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Brown v. Cook County

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

June 26, 2018

CRYSTAL BROWN, et al., individually and for all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
COOK COUNTY, AMY CAMPANELLI, in her official capacity as Public Defender of Cook County, and THOMAS DART, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, Defendants. SDAHRIE HOWARD, et al., individually and for all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, and COOK COUNTY, Defendants. DIANA CALOCA, Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS DART, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, and COOK COUNTY, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          MATTHEW F. KENNELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This opinion addresses six motions to dismiss filed in three of four related lawsuits: Brown et al. v. Cook County et al. (Brown), Howard et al. v. Cook County Sheriff's Office et al. (Howard), and Caloca v. Cook County et al. (Caloca). These suits are related because they arise from the same pervasive and deeply disturbing problem: male detainees in Cook County Jail and courthouse lockups have been exposing themselves, masturbating, and otherwise sexually harassing female assistant public defenders, law clerks, court interpreters, correctional officers, court services deputies, deputy sheriffs, and health care providers. The plaintiffs in these cases are women who have been victims-often, repeat victims-of these forms of sexual harassment while attempting to do their jobs. They allege that their respective employers, the Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender (CCPD), Cook County, and the Cook County Sheriff's Office (CCSO), which is responsible for security in the jail and courthouse lockups, have not merely failed to protect them from such harassment, but have actually emboldened the harassers by enacting policies and engaging in practices that have led the harassers to believe that they may act with impunity.

         The defendants in Brown, Howard, and Caloca have moved separately under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the various federal and state claims against them. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the majority of these motions, but grants Cook County's motion to dismiss the Title VII claim against it in Howard and grants in part Dart's and Cook County's motions in Caloca.

         Discussion

         To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This plausibility threshold is not a probability requirement; instead, it simply requires that a plaintiff "give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together. . . . In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did they happen." Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017) ("[A] plaintiff need not plead detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, [but] she still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered adequate.") (citation omitted). On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint and draws all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 548-49. Legal conclusions and conclusory allegations that merely recite the elements of a claim, however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

         The defendants in Brown, Howard, and Caloca have filed a total of six somewhat overlapping motions to dismiss-two in each case. The Court will address each of the defendants' motions by case, starting with Brown, then proceeding to Howard and Caloca. The factual background set forth below is taken from the allegations contained in most recent version of the complaint filed in each case.

         A. Brown

         Over the last two years, female Assistant Public Defenders (APDs) and law clerks from the Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender have endured frequent and repeated sexual harassment in the Cook County jail and courthouse lockups. Because many of the clients that APDs represent are in custody, they often have no choice but to meet with their clients in the jail and lockups. These client meetings are not private-during such meetings, other detainees can see the APDs through the window, and they know that the APDs can see them. There has been an alarming increase in the number of incidents of detainees exposing themselves and / or masturbating while staring lewdly and aggressively at female APDs and law clerks through the window and engaging in other verbal sexual harassment and threatening behavior while they are meeting with their clients in the Cook County jail and lockups.

         In response to this ongoing problem, Crystal Brown and a number of other female Assistant Public Defenders (the Brown plaintiffs) have sued Public Defender of Cook County Amy Campanelli (in her official capacity), Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart (in his official capacity), and Cook County on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly situated persons. The Brown plaintiffs, all of whom have suffered repeated harassment of this nature in the jail and lockups, allege that the defendants have contributed to the creation of a discriminatory and hostile work environment in which sexual harassment is commonplace, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and equal protection (count 1 against Dart and Campanelli), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (count 2 against Dart, Campanelli, and Cook County), and the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, 740 ILCS 23/5 (count 4 against Dart, Campanelli, and Cook County). They also assert a Title VII retaliation claim against Campanelli (count 3) and a claim of indemnification against Cook County (count 5). See Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle Cty., 203 Ill.2d 497, 499, 787 N.E.2d 127, 129 (2003) ("Because the office of the sheriff is funded by the county, the county is therefore required to pay a judgment entered against a sheriff's office in an official capacity.").

         Dart has moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2 of the Brown plaintiffs' amended complaint, and Campanelli has filed a separate motion to dismiss all claims against her (counts 1-4). Cook County, which is named as a defendant in counts 2, 4, and 5 of the amended complaint, did not file its own motion to dismiss. Instead, it "joined" both Dart's and Campanelli's motions via footnote. See Dart's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Brown) at 1 n.1 ("Defendant Cook County also joins the instant motion."); Campanelli's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Brown) at 2 n.1 ("Cook County asserts that the arguments raised by Amy Campanelli in her Motion to Dismiss and this Memorandum also apply to Cook County, and therefore, respectfully requests that this honorable Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in its entirety."). Many of the arguments made by Dart and Campanelli are specific to those defendants and do not, in fact, apply to the County. In any case, because the Court denies both Dart's and Campanelli's motions to dismiss for the reasons explained below, Cook County's attempt to join those motions gets it nowhere.

         1. Dart's motion to dismiss

         a. Section 1983 equal protection claim (count 1)

         Dart argues that the Brown plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he contends that they have failed to plausibly allege an equal protection violation because (1) they do not allege that male APDs received greater protection from sexual harassment than female APDs because of their gender, and (2) they have not alleged facts that would allow for a reasonable inference that Dart or some other final policymaker in the Sheriff's Office acted with intent to discriminate against them because of their sex. Dart also notes that, by suing him in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Cook County, the Brown plaintiffs are effectively suing the Cook County Sheriff's Office. See Sow v. Fortville Police Dep't, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n official capacity suit is another way of pleading an action against an entity of which the officer is an agent."). He argues that the Court should therefore dismiss the Brown plaintiffs' equal protection claim for the additional reason that they do not plausibly allege that any CCSO policy or practice was the moving force behind the violation such that the Sheriff's Office may be held liable under section 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Not surprisingly, the Brown plaintiffs disagree. They contend that they have alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible equal protection claim against Dart under section 1983 and Monell.

         To hold a municipality or comparable entity liable for a constitutional violation pursuant to section 1983 and Monell, a plaintiff must show that an official policy, a widespread custom, or an action by an official with final policymaking authority was the "moving force" behind the alleged violation. Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must establish not only that the defendant's actions had a "discriminatory effect," but also that the defendant was "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Alston v. City of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2017). To state a Monell claim for an equal protection violation, therefore, a plaintiff must plead facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant "maintained a policy, custom, or practice of intentional discrimination against a class of persons to which [the plaintiff] belong[s]." McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (emphasis added). "Purposeful discrimination requires more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Dart contends that the Brown plaintiffs have failed to state an equal protection claim because they do not allege that the CCSO has provided male APDs with greater protection than female APDs with respect to the types of sexual harassment at issue in this case. The complaint itself states that the sexual harassment in question is "solely directed toward female employees and because of their sex." 1st Am. Compl. (Brown) ¶ 3; see also Id. ¶ 137 ("The sexual harassment is because of Plaintiffs' sex."). Because it is directed solely at women, the plaintiffs cannot and do not allege that the CCSO provides different levels of protection to male and female APDs when it comes to this particular type of harassment; there is no need to protect male APDs from a problem that does not affect them. Nonetheless, the Brown plaintiffs argue that Dart's intent to subject women to discriminatory treatment because of their sex can be reasonably inferred by contrasting the CCSO's response to this problem with the swift and decisive action it took in response to the physical assault of a male APD by a detainee in 2014. Specifically, in December 2014, after a male APD was physically assaulted by a detainee client during a meeting at the Cook County Jail, Dart instituted a policy requiring detainees to be handcuffed to a desk or other stationary object during such meetings. Although, as Dart points out, the 2014 incident is different in kind from the sexual harassment at issue in this case, the Court does not find it entirely irrelevant to the only question presented at this stage in the proceedings: whether the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient factual matter to state a plausible equal protection claim. Even if the CCSO cannot be said to treat male and female APDs differently with respect to this particular problem, this allegation must be considered in combination with the other factual allegations contained in the complaint.

         The Brown plaintiffs also allege that Dart's de facto policies and widespread practices have not just enabled detainees to continue sexually harassing female APDs and law clerks, but have in fact emboldened detainees to increase the frequency and severity of the harassment by leading them to believe that they may engage in such behavior with impunity. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Dart made the harassment worse by implementing several different solutions to the problem that actually seemed to be working, only to discontinue each of them a short time later. For example, in early 2017, Dart began handcuffing detainees while they were in lockup, which significantly decreased the incidents of masturbation and indecent exposure; after two weeks, however, because Campanelli objected to the practice, Dart discontinued it, and the harassment of female APDs and law clerks increased. Dart also briefly experimented with a requirement that detainees wear special jumpsuits that would prevent exposure and masturbation, but he lifted the requirement after a small group of detainees burned the jumpsuits using microwave ovens. Around May 2017, Dart again curbed the harassment by placing additional CCSO officers on duty in the lockups, but he withdrew the officers a short time later, claiming that he lacked sufficient funds from Cook County to keep them there. In response to female APDs' complaints, the CCSO policy director Cara Smith stated, "This is something that happens in custodial environments, period." Id. ¶ 110.

         Dart argues that far from serving as evidence of intentional discrimination, there is an obvious alternative explanation for his failure to implement an effective, long-term solution to this problem: he is making "good faith but less-than-completely-successful efforts” to curb the harassment, but he is hampered by a lack of resources and running into opposition from Campanelli (at least with respect to handcuffing detainees). Dart's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Brown) at 9. Although that is an entirely plausible explanation, at this stage of the case all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiffs, not Dart. Dart's alternative explanation is not so obvious that it renders the plaintiffs' version less than plausible; accordingly, the Court rejects it as a basis for dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim. See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) ("'Plausibility' in this context does not imply that the district court should decide whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than not. . . . For cases governed only by Rule 8, it is not necessary to stack up inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff's inferences seem more compelling than the opposing inferences.").

         Dart further contends that complaints about the CCSO's ineffectiveness in coming up with a long-term solution to curb the detainees' sexually abusive behavior cannot form the basis for an equal protection claim. In support of this argument, Dart cites Schroeder v. Hamilton School District, 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit noted in Schroeder that the plaintiff-a teacher who was harassed by students and parents because of his sexual orientation-seemed to take the position that the school district and its administrators violated his right to equal protection simply because the disciplinary and investigative measures it took in response to the harassment were "less than 100 percent effective." Id. at 956. The Seventh Circuit rejected that proposition, explaining that "[t]he defendants' failure to address, to Schroeder's satisfaction, his complaints of harassment does not . . . establish an equal protection violation." Id.

         In this case, however, the plaintiffs do not merely allege that Dart's attempts to put a stop to the harassment were less than 100 percent effective. As previously explained, the plaintiffs allege that Dart made the harassment worse by briefly implementing-and then quickly discontinuing-effective solutions to the problem. See 1st Am. Compl. (Brown) ¶¶ 6, 78-80. The plaintiffs further allege that Dart affirmatively acted to reward serial masturbators with pizza by enacting a program that "gave any detainee reported as having exposed himself or masturbated the opportunity to receive a pizza and / or pizza party if they . . . went 30 days without another sexual assault / masturbating incident." Id. ¶ 81. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a result of this program, detainees who had not previously engaged in such behavior were incentivized to do so in order to be eligible for a pizza reward thirty days later. The plaintiffs also allege that by allowing CCSO supervisors to discourage female employees from reporting sexual harassment and CCSO investigators to refuse to investigate it, and by failing to discipline detainees who sexually harass female employees, Dart has perpetuated the existence of this abusive and discriminatory work environment.

         This case is different from McCauley, in which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim against the City of Chicago where her complaint contained "only generalized allegations that the City failed to have specific policies in effect to protect [female] victims of domestic violence from harm inflicted by those who violate their parole or court orders of protection by committing acts of domestic violence." McCauley, 671 F.3d at 613. The Seventh Circuit explained in that case that allegations that the City "failed to single out domestic-violence victims as a class for special protection" did not plausibly suggest that the City denied such victims "equal protection" by intentionally omitting police protection from female domestic-violence victims as a class. Id. at 613, 619 (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs in the present case do not allege merely that Dart and the CCSO failed to single them out for special protection from private violence. As detailed above, they allege that specific CCSO policies and practices are responsible for creating an environment in which detainees believe they may sexually harass female APDs with impunity and have even incentivized such behavior.

         Lastly, Dart argues that the Brown plaintiffs' equal protection claim is deficient for the additional reason that the plaintiffs do not specifically allege that Dart or any other CCSO employees were motivated by a discriminatory animus against women. But, as the Seventh Circuit has explained, "abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements . . . do nothing to distinguish the particular case that is before the court from every other hypothetically possible case in that field of law. Such statements therefore do not add to the notice that Rule 8 demands." Swanson, 614 F.3d at 405 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). What matters is whether the factual allegations in a complaint are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although the plaintiffs do not allege in so many words that Dart acted with a discriminatory purpose, they allege that he "intentionally subjected Plaintiffs . . . to unequal and discriminatory treatment by requiring [them] to suffer incidents of assault, masturbation and / or indecent exposure by detainees . . . by knowingly refusing to protect [them] from this hostile work environment." 1st Am. Compl. (Brown) ¶ 126. And they provide the specific factual allegations detailed above in support of their claim. These factual allegations, taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, are sufficient to support a plausible inference of discriminatory effect as well as a plausible inference that Dart has intentionally failed to act appropriately to address the detainees' behavior toward female APDs because of their sex. See T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs did not need to prove discriminatory intent by showing that male and female victims were treated differently, because a jury could reasonably infer that the principal had a purpose of discriminating against girls based on their gender where plaintiffs offered evidence that the principal knew a teacher was abusing girls and deliberately helped cover it up). At the motion to dismiss stage, nothing more is required.

         Dart contends that even if the Court finds the Brown plaintiffs have stated an equal protection claim, the claim must nonetheless be dismissed because they do not plausibly allege that any CCSO policy or custom was the "moving force" behind the equal protection violation alleged, which is necessary for Monell liability under section 1983. The Court disagrees. As previously noted, the plaintiffs have alleged that Dart's official and de facto policies and practices have created an environment in which detainees are emboldened to sexually harass female APDs and law clerks. They have additionally alleged that certain of Dart's policies caused an increase in the frequency with which they experience sexual harassment. That is enough to plausibly allege that Dart's policies and practices were the moving force behind the equal protection violation alleged. The Court therefore denies Dart's motion to dismiss the Brown plaintiffs' equal protection claim.

         b. Title VII sex discrimination / hostile work environment claim (count 2)

         Dart has also moved to dismiss the Brown plaintiffs' Title VII claim against him on the ground that he is not their employer.

         To maintain a Title VII action against a defendant, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an employment relationship. Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Feb. 7, 1997). As assistant public defenders, the Brown plaintiffs are employees of Cook County. See Johnson v. Halloran, 194 Ill.2d 493, 498, 742 N.E.2d 741, 744 (2000); 1st Am. Compl. (Brown) ¶ 14. The Brown plaintiffs contend that they may nonetheless maintain a Title VII claim against Dart on the ground that his above-described policies and practices have interfered with their employment by creating a discriminatory work environment in the jail and lockups. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual," leaving open the possibility that an employer may be held liable for disparate treatment under Title VII by an individual with whom it is not in a direct employer-employee relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added); Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Courts in this district are divided with respect to how broadly this provision of Title VII should be read based solely on Congress's use of the word "individual" instead of "employee." Compare EEOC v. Foster Wheeler Const., Inc., No. 98 C 1601, 1999 WL 515524, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999) ("[A]n employee of one Title VII employer may sue a different Title VII employer whose discriminatory actions interfere with the employee's employment conditions.") with Kerr v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 229 F.Supp.2d 880, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("[T]his court concludes that [an interference] theory is unavailable in a Title VII action."). The Seventh Circuit has not expressly decided whether an entity that meets the definition of an employer may be held liable under Title VII for discriminatory conduct that interferes with a plaintiff's employment by a different employer. See Alexander, 101 F.3d at 493 n.2. In EEOC v. State of Illinois, 69 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1995), however, the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that it was "very doubtful that laws which forbid employers to discriminate create a blanket liability to employees of other employers for interference with their employment relationships." Id. at 169 (emphasis in original). It also suggested that such an interference theory would be limited to cases "in which the defendant so far controlled the plaintiff's employment relationship that it was appropriate to regard the defendant as the de facto or indirect employer of the plaintiff, as where a hospital prevents a nurse from being employed by a hospitalized patient." Id. It is undisputed that a de facto or indirect employer may be held liable as an employer under Title VII. See, e.g., Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2015); State of Illinois, 69 F.3d at 171.

         Although courts in the Seventh Circuit have used a number of different tests to determine whether a defendant may qualify as an indirect employer of a plaintiff in a given case, the most important consideration is the defendant's exercise of control over the plaintiff's employment relationship. Harris v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 890 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2018). The power to hire and fire is generally a key indicator of control, but the employer's control over other aspects of the employment relationship may be relevant if "related to the subject of the plaintiff's suit." Id. at 684; see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a Title VII claim against defendant under indirect / de facto employer liability theory where she alleged, in part, that the defendant controlled the very aspect of her job that formed the basis of her claim).

         Regardless of whether this Court is inclined to recognize some sort of interference theory of employer liability, it will therefore be necessary to consider the amount of control that Dart has over the plaintiffs' employment relationship in order to determine whether he may be held liable for the alleged Title VII violations. It is difficult to do this without a more fully developed factual record, which is probably why, in so many of the cases cited by both parties, such issues were determined at the summary judgment stage rather than on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 971 F.Supp.2d 862, 867-68 (E.D. Wis. 2013), aff'd, 779 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2015); Mays v. BNSF Ry. Co., 974 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1178-79 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Abbott v. Village of Westmont, No. 02 C 2296, 2003 WL 22071492, at *3-7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2003); Kerr, 229 F.Supp.2d at 883-89; Foster Wheeler, 1999 WL 515524, at *5-10. But see Douglas v. Univ. of Chicago, No. 14 CV 7244, 2015 WL 738693, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015), aff'd, 619 Fed.Appx. 556 (7th Cir. 2015); Tamayo v. Hamer, No. 06 C 3151, 2007 WL 1576528, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2007), rev'd in part, Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008). It is true that in Douglas v. University of Chicago, 619 Fed.Appx. 556 (7th Cir. 2015), the Seventh Circuit affirmed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a plaintiff's Title VII claim on the ground that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the defendant was either his employer or so far controlled his employment relationship that it was appropriate to consider it his de facto or indirect employer. Id. at 557. But in that case, the plaintiff's claim was based on a highly attenuated theory of control: the plaintiff, a retired economist, alleged that the University of Chicago's rejection of an article he submitted to one of its journals discriminatorily interfered with his prospective employment opportunities. Id. at 556-57. The Seventh Circuit found the dismissal appropriate because the plaintiff had "not plausibly alleged that the university journal's decisions about which articles to publish controlled any of his potential employment relationships to such an extent as to trigger the theory's application." Id. at 557. In the present case, by contrast, the connection between the allegedly discriminatory interference and the plaintiffs' employment is much less tenuous.

         The Brown plaintiffs do not allege that Dart has the ability to pay their salaries, supervise them, or hire and fire them. They have alleged, however, that Dart, in his capacity as the Sheriff of Cook County, not only is specifically responsible for "inmate control," but also has authority over and responsibility for the custody and care of the jail and courthouses in Cook County, which is where they allege they must meet their detainee clients and, crucially, where the allegedly discriminatory and hostile work environment exists. See 1st Am. Compl. (Brown) ¶¶ 2, 21-22, 152-154. Plaintiffs further allege that because visiting client detainees is an essential function of their jobs as assistant public defenders, the sexually abusive conditions that have been created and fostered by Dart's policies and practices in the jail and lockups interfere with their employment. These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The issue of whether Dart does, in fact, exercise sufficient control over plaintiffs' employment such that he may be held liable under some version of an interference theory-or simply an indirect employer theory-may be revisited at the summary judgment stage.

         2. Campanelli's motion to dismiss

         a. Section 1983 equal protection claim (count 1)

         Campanelli contends that the Brown plaintiffs' equal protection claim against her should be dismissed for many of the same reasons argued by Dart and discussed above. First, Campanelli argues that the plaintiffs' own allegations show that she lacked the requisite discriminatory intent to be held liable under the Equal Protection Clause. She further contends that despite the plaintiffs' attempt to draw comparisons between her response to the 2014 assault of a male APD and her response to the current situation, they have not alleged facts sufficient to plausibly support their claim that she intentionally treated incidents involving sexual harassment of female APDs differently from incidents of assault involving male APDs; nor have the plaintiffs alleged that she has deliberately responded ineffectively to this problem while enacting effective policies against the harassment of male APDs. Campanelli further argues that she has very little control over the problem, because it is Dart-not the Cook County Public Defender-who is responsible for the jail and courthouse lockup environments. Lastly, Campanelli contends that the Brown plaintiffs have not stated a claim to relief against her under Mo ...


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