United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Robinson
Correctional Center (“Robinson”), brings this
pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition.
The Complaint is now before the Court for a preliminary
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner
complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion
of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks
for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that “no
reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.”
Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on
its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations
as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th
Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be
liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d
742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff's
claims survive threshold review under Section 1915A.
alleges that he suffers from an eye condition (which he does
not name) that has caused his eyesight to deteriorate. (Doc.
1, p. 5). While he was in the Cook County Jail, he was
referred to Stroger Hospital for treatment with shots in his
eyes. The doctor there told Plaintiff that if he did not get
those shots, he would go blind. Id. According to
Plaintiff, the IDOC and “Wexford Medical
Department” have medical records documenting
Plaintiff's treatment at Stroger Hospital.
2017, Plaintiff was transferred to Robinson. He has seen a
doctor several times, and was taken to an outside hospital,
but he has never been given the shots that he needs to
prevent blindness. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). His eyes have become
worse, and for nine months Plaintiff has never been sent to
an outside doctor for the injections he needs. Plaintiff
alleges that he has asked for help numerous times, but help
has been denied. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
“Grievance Procedure” section of the form
Complaint, Plaintiff states that he talked to Martin (the
Robinson Health Care Administrator) about a referral. Martin
told Plaintiff “it was up to Springfield” to
approve his treatment. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Dr. Shah repeated this
same information when Plaintiff spoke to him. Id.
appears to be seeking injunctive relief to be given treatment
for his eye condition, as well as money damages. (Doc. 1, p.
Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to divide the pro se action into
two counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as
to their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in the
Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
considered dismissed without prejudice.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against Martin and Shah, for failing to
pursue timely authorization for Plaintiff to receive
specialist treatment for his serious eye condition;
Count 2: Claims against the Illinois
Department of Corrections, Robinson Correctional Center,
Wexford Medical Department, and Carrell, in connection with
Plaintiff's need for specialist ...