United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey United States District Judge.
Christopher Kraszinski sued Rob Roy Country Club Village
Association, its board of directors, and its property
manager, Rowell Property Management, Inc., under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Plaintiff lives in a condominium unit at Rob Roy and
suffers from a disabling autoimmune disease. He alleges that
Defendants retaliated against him by suing him in state court
after he requested accommodations from some of the
association's policies, discriminated against him based
upon his disability, and caused him emotional distress.
Defendants moved to dismiss every count for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the
reasons explained below, this Court grants the motion in part
and denies it in part.
The Complaint's Allegations
govern and manage the condominium association where Plaintiff
has lived since 1997.  ¶¶ 13-14. Beginning in
1997, Plaintiff, through his mother, regularly asked
Defendants to stop applying landscape pesticides and
herbicides outside his condominium unit. Id. ¶
15. Plaintiff's mother made these requests through
written correspondence and in person during Defendants'
board meetings. Id. ¶ 16. Defendants denied
each request. Id. ¶ 21. They continue spraying
chemicals around Plaintiff's unit today, and
Plaintiff's mother continues asking Defendants to use
fewer chemicals. Id. ¶¶ 15, 21.
2006, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an autoimmune disease that
severely limits his “ability to engage in major life
activities.” Id. ¶ 22. Doctors told
Plaintiff to avoid toxins-like pesticides and herbicides-that
could aggravate his condition. Id. ¶ 23.
Subsequently, Plaintiff and his mother “increased the
frequency of their requests” that Defendants stop using
pesticides near Plaintiff's home. Id. ¶ 24.
Defendants not only denied those requests, but also told
Plaintiff in 2009 that they would spray more often outside
his unit because Plaintiff's frequent requests for
accommodation annoyed them. Id. ¶¶ 28-30.
2009, Plaintiff's autoimmune disease had progressed
significantly and often rendered him bedridden for several
weeks in a row. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff's
doctors again recommended that he avoid exposure to toxins
like pesticides that could aggravate his symptoms.
Id. ¶¶ 33-34. The doctors also explained
that Plaintiff's wall-to-wall carpeting likely harbored
environmental toxins carried inside on people's clothing
and shoes. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff and his doctors
then asked Defendants to modify the association's policy
to allow Plaintiff to remove the carpeting from his unit to
“aid in his recovery.” Id. ¶¶
April 2009, Defendants refused to modify the carpeting
policy. Id. ¶ 37. Defendants specifically told
Plaintiff that they wanted to force Plaintiff and his mother
to move out of the community. Id. ¶ 38. In
2010, Defendants sued Plaintiff and his mother in state court
seeking an injunction to prevent them from removing the
carpeting in the unit, as discussed below. Id.
2011, after Plaintiff's health declined further, the
Social Security Administration declared him permanently
disabled. Id. ¶ 43. In 2013, Plaintiff was
hospitalized for psychological injuries stemming from the
“chronic stress and trauma” of Defendants denying
his requests for accommodation and harassing him.
Id. ¶ 48. Additionally, Plaintiff has developed
a “stress-based cardiovascular condition” that
Defendants' behavior caused. Id. ¶ 51.
2014, doctors diagnosed Plaintiff with severe allergies to
carpeting and dust. Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff takes
medication for the allergies, but the medication offers only
minimal relief because carpeting-the source of the
allergens-remains in Plaintiff's unit. Id. From
2014 through the present, Plaintiff continued asking
Defendants to allow him to remove the carpeting from his
unit. Id. ¶¶ 15, 55-56. In response to
Plaintiff's continued requests, Defendants, among other
things, fined Plaintiff for trivial policy violations that
they never held other unit owners accountable for and removed
medicinal plants from Plaintiff's balcony. Id.
State Court Litigation
state lawsuit, Defendants sought to enforce a condominium
bylaw that barred Plaintiff from removing the carpeting in
his unit. Id. ¶¶ 42, 78. Plaintiff raised
defenses of retaliation under federal statutes, and also
argued that Defendants violated his rights to speech,
participation in government, and a healthy environment.
See [39-3] at 15-21. The state court issued a default
judgment barring Plaintiff from removing the carpeting in his
unit in 2012.  ¶ 45. Plaintiff has made
“numerous failed attempts” to reverse the
permanent injunction in state court. Id. ¶ 47.
Plaintiff alleges that the state litigation contributed to
his poor health and caused him severe emotional distress.
Id. ¶¶ 128-30.
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must provide a “short and plain statement of the
claim” showing that the pleader merits relief,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), so the defendant has “fair
notice” of the claim “and the grounds upon which
it rests, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must also contain
“sufficient factual matter” to state a facially
plausible claim to relief-one that “allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference” that the defendant
committed the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). This plausibility standard “asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d
432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).
evaluating a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this Court
accepts all well-pled allegations as true and draws all
reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This Court does not,
however, accept legal conclusions as true. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). On a motion to
dismiss, this Court may consider the complaint itself,
documents attached to the complaint, documents central to the
complaint and to which the complaint refers, and information
properly subject to judicial notice. Williamson, 714
F.3d at 436.
argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
Plaintiff's claims because they either seek review of the
state court's decision or are “inextricably
intertwined” with that decision.  at 2, 6.
Defendants also argue that, even if Rooker-Feldman
does not apply, this Court should dismiss all counts as
time-barred or insufficiently pled. Id. Plaintiff
counters that he seeks damages independent of the state
court's judgment and that several ...