involved in another fight with an unknown person a few
days after his fight with Wilson (Id. at 16). Around
this time, Hempstead was approached by Inmate Garcia who told
him they were “going to have a problem”
(Id. at 11). On December 17, 2013, Garcia, along
with six other Latin Kings or Four Corner Hustlers came to
Hempstead's cell (Id. at 10, 16). Garcia fought
Hempstead in the cell, causing Hempstead to suffer a fracture
of his hand (Id. at 17). Thereafter, Hempstead was
placed in segregation on investigative status based on a
disciplinary report written by Holloman (Id. at 18;
Doc. 1-1 at 64). Hempstead was transferred to Pinckneyville
Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”) shortly
after the incident with Garcia (Doc. 98-1 at 20).
at Vienna, Hempstead was involved in numerous other
altercations with other inmates, including Wilson, Mackey and
about five members of the Latin Kings (Id. at 14).
It is not clear when these altercations occurred. Also,
throughout his time at Vienna, Hempstead told Warden Davis
and Assistant Warden Love about his enemies, but they failed
to take action (Id. at 18).
maintain that a review of IDOC's electronic records
indicate individuals by the name of Terrell Mackey, Antoine
Banks, or Tony Trumel were never in IDOC custody (Declaration
of Darren Harner, Doc. 98-2 at ¶¶ 11, 12). They
also maintain that an individual with the nickname
“Little Ben” was incarcerated at Vienna during
the relevant time, but there is no documentation
substantiating Hempstead's claim that he threatened
Hempstead's life or safety (Id. at ¶ 13).
judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also
Ruffin- Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate
of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). When
considering a summary judgment motion, the district court
views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.
Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735
F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment requires that prison officials “take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
inmates.” Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 758
(7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994) (other citations omitted)). In order to
succeed on a claim for failure to protect against a prison
official, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he was incarcerated