United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
GLENN E. HURN, Petitioner,
STEVE KALLIS, Respondent.
ORDER & OPINION
BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge
matter is before the Court on a “Petition for
Reconsideration” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), (Doc. 19), and a “Motion to Substitute Party,
” (Doc. 20), filed by Glenn Hurn. For the reasons
stated below, both motions are DENIED.
1997, a general court-martial convicted Hurn of rape,
forcible sodomy, indecent acts, four specifications of
assault, and indecent assault, all involving a child under 16
years of age. (Doc. 17 at 1). The court-martial sentenced
Hurn to life in prison. After several appeals, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed Hurn's
convictions and sentence. See United States v. Hurn,
58 M.J. 199 (C.A.A.F. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
attempt to challenge his court-martial convictions, Hurn sent
an Application for Correction of Military Record to the Board
for Corrections of Naval Records (“BCNR”) in
December 2014, asking that his enlistment contract be
declared void, that he not be subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) of the duration of his
military service, and that his court-martial proceedings be
removed from his Official Military Personnel File. (Doc. 8-2
at 4-5). On July 18, 2016, the BCNR denied Hurn's
application on the merits. Id. at 1-3. The BCNR
reasoned that Hurn's 1992 enlistment contract was valid,
that Hurn certified that he understood its content and terms,
and that he agreed to subject himself to the UCMJ as a member
of the Armed Forces. Id. at 2.
September 5, 2017, Hurn filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with this Court. (Doc. 1).
In his petition, Hurn challenged the BCNR's decision
related to his application to correct military record. (Doc.
17 at 4). He also argued that his enlistment contract was
fraudulent and that 10 U.S.C. § 802, Article 2(a)(b)(c),
is unconstitutional “because it changes
Petitioner's legal status which deprives Petitioner of
Constitutional Rights and Article III procedural protections
constitutionally mandated in trials for purely civilian
offenses without due process.” Id.
6, 2018, this Court denied Hurn's petition. (Doc. 17).
The Court held that Hurn waived his arguments concerning his
military contract and its validity, as well as his arguments
challenging § 802 as unconstitutional, because he did
not show good cause for failing to raise those arguments
before the court-martial or on direct appeal. Id. at
8. The Court also found that Hurn abused the writ for
attempting to raise arguments he could have raised in his
first § 2241 petition before the District of Kansas.
Id. at 9. Lastly, the Court found that the
BCNR's 2016 administrative decision denying Hurn's
application to correct his military record was supported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 11-13.
19, 2018, Hurn filed a “Petition for
Reconsideration” pursuant to Rule 59(e), asking that
this Court alter or amend its June 6, 2018, Order &
Opinion. (Doc. 19). “A Rule 59(e) motion will be
successful only where the movant clearly establishes:
‘(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law
or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded
entry of judgment.'” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co.
v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698
F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)). Relief pursuant to a Rule
59(e) motion is an “extraordinary remed[y] reserved for
the exceptional case.” Foster v. DeLuca, 545
F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008). A manifest error “is not
demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is
the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.” Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Habeas petitioners like Hurn
cannot use Rule 59(e) as a way to relitigate issues already
addressed and denied by the Court. See Barnes v.
Lashbrook, No. 16-798, 2017 WL 2574021, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
June 14, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom., No.
17-2370, 2017 WL 6762224 (7th Cir. July 18, 2017).
vast majority of his motion, Hurn simply repeats arguments he
already raised in his § 2241 petition. (See
Doc. 19 at 1-4). Instead of alleging that this Court
made manifest errors of law or fact, Hurn alleges that
the BCNR made manifest errors of law or fact in
denying his Application for Correction of Military Record.
Id.; see Cincinnati Life Ins. Co., 722 F.3d
at 954 (“A Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only
where . . . the court commit[s] a manifest
asserts that the Court “did not scrutinize the facts to
make its own determination” independent of the
BCNR's determination and thus erred in
“Rubber-Stamping the BCNR's decision.” (Doc.
19 at 4). Hurn does not provide any legal support showing
that this Court committed manifest error in giving
substantial deference to the BCNR's determination. And,
in any event, Hurn is incorrect. The Court is not allowed to
substitute its judgment for the BCNR's and make an
“independent” determination of the facts. To the
contrary, as explained in the Order & Opinion, military
board decisions can be set aside only if they are arbitrary,
capricious or not based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 17 at
11). The military is entitled to substantial deference in
military personnel decisions. Id. at 13. The Court
did not apply the wrong legal standard, and Hurn's Motion
for Reconsideration (Doc. 19) is therefore denied.
Motion to Substitute Party (Doc. 20) is also denied, as Hurn
cannot “substitute” the BCNR as Respondent on
appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding.
reasons stated above, Hurn's “Petition for
Reconsideration” (Doc. 19) and Motion to ...