United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
ORDER AND OPINION
E. SHADID CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Petitioner Redding's Petition (Doc.
1) for Writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For
the reasons set forth below, Redding's Petition (Doc. 1)
Redding was charged in a four-count indictment in the
District of Minnesota on July 8, 1992. Each count of the
indictment alleged that Redding, a felon, possessed a firearm
or ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)
and 924(e)(1). See Presentence Report, Doc. 9, at 3.
On November 12, 1992, a jury convicted Redding of three of
the four counts alleged in the indictment. At sentencing, the
court determined that Redding's prior felony convictions
qualified him for an enhanced sentence under Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(1), and imposed a term of imprisonment of 327 months.
Redding's ACCA enhanced sentence was based on six prior
felony convictions. Three of those convictions were 1987
Minnesota state court convictions for aggravated robbery; the
other three were Illinois state court convictions for
robberies between 1975 and 1979. United States v.
Redding, 16 F.3d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1994). Redding
appealed his conviction and sentence, and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. United States v. Redding, No. CR 4-92-116
(D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 298 (8th Cir.
1994). Redding also filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 collaterally attacking his sentence, but it was denied
by the district court, and the district court's judgment
was subsequently affirmed on appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
Redding v. United States, 105 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th
nearly 25 years of incarceration, Redding was released from
custody on March 18, 2016. However, five years of supervised
release proved to be four and a half years too long for
Redding. After violating the terms of his supervised release,
he was sentenced on January 18, 2017 to an additional 5
months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release.
Doc. 23, at 2. He fared no better the second time around-his
supervised release was again revoked on August 30, 2017, and
he was subsequently sentenced to a term of 14 months of
imprisonment with no term of supervised release. Id.
Redding was serving his sentence for his first violation of
supervised release, he filed the instant Petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Therein, Redding argues that he was
improperly sentenced as an armed career criminal because
neither his Illinois nor his Minnesota convictions should
have counted as violent felonies. Doc. 1, at 5-7. The
Government filed a Response (Doc. 23), to which Redding filed
a Reply (Doc. 28). This Order follows.
federal prisoners who seek to collaterally attack their
conviction or sentence must proceed by way of motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, the so-called “federal
prisoner's substitute for habeas corpus.”
Camacho v. English, 16-3509, 2017 WL 4330368, at *1
(7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017) (quoting Brown v. Rios, 696
F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)). The exception to this rule is
found in § 2255 itself: a federal prisoner may petition
under § 2241 if the remedy under § 2255 “is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Under the
“escape hatch” of § 2255(e), “[a]
federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus
only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier
judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction
or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255
motion.” In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611
(7th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held that
“alternative relief under § 2241 is available only
in limited circumstances: specifically, only upon showing
that (1) the claim relies on a new statutory interpretation
case; (2) the petitioner could not have invoked the decision
in his first § 2255 motion and the decision
applies retroactively; and (3) there has been a fundamental
defect in the proceedings that is fairly characterized as a
miscarriage of justice.” Montana v. Cross, 829
F.3d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom.
Montana v. Werlich, 137 S.Ct. 1813 (2017).
argues in his Petition that (1) his Illinois robbery
convictions were not violent felonies because he never
possessed a weapon or made any threats to any person; and (2)
his Minnesota convictions should not have been considered
because he was not advised of his constitutional rights in
the state court proceedings, citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Doc. 1, at 6-7. Redding
also cites the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v.
United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), though he does not
explain how it applies to his case.
petitioner who seeks to invoke the savings clause of §
2255(e) in order to proceed under § 2241 must establish:
(1) that he relies on ‘not a constitutional case, but a
statutory-interpretation case, so [that he] could not have
invoked it by means of a second or successive section 2255
motion ….' ” Montana v. Cross, 829
F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998)). As the
Government rightly points out, Redding does not meet the
first requirement for proceeding under § 2241 because he
does not rely on a new statutory interpretation case. Doc.
23, at 6. With respect to his Minnesota aggravated robbery
convictions, Redding argues only that he was not advised of
his constitutional rights under Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969). But Boykin was a constitutional
case decided 20 years before Redding's federal criminal
case, not a statutory interpretation case decided after his
conviction became final or his first § 2255 motion was
decided. Thus, Redding fails to meet even the initial
threshold for proceeding under § 2241.
Redding were able to show that his three Minnesota aggravated
robbery convictions did not qualify as predicate violent
felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), his remaining
three Illinois robbery convictions also qualify as predicate
offenses unaffected by Mathis, Section 924(e)(2)(B)
defines “violent felony” as any felony that
“has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another.”
Unsurprisingly, the Illinois robbery statute Redding was
convicted under provided that “[a] person commits
robbery when he takes property from the person or presence of
another by the use of force or by threating the imminent use
of force.” Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 18-1(a)
(1975). The Illinois statute thus “ha[d] as an element
the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another.” § 924(e)(2)(B).
See Doc. 23, at 11.
Redding cannot show that § 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention, he may not
collaterally attack ...