United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
of Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson (Doc. 205), which
recommends denying two pending Motions for Preliminary
Injunction filed by Plaintiff Durwyn Talley (Docs. 197, 198,
202). The Report and Recommendation was entered
on February 23, 2018. Talley filed a timely objection on
February 28, 2018 (Doc. 207) and a second, supplemental
objection on March 6, 2018 (Doc. 210). For the following
reasons, the Court modifies the Report and Recommendation and
denies the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
facts of this case have been recited by the Court on numerous
occasions. On September 21, 2015, Talley, an inmate of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),
filed a pro se Complaint stating that he was in
imminent danger at Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 1). The
Complaint alleges Defendants were aware Talley had a gang hit
out against him for being a “stool pigeon, ” and
that the hit was supposed to occur in May 2015. Talley
alleges his request for protective custody was denied in
retaliation for filing repeated grievances and lawsuits, in
violation of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. Talley
also claims he received death threats from other inmates and
prison officials, who told him he would be beaten or killed
if he continued with his court filings. The Complaint
requests a transfer to Pontiac Correctional Center, placement
in protective custody, and a single cell. On January 5, 2017,
Talley was permitted to proceed on a second count, an Eighth
Amendment violation for failure to protect him from an
excessive risk of harm (Doc. 106).
has filed a number of motions for preliminary injunction
since filing his Complaint, all of which have been denied. In
his current motions, filed in February 2018, Talley seeks to
enjoin Defendants Spiller, Monje, IDOC Director John Baldwin
(in place of former Director Donald Stolworthy), the Warden
of Western Correctional Center and “other
defendants” from intercepting, altering, failing to
file, and failing to give him copies of his court documents
(Doc. 197). Talley also wants to enjoin IDOC Director John
Baldwin, Spiller, Monje “and all of their agents
statewide” from failing to protect him and to stop
Joseph Jennings, the head of Internal Affairs in Springfield,
from directing this misconduct against him statewide (Docs.
198, 202). On May 31, 2018, Talley was transferred to Big
Muddy River Correctional Center (Doc. 229).
Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson
concluded that a preliminary injunction is not warranted in
this case because there is no reasonable likelihood Talley
will prevail on the merits of the case (Doc. 205). As the
Court has repeatedly found, Talley bases his allegations,
including his belief that there is a vast conspiracy to harm
him, on conjecture and speculation that has no basis in fact.
Thus, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson found it is highly unlikely
Talley will be able to show his First Amendment activity was
“at least a motivating factor” in Defendants'
Judge Wilkerson also found that Talley's requests for
injunctive relief are unrelated to the allegations in this
lawsuit, which concern Defendants' refusal to place in
him in protective custody at Menard in retaliation for filing
grievances and lawsuits. Rather his motions for preliminary
injunction involve interference with court filings and a
failure to protect by employees at Western Correctional
Center. Because the preliminary injunctive relief sought must
relate to the claims pending in the underlying lawsuit, and
the requests here only tangentially relate to the retaliation
claim against Menard employees, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson
found Talley is not entitled to injunctive relief.
objected to the Report and Recommendation on February 28,
2018 (Doc. 207), arguing he is proceeding on both a
retaliation and a failure to protect claim. Talley
also takes issue with Magistrate Judge Wilkerson's
conclusion that his allegations are based upon pure
speculation. Talley then accuses Magistrate Judge Wilkerson
of taking sides, having already decided the case, and
depriving Talley of a fair trial. Talley filed a supplement
on March 6, 2018 (Doc. 210) and provided an exhibit showing
he was allowed to proceed on a failure to protect claim in
addition to his retaliation claim.
timely objections are filed, this Court must undertake a
de novo review of the Report and Recommendation. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); SDIL-LR
73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824
F.Supp. 786, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Govas v.
Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). The Court
must look at all of the evidence contained in the record and
give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific
objections have been made. Id. (quoting 12 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3076.8, at p. 55 (1st ed. 1973) (1992 Pocket Part)).
The Court may then accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the magistrate judge's recommended decision.
Harper, 824 F.Supp. at 788.
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic
remedy” for which there must be a “clear
showing” that a plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)
(quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R Miller, & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948 (5th ed.
1995)). The purpose of an injunction is “to minimize
the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution
of the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841
F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). To be granted an injunction, a
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, no adequate remedy at
law, and irreparable harm absent the injunction. Planned
Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept.
Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012).
the first hurdle, the Court must determine whether the
“plaintiff has any likelihood of success-in other
words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.”
AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d
796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). “The absence of an adequate
remedy at law is a precondition to any form of equitable
relief.” Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984). The requirement
of irreparable harm eliminates those cases where, although
the ultimate relief sought is equitable, the plaintiff can
wait until the end of trial to get that relief. Id.
Only if the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the
interim-that is, before a final judgment-can he obtain a
preliminary injunction. Id.
the plaintiff has met his burden, the Court must weigh
“the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction
is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an
injunction on the public interest.” Id.;
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir.
2013). “This equitable balancing proceeds on a
sliding-scale analysis; the greater the likelihood of success
of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip
in the moving party's favor.” Korte, 735
F.3d at 665.
Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a preliminary
injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further
than necessary to correct the harm . . ., ” and
“be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit
has described injunctions like the one sought here, requiring
an affirmative act by the defendant, as a mandatory
preliminary injunction. Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio,
130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory injunctions are
“cautiously viewed and sparingly issued, ...