United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
L. Alonso United States District Judge
reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint  is granted.
Civil case terminated.
Darryl Pruitt brings this action following his alleged
unlawful arrest and detention. Before the Court is
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third
following facts are drawn from the complaint. Pruitt was
released on a two-year period of parole from Vienna
Correctional Center on or about March 17, 2008. The
conditions of parole required him to undergo continuing
mental health treatment among other things. On or about May
3, 2010, Pruitt was arrested by Defendants Green and Dunbar
for failure to comply with the terms of his parole. Pruitt
complains that Defendants did not have a warrant to arrest
him and failed to give him a Miranda warning, and that Green
falsely stated on a parole violation report that Pruitt had
failed to attend mental health counseling in conformity with
the conditions of his parole. As a result of his arrest,
Pruitt was incarcerated from his arrest until October 5,
2011, and never given the opportunity to participate in a
hearing regarding his incarceration.
filed a pro se complaint on December 21, 2016, and
counsel was recruited for him in 2017. Pruitt's operative
complaint seeks redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
Fourth Amendment claims of unlawful arrest and false
swearing, and a Fourteenth Amendment claim of denial of due
process with regard to the revocation of his parole.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as time-barred,
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and
for failure to state a claim.
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true
all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint,
drawing all possible inferences in plaintiff's favor. See
Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th
Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,
” but it must contain “enough facts to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
failure to file a complaint within the applicable limitations
period is an affirmative defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).
Generally, “complaints do not have to anticipate
affirmative defenses to survive a motion to dismiss.”
U.S. v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005).
The general rule notwithstanding, “The exception occurs
where . . . the allegations of the complaint itself set forth
everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such
as when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is
untimely under the governing statute of limitations.”
argue Pruitt's complaint should be dismissed because it
was filed several years after the limitations period expired.
Pruitt opposes the motion, arguing his claims should be
tolled due to his mental condition from the time of his 2010
arrest through the filing of this action. According to
Defendants, Pruitt has not shown that he suffers from a legal
disability sufficient to warrant tolling.
the statute of limitations and principles of tolling are
supplied to Pruitt's Section 1983 claims by Illinois law.
See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 317 (7th Cir.
2001); Jenkins v. Village of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622,
623 (7th Cir. 2007). Under Illinois law, the applicable
limitations period is two years from the date of accrual.
See Jenkins, 506 F.3d at 623 (citing 735 ILCS §
5/13-202). The date of accrual, on the other hand, is
supplied by federal law. See Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Heard, 253 F.3d at 317-18.
“A claim accrues for § 1983 purposes when the
plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional
rights have been violated.” Behavioral Inst. of
Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d
926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
Fourth Amendment claims accrued upon his May 3, 2010 arrest,
see Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 425
(7th Cir. 2006), and the latest his due process claim could
have accrued is prior to his October 5, 2011 release. Because
he did not file this action until December ...