United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
JOHNSON COLEMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Leo Washington file a pro se Complaint seeking
injunctive and other relief against his employer, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), and
federal officers for violating certain VA regulations and
procedures. Defendants move to dismiss  for lack of
jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and lack of standing.
Mr. Washington did not file a written response to the motion,
but this Court heard oral arguments on July 30, 2018. For the
reasons stated below, this Court grants the motion.
Washington has two separate complaints pending that arise
from his employment with the VA. Washington is a GS-13
contract specialist at VA in Hines, Illinois. In the case now
before the Court, Washington alleges that, beginning in July
2016, the defendant VA officials improperly interfered with
the work of all VA contracting officers in violation of his
due process rights among other issues.
party moves to dismiss based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the district court
must accept all well-pleaded facts within the complaint as
true but may also consider evidence outside of the pleadings
to ensure jurisdiction is proper. Evers v. Astrue,
536 F.3d 651, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing St.
John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago,
502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007)). To survive dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) a complaint
must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face and raising the
right to relief above speculation. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 62, 678 (2009). The Court must first
examine whether there is jurisdiction in this court.
Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining
suits by private parties against States and their agencies.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057,
3058, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978); JMB Grp. Tr. IV v.
Pennsylvania Mun. Ret. Sys., 986 F.Supp. 534, 537 (N.D.
Ill. 1997). A court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit
against the United States, its agencies or officials except
where Congress has consented. Indiana Prot. &
Advocacy Servs. v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs.
Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 370-71 (7th Cir. 2010).
Washington initially invokes 28 U.S.C. §1331, federal
question jurisdiction, as the source of jurisdiction over his
claim. That provision, however, is not source of
jurisdiction. See Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v.
Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 137 S.Ct.
1312, 1322, 197 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017) (Section 1331 “often
simply determines which court's doors are open (federal
or state).”). This Court then must look to Mr.
Washington's claims to determine whether there is a
statutory basis for entertaining a suit against the VA, a
form complaint, Washington asserts the following bases for
federal jurisdiction: PL 105 270 § 5; 5 U.S.C. §
558; 5 U.S.C. Chapter 7; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985; and 41 U.S.C. § 1707; Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR 1.603-4); VA Acquisition Regulation (VAAR
801.690-7). None of the cited statutes and regulations confer
jurisdiction on this Court.
the variety of statutes to which Mr. Washington refers to in
his complaint support jurisdiction in this Court. See
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) (Title 5
should not be interpreted as conferring subject-matter
jurisdiction over agency actions); Crestview Village
Apartments v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development, 383 F.3d 552, 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2004) (42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985 do not confer
a jurisdictional basis for suits against federal agency or
officials); Davis v. Department of Justice, 204 F.3d
723, 725 (7th Cir. 2000) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985,
1986 do not provide a jurisdiction); The various agency
regulations that Mr. Washington refers to also do not create
a basis for jurisdiction. See American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 2119 v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460,
471-72 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's
holding of no jurisdiction to hear federal employee's
claims based on federal contracting and procurement
Washington purports to seek relief through the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) for the above stated
grievances. Despite his claims being rather vague, this Court
should find that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over this
matter because the APA does not provide for an avenue for
federal employees to circumvent the Civil Service Reform Act
(“CSRA”), 5 U.C.C. § 2302, et seq.
By creating the CSRA, Congress removed the jurisdiction of
federal district courts over personnel actions arising out of
federal employment. Paige v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 40,
43 (7th Cir. 1996). Mr. Washington's reliance on the
“Follow the Rules Act, ” PL 105 270 § 5,
during oral arguments does not save his complaint as that
provision only added “rule or regulation” to the
federal employee whistleblower statute. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302. He has not presented any authority demonstrating
that this amendment altered the analysis that the CSRA is the
exclusive avenue for personnel actions by federal employees.
In Sculimbrene v. Reno, for example, the court found
that the CSRA precluded the whistleblower suit by former FBI
agent against FBI General Counsel and White House Counsel,
alleging they conspired to injure him and forced him to
retire, in retaliation for agent's testifying as defense
witness at criminal trial of former head of White House
Travel Office. 158 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2001). The CSRA
precluded the federal agent's law suit despite the CSRA
providing no remedy for his claims. Id. Similarly,
Mr. Washington's status as a federal employee is central
to his claims and the CSRA precludes jurisdiction in this
on the foregoing, this Court grants defendants' Motion to
Dismiss  and dismisses the case for lack of ...