United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Keenon J. Farr, who is currently incarcerated in the Federal
Correctional Institution at Greenville, Illinois, brings this
habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
claiming that his indictment was defective and his attorney
was ineffective during his criminal proceedings. (Doc. 1).
This matter is now before the Court for review of the
Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing §
2254 Cases in United States District Courts, which provides
that upon preliminary consideration by the district court
judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives this Court
the authority to apply the rules to other habeas corpus
cases. Following careful review of the Petition in the
present case, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not
entitled to relief, and the Petition must be dismissed.
Farr pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute crack
cocaine, see 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. §
846, and was sentenced in June 2016 to 125 months'
imprisonment, No. 15-cr-40055-JPG-4 (S.D. Ill. June 17,
2016). His July 2016 deadline for appealing passed without an
appeal. In August 2017, Farr moved under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 to vacate the conviction and sentence. No. 17-cv-872-JPG
(S.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2017). His relevant claims included that
his underlying indictment was flawed and that his counsel was
ineffective. Noting the one-year statute of limitations under
§ 2255(f), the district court invited Farr to explain by
early September 2017 whether and how it could consider his
motion timely. Farr did not respond, and in October 2017, his
§ 2255 motion was dismissed with prejudice. No.
did not appeal the dismissal. He later sought leave from the
Seventh Circuit to file a second § 2255 motion seeking
to reassert his challenge to the indictment and his
challenges to his attorney's pre-plea performance and
post-plea failure to submit a notice of appeal. Citing §
2244(b)(1)'s bar on claims asserted in previous
collateral attacks, and the limit on successive collateral
attacks under § 2244(b)(2) and 2255(h) to claims based
on new and retroactive constitutional rules or new and
decisive evidence of innocence, the Seventh Circuit denied
Farr's request. No. 17-3472 (7th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018).
has reasserted the same grounds in his petition in the
instant case (Doc. 1) that he brought in his original §
2255 action and sought to bring in a successive § 2255
action. In fact, four of the pages in Farr's petition in
this action are identical to pages in his original §
2255 petition. See (Doc. 1, pp. 10-13); No.
17-cv-872-JPG, Doc. 1, pp. 12-15. Thus, Farr's claims are
clearly barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a).
Farr had not already attempted to bring these claims, they
are not appropriate for a § 2241 action and would
therefore fail regardless. As a general matter, “28
U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provide federal
prisoners with distinct forms of collateral relief. Section
2255 applies to challenges to the validity of convictions and
sentences, whereas § 2241 applies to challenges to the
fact or duration of confinement.” Hill v.
Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.
2000). A § 2255 motion is ordinarily the
“exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his
conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214,
217 (7th Cir.2003).
does not attack the duration of his confinement. Instead, he
is attacking his conviction claiming that his indictment was
defective and his counsel was ineffective. Therefore, §
2241 does not appear to be the appropriate avenue for relief.
However, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that it is
possible, under very limited circumstances, for a prisoner to
challenge his federal conviction or sentence under §
2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a “savings
clause” which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a
§ 2241 petition where the remedy under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See United
States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir.
Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within
the savings clause, a petitioner must meet three conditions.
First, he must show that he relies on a new statutory
interpretation case rather than a constitutional case.
Secondly, he must show that he relies on a decision that he
could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion and
that case must apply retroactively. Lastly, he must
demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental
defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave
enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).
has not met this standard. Whether or not any other condition
is met, Farr does not rely on any cases that were decided
after his sentence in June 2016, much less after his §
2255 motion was filed in August 2017. All of his arguments
could therefore have been brought, and were brought to some
extent, in his § 2255 petition.
the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of