Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Murray v. Werlich

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

May 17, 2018

KENNETH MURRAY, Petitioner,
v.
T.G. WERLICH, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          CLIFFORD J. PROUD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Kenneth Murray, an inmate in the custody of the BOP, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1).

         Petitioner was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), he argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because his three prior convictions for violation of Mo. Rev. Stat § 195.211 do not constitute “serious drug offenses” within the meaning of § 924(e).

         Relevant Facts and Procedural History

         In March 2007, Murray pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the Western District of Missouri. United States v. Murray, No. 06-cr-00272-NKL. The docket sheet for that case is attached to Doc. 14 as Exhibit 4.[2] There was no plea agreement. Because he had at least three prior convictions for serious drug offenses, he was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment.

         The presentence investigation report stated that Murray had three prior convictions for sale of a controlled substance in violation of Missouri law. Doc. 15 (sealed) at p. 9. At sentencing, the district judge determined that those three convictions constituted three separate convictions for serious drug offenses and therefore he qualified as an armed career criminal under § 924(e). See, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Doc. 14, Ex. 2.

         On direct appeal, Murray argued that his three prior convictions should have been considered as a single prior conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Doc. 14, Ex. 6. Murray filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 invoking Johnson v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2251 (2015), which was dismissed in March 2017. Doc, 14, Ex. 8.

         Applicable Legal Standards

         1. Availability of § 2241

         A prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. A motion under § 2255 is ordinarily the “exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to bringing only one motion under § 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second or successive” motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either 1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense, ” or 2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

         However, it is possible, under very limited circumstances, for a prisoner to challenge his federal conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit construed the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): “A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”

         The Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on a decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion and that case must apply retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). See also, Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012).

         2. The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)

         The ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years on a person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has three prior ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.