United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. Dow, Jr. Judge
the Court is Plaintiffs' motion  for reconsideration
of the Court's October 3, 2017 order dismissing all but
one of the claims in Plaintiffs' third amended complaint.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion  is denied.
This case is set for further status on May 8, 2018, at 9:00
Tina Turner and James Garner lived next to a local branch of
M.B. Financial Bank, located near Sherman Park in Chicago,
Illinois. [86, ¶¶ 11, 12.] M.B. Financial
“contracted with Digby's Detective & Security
Agency, Inc.” (“Digby”) to provide
“armed security guard services” for its branches,
and Digby stationed Andre Lamb as a security guard at the
Sherman Park branch on October 30, 2013. Id.
¶¶ 8, 13. At approximately noon that day, Plaintiff
Turner was approached by Defendant Lamb while Plaintiff was
in the alley between her home and the bank branch.
Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lamb
“ran off Bank property and into the alley and aimed a
gun at Turner's head, shouting, ‘Don't you
f*cking move or I'll blow your brains out.'”
Id. ¶ 14. Defendant Lamb then grabbed Turner;
dragged her by the arms and body out of the alley
“toward the public sidewalk”; yelled,
“I'm taking you inside the Bank”;
“violently attacked” Turner on the ground;
“and pulled her arms behind her back to restrain
her.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. During these
events, Plaintiff Garner allegedly walked outside the house
and yelled at Defendant Lamb to release Turner. Id.
¶ 18. Defendant Lamb then “slammed Turner to the
ground and used his fully body weight to restrain
Turner” as Bank employees watched. Id.
¶¶ 19, 20.
minutes later, ” an unidentified “White-Shirt
Officer” arrived and then “violently jerked
Turner's arms backwards and yelled at her to ‘get
up.'” [86, ¶¶ 22-25.] Turner alleges that
she did not resist-indeed, she could not resist because
Defendant Lamb was still “sitting on her.”
Id. ¶ 28. “The White-Shirt Officer then
handcuffed Turner's hands behind her back, ” and
Defendant Lamb got up from sitting on her. Id.
¶ 30. Defendants Officer V. L. Wathen, Officer E.E.
Kujawa, and other officers “arrived on the scene during
the course of the struggle.” Id. ¶ 31.
Turner complained that she needed medical attention, but was
placed in a patrol car for 30 minutes. Id. ¶
32. She was ultimately taken to a hospital and released back
into police custody, after which she was charged with
misdemeanor offenses, including battery and littering.
Id. ¶ 34. Eventually, these charges were
dismissed. Id. Plaintiffs contend that these actions
were taken in retaliation for unrelated lawsuit that
Plaintiffs had filed against the City of Chicago, several
officers, and M.B. Financial nearly a year earlier.
Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
on these events, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in December
2014. Plaintiffs proceeded on their own for more than a year.
After an arrangement with prospective counsel fell through
[see 60], Plaintiffs filed a motion for recruitment of
counsel in March 2016. The Court granted the motion, and
through counsel Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint in
November 2016 asserting thirteen claims against eight
defendants, including the City of Chicago. [86.] Plaintiffs
brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive
force, false arrest, and conspiracy, as well as state law
claims for malicious prosecution, assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, respondeat
superior, and indemnification. The first time that Plaintiffs
identified Defendants Lamb and Officers Wathen and Kujawa by
name was the third amended complaint, filed on November 16,
all Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' third amended
complaint, the Court dismissed all but one of Plaintiffs'
claims-an excessive force claim against the City of Chicago
under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of
New York, 536 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The Court dismissed
Counts I-IX as time-barred against the police officer
Defendants and Defendant Lamb, as Plaintiffs failed to
identify these Defendants by name before the statute of
limitations on Plaintiff's claims against these
Defendants expired and Plaintiffs failed to show that they
acted with the diligence necessary to invoke equitable
tolling. Because Count XII (against Digby), Count XIII
(against M.B. Financial Bank), and Counts X and XI (against
the City of Chicago) were contingent on these time-barred
claims, the Court dismissed these claims as well. That left
Plaintiffs' two § 1983 claims. Because Count II did
not describe any of “the City's policies and
practices” regarding false arrests and there were no
specific allegations regarding these specific policies and
practices anywhere else in the complaint, the Court concluded
that Count II was not viable under Monell, 536 U.S.
at 694, and dismissed the claim. Before the Court is
Plaintiffs' motion  for reconsideration of the
Court's October 3, 2017 decision dismissing all but one
of Plaintiffs' claims.
bring their motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59. However, because there has not yet been a
final judgment in this case, Rule 54(b) governs
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Under Rule 54(b),
“any order or other decision [ ] that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the
claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties' rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b); see also Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal &
Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir.), opinion amended on
denial of reh'g, 835 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming
district court's denial of motion to reconsider under
under Rule 54(b) are discouraged and should be reserved for
circumstances in which the initial decision was
“clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice.” See Ghashiyah v. Frank, 2008 WL
680203, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2008) (quoting
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 817 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
general, “litigants must fight an uphill battle in
order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
to reconsider under Rule 54(b) “are judged by largely
the same standards as motions to alter or amend a judgment
under Rule 59(e).” Ghashiyah, 2008 WL 680203,
at *3. The Court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or
amend the judgment if the movant presents newly discovered
evidence that was not available at the time of trial, points
to evidence in the record that clearly establishes a manifest
error of law or fact, or if the Court previously
misunderstood a party's arguments. Miller v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am., 683 F.3d 805, 813 (7th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.
2008). Rule 59(e) “enables the court to correct its own
errors and thus avoid unnecessary appellate
procedures.” Miller, 683 F.3d at 813 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 59(e) motions are
“not appropriately used to advance arguments or
theories that could and should have been made before the
district court rendered a judgment, or to present evidence
that was available earlier.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
“‘manifest error' is not demonstrated by the
disappointment of the losing party. It is the
‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.'” Oto v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F.Supp. 1063, 1069
(N.D. Ill. 1997)). “A party moving for reconsideration
bears a heavy burden and its motion must be supported by a
showing of extraordinary circumstances.” Id.
(citing Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI
Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)).
moving for reconsideration, Plaintiffs do not argue that the
Court erred in concluding that their claims against the
police officer Defendants and Defendant Lamb would be barred
by the statute of limitations absent the application of
equitable tolling. Nor do Plaintiffs argue that the Court
erred in concluding that Count XII (against Digby), Count
XIII (against M.B. Financial), and Counts X and XI (against
the City of Chicago) should be dismissed if the underlying
claims against the police officer Defendants and Defendant
Lamb are dismissed.
Plaintiffs appear to be arguing that the Court should
reconsider its October 3, 2017 decision because Plaintiffs
“have been repeatedly subjected to injustice by
Defendants before and or while this case has been pending * *
*, making it virtually impossible for Plaintiffs to prove
their case.” [133, at 1.] In support of this argument,
Plaintiffs cite to failed settlement discussions,
dissatisfaction with recruited counsel, and documents from
2004 to 2016 that Plaintiffs contend demonstrate that
Defendants harassed them. However, all of the facts and
evidence relied upon by Plaintiffs either were cited in their
response to Defendants' motions to dismiss or could have
been. Plaintiffs are not entitled to
reconsideration based on evidence that was available earlier.
Miller, 683 F.3d at 813; Conditioned Ocular
Enhancement, Inc. v. Bonaventura, 458 F.Supp.2d 704, 707
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Reconsideration is not an
appropriate forum for rehashing previously ...