United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
NATHAN M. SILL, # B83157, Plaintiff,
JILL MOORE, and CHARLES DAVID PAULIUS, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PHIL GILBERT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff brings claims
pertaining to his arrest and subsequent detention at the
Saline County Jail (“Jail”). In connection with
his claims, Plaintiff names Jill Moore (Medical Supervisor,
Jail) and Charles David Paulius (Physician, Jail). The
original Complaint did not survive preliminary review. (Doc.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 10, 2018. (Doc.
12). The Amended Complaint is now before the Court for a
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
(a) Screening - The court shall review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the
court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable
person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209
F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of
entitlement to relief must cross “the line between
possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At
this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.
January 24, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested and detained at the
Jail. (Doc. 12, p. 5). Prior to being arrested, Plaintiff had
been prescribed medication to treat his mental illness and
that medication “worked for [him].” Id.
Plaintiff told Moore and Paulius about his preferred
medication. Id. Paulius refused to prescribe
Plaintiff's preferred mental health medication.
Id. However, Plaintiff did receive “[his]
Lithium,  Cogentin,  and Gabapentin. Id.
Plaintiff “talked to them” regarding medication
for his mental illness, but “they still said no.”
on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the Court
divides the pro se action into a single count. Any
other claim that is mentioned in the Amended Complaint but
not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice under the Twombly pleading
Count 1: Inadequate medical care claim
against Moore and John Doe for declining to provide
Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), with the exception of specifying
that Paulius is the staff member who denied Plaintiff's
requested medication, Plaintiff has wholly failed to expand
upon the allegations in the original Complaint (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff claims that he informed Defendants about the
“meds” that “worked for [him]” in
treating his “mental illness.” But, once again,
he does not describe what mental health medications were
previously prescribed or what serious condition they were
prescribed for. Without additional factual allegations,
Plaintiff's conclusory statement does not establish that
he made either Defendant aware of a serious medical need at
that time. Nor does he describe any obvious symptoms that
demanded treatment with a specific medication. See Greeno
v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (defining a
serious medical condition). Further, the Amended Complaint is
devoid of any allegations suggesting deliberate indifference
on the part of either Defendant. At most, Plaintiff's
allegations suggest a difference of opinion between him and
the Defendants regarding medically appropriate medications
for Plaintiff's unknown mental health condition. This
type of disagreement does not support a claim for deliberate
indifference. See Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267
(7th Cir. 1997); Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392,
396 (7th Cir. 2006). As such, the Amended Complaint is
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
failure of the Amended Complaint to state a colorable
constitutional claim begs the question, should Plaintiff be
given another opportunity to plead his case? Leave to amend
need not be granted when further amendment would be futile.
McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir.
2011). “[F]utile repleadings include restating the same
facts using different language, Wakeen v. Hoffman House,
Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1983), reasserting
claims previously determined, id., failing to state
a valid theory of liability, Verhein v. South Bend Lathe,
Inc., 598 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir. 1979), and the
inability to survive a motion to dismiss, Glick v.
Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1985).”
Garcia v. City of Chicago, Ill., 24 F.3d 966, 970
(7th Cir. 1994). Giving Plaintiff leave to amend would be