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Williamson v. Lashbrook

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

July 11, 2018

DEANTHONY WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff,
v.
JAQUIEL LASHBROOK, and ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          MICHAEL J. REAGAN CHIEF JUDGE

         Plaintiff DeAnthony Williamson, a former inmate at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims the defendants subjected him to unlawful imprisonment by keeping him imprisoned past his proper parole date. (Doc. 1). This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

(a) Screening - The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

         An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

         Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

         The Complaint

         In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff seeks to hold the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and Menard accountable for his unlawful imprisonment beginning February 11, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 5). He refers to the various exhibits attached to the Complaint to support his claim. The judgment Plaintiff attached indicates that he received a six-year prison sentence with one year of mandatory supervised release on November 5, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 7). He was also credited 293 days for previous time served. Id. An offender disciplinary report attached to the Complaint dated January 6, 2017 indicates that Plaintiff was charged with a major infraction for “106 -Escape or Runaway” and “307 - Unauthorized Movement” for failing to return to Crossroads ATC on September 7, 2016 after signing out of the center on a work pass. (Doc. 1, p. 9). The report notes that Plaintiff was apprehended on December 8, 2016, after having been “unauthorized for approximately 90 days.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). A handwritten note on the report indicates that Plaintiff was returned to IDOC on January 6, 2017. Id.

         Plaintiff was found guilty of the infraction and sentenced to, among other things, a disciplinary transfer and the revocation of one year of good conduct credit. (Doc. 1, p. 11). The revocation of Plaintiff's good conduct credit was later expunged on February 27, 2017. Id. Plaintiff's mandatory supervised release date was eventually recalculated by Menard and set at June 9, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 16). Plaintiff wrote a letter, attached to the Complaint, claiming that his mandatory supervised release date should have been set at February 11, 2018, its original date, rather than June 9, 2018. Id. He also wrote several grievances complaining about this issue. (Doc. 1, pp. 17, 19-25). The responses to Plaintiff's grievances indicated that the extension reflected the time Plaintiff spent out of custody, 3 months and 28 days. (Doc. 1, pp. 17, 20, 22, 24).

         Plaintiff seeks payment from the defendants for each day he was held after February 11, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 6).

         Discussion

         Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate a single count in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The ...


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