United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Maurice
McClinton's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 12). In the
Motion, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Wexford Health
Sources and Daniel Lynn should not have been dismissed from
this action when the Court referred this case to the
Magistrate Judge (see Doc. 12, p. 1). For the
reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
Order Referring Case (Doc. 7) is an interlocutory order.
Requests for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are
governed by the Court's inherent power to modify and
revise non-final orders at any time prior to the entry of
final judgment. See, e.g., Kapco Mfg. Co.,
773 F.2d at 154 (“A court always ha[s] the power to
modify earlier orders in a pending case.”);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (providing that non-final orders
“may be revised at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties'
rights and liabilities.”).
Motion, Plaintiff claims that Wexford Health Sources should
not have been dismissed because Nurse Casey did not
“promptly and appropriately” tend to his illness
“as a result of Wexford Health Sources policy.”
(Doc. 12, p. 1). Plaintiff also claims that he “stated
the wrong claim” against Defendant Lynn. Id.
He seeks to bring a retaliation claim against Lynn, because
“he only did what he did because of what Plaintiff was
doing.” Id. Plaintiff also believes he brought
an adequate due process claim against Lynn based on his
alleged “protective conduct” and his
“covering up evidence.” Id.
Wexford, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not
applicable to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus Wexford cannot be liable
for deliberate indifference based solely on the actions of
its employee Nurse Casey. Instead, as noted in this
Court's previous Order (Doc. 7), a corporation can be
held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a
policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a
constitutional right. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of
Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). See
also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766
n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though
it were a municipal entity in a Section 1983 action).
a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the
‘deliberate action attributable to the
[corporation] itself is the “moving force”'
behind the deprivation of his constitutional rights.”
Johnson v. Cook Cnty., 526 Fed.Appx. 692, 695 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citing Bd. of the Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (citing Monell v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978))).
Further, “[a] municipality's culpability for a
deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim
turns on a failure to train.” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985) (“[A]
‘policy' of ‘inadequate training'”
is “far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed
from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in
extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against Wexford based
on an unconstitutional policy, the Complaint is devoid of
facts supporting that such a policy exists. His assertion in
his Motion that Nurse Casey failed to act as a result of a
Wexford policy is conclusory and, while it may well be
relevant to Plaintiff's claims, it does not provide a
basis for reconsidering the challenged order. If Plaintiff
believes a policy of Wexford was the moving force behind his
alleged inadequate medical care, he may seek to file an
amended complaint alleging facts supporting such a claim. The
Court is confident in its finding that Plaintiff did not
adequately state such a claim in the original Complaint.
Defendant Lynn, Plaintiff's assertions that his actions
were retaliatory are new and were not in his Complaint. The
Court will not reconsider its Order based on allegations not
found in the Complaint. If Plaintiff seeks to bring a
retaliation claim against Lynn, he may attempt to do so
through an amended complaint in which he alleges facts
supporting such a claim.
respect to Plaintiff's claim that he stated an adequate
due process claim against Lynn for “protective
conduct” and “covering up evidence, ” his
allegations in the Complaint to this effect are minimal and
conclusory. The due process clause is triggered when the
government deprives an individual of life, property, or
liberty. See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). Decisions and
actions by prison authorities which do not deprive an inmate
of a protected liberty interest may be made for any reason or
for no reason. Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641,
644 (7th Cir. 2001) (when no recognized liberty or property
interest has been taken, the confining authority “is
free to use any procedures it chooses, or no procedures at
all”). Plaintiff did not claim in the Complaint that
Lynn's “protective conduct” aimed at
“covering up evidence” deprived him of life,
property, or liberty, so the Court finds no reason to revise
its Order finding no sufficient claim against Lynn.
has not made any arguments warranting reconsideration of this
Court's Order Referring Case, and thus his Motion to
Reconsider (Doc. 12) is DENIED.