United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey United States District Judge.
Mario English sued numerous correctional officers under 28
U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly using excessive force
against him, subjecting him to an unconstitutional strip
search, and exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious
medical condition. Defendants Tarry Williams and Samuel
Johnson moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's
deliberate indifference claim. For the reasons explained
below, this Court grants Defendants' motion.
facts come from Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of
facts  and Plaintiff's statement of additional facts
November 2, 2014, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Stateville
Correctional Center.  ¶ 2. Stateville had Plaintiff
under suicide watch-which Defendants call “crisis
watch”-meaning that guards checked on Plaintiff in his
cell every ten minutes and recorded their observations in a
log.  ¶ 9; see generally [130-6]. Around
11:00 a.m. that morning, a guard doing a scheduled check on
Plaintiff saw him wearing a string made from a bedsheet
around his neck.  ¶¶ 11-12. Ten minutes later,
the same guard again observed Plaintiff with a string around
his neck. [130-6] at 4. Shortly after, multiple guards came
to Plaintiff's cell to remove the string; Plaintiff
attempted to use the string to end his life before guards
took it away from him.  ¶¶ 13-15.
to Plaintiff, the guards then assaulted him.  ¶ 2.
Plaintiff testified that the guards punched and kicked him at
least 20 times (including strikes to his head) and pulled his
hair out. Id. ¶ 7. Despite the fact that
Plaintiff had already submitted to a strip search before the
guards started beating him,  ¶¶ 17-18, they
forced him into the fetal position on the ground, grabbed his
right butt cheek, and pulled it aside to examine his anus,
 ¶ 7.
maintains that Johnson stood outside his cell before and
during the attack and had a clear view of the attack, but did
nothing to stop the other guards from hurting Plaintiff.
Id. ¶¶ 3-6. Johnson disputes
Plaintiff's testimony and says that he did not arrive at
Plaintiff's cell until 12:40 p.m., when he took over the
regular checks for crisis watch.  ¶¶ 34-35.
Under Plaintiff's version of events, Johnson and the
other guards stood within earshot of Plaintiff's cell
after the attack and ignored Plaintiff's cries for help.
 ¶ 8. Plaintiff says that, while the guards
remained outside his cell, he stomped on his bed to make
noise and alert anyone who could possibly help him. [130-2]
at 31 (“I was basically calling for help, like, anybody
besides them. If anybody could hear me.”).
side explains who brought Plaintiff to get medical attention,
but Plaintiff saw a nurse by 12:15 p.m. the same day-about an
hour after the assault. See  ¶ 33; 
¶ 10. Plaintiff told the nurse that his body hurt
“all over.”  ¶ 10. The nurse noted some
“mild erythema, ” or redness, on Plaintiff's
leg, but documented that Plaintiff had no other visible
injuries. [130-3] at 2.
parties agree that Williams, Stateville's then-warden,
neither participated in nor witnessed the attack. 
¶ 40. Plaintiff says that he later wrote to Williams
about the assault and “requested an
investigation.”  ¶ 12. Plaintiff received a
“non-substantive, form letter response” in early
December. Id. ¶ 14. According to Williams, his
designee “jal” responded to Plaintiff's
letter.  ¶ 43. Williams does not remember receiving
a letter from Plaintiff or responding to Plaintiff, and
Williams says that he did not sign the form letter.
Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. An investigator from
Stateville's Internal Affairs Unit testified, however,
that Williams would have gotten notice of Plaintiff's
alleged assault by staff members through a written
“reportable” that traveled up the chain of
command.  ¶¶ 15-17; see also [138-4]
should grant summary judgment when the moving party shows
that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and
the evidence weighs so heavily in the moving party's
favor that the moving party “must prevail as a matter
of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A
genuine dispute as to a material fact exists when, based upon
the evidence, a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To show a genuine
dispute as to a material fact, the non-moving party must
point to “particular materials in the record, ”
and cannot rely upon the pleadings or speculation.
Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir.
summary judgment, courts must evaluate evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and refrain from
making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.
Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2017)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party
bears the burden of establishing the lack of genuine disputes
as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Objectively Serious ...