United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
David Weisman United States Magistrate Judge
sues defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
conspiring to, violating, and failing to intervene to prevent
the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and for
state-law conspiracy, malicious prosecution, respondeat
superior, and indemnification. Defendants have filed a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6)
to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies the motion.
8, 2016, plaintiffs daughter called the May wood Police
Department because her brother, Xavier, was brandishing a
weapon. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Defendant Pope Patterson
(hereinafter "Pope") and defendant Patterson
(hereinafter "Patterson") responded to the call and
went to the second floor of plaintiffs home, where Xavier was
located. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) When Patterson
reached the top of the stairs, he grabbed Xavier, and a
struggle ensued. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff
and his wife, who were on the second floor landing, saw the
struggle and told Xavier to stop arguing with the police.
(Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Defendant Pope then told
plaintiff and his wife to go downstairs, which they did.
(Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)
plaintiff and his wife were downstairs, defendant Smith
arrived and went to the second floor. (Id. ¶
20.) Shortly thereafter, plaintiff and his wife heard loud
noises from upstairs and Xavier shouting '"they
choking me'" and '"I can't
breathe.'" (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff and
his wife ran back to the top of the stairs where they could
see Xavier lying on the floor of his bedroom with defendant
Pope's knee on his chest, defendant Patterson's hands
on his throat, and defendant Smith standing over them.
(Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) When plaintiff protested,
defendant Smith obstructed plaintiffs view of the bedroom.
(Id. ¶ 26.)
moments later, defendant Patterson dragged Xavier from the
bedroom in a headlock, and with defendants Pope and Smith,
took Xavier downstairs. (Id. ¶ 30.) As he left
the house, defendant Smith "placed his arm against the
front door preventing Plaintiff and his wife from leaving
their home and recording the event." (Id.
¶ 32.) Defendant Patterson told plaintiff he could
retrieve Xavier from the Maywood Police Department, after
Xavier had been processed. (Id. ¶ 36.)
plaintiff went to the Maywood Police Department to get his
son. (Id. ¶ 38.) He saw defendant Pope there
and told her he wanted to file a complaint against
defendants. (Id. ¶ 41.) Defendant Pope refused
to give plaintiff a complaint form, and subsequently told
defendants Smith and Daniels to arrest plaintiff, which Pope
later told plaintiff she did "simply because she
could." (Id. ¶¶ 42-49.)
that day, defendant Smith drafted a police report stating
that plaintiff was arrested for obstructing an officer in
violation of 515 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/1-200. (Id.
¶¶ 48, 52.) The report states that "Plaintiff
attempted to prevent Officer A. Pope from assisting in the
arrest of Xavier by standing in front of her."
(Id. ¶ 53.) Defendant Pope signed a
criminal complaint alleging that plaintiff "violated 515
ILCS 5/1-200 by failing to obey a lawful order of a peace
officer through refusing to allow the arrest of his
son." (Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff was in custody
for seven hours before he was released on bond. (Id.
1, 2016, a court found there was probable cause for
plaintiffs arrest. (Id. ¶ 55.) At a bench trial
on December 14, 2016, defendant Pope falsely testified that
plaintiff prevented her from going upstairs to assist
defendant Patterson. (Id. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff was
acquitted of the charge (id. ¶ 58), and this
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
'"constru[es] the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all
well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible
inferences in [plaintiffs] favor.'" Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081
(7th Cir. 2008)). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations" but must contain "enough facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
Count I, plaintiff asserts a § 1983 false arrest claim,
i.e., that he was arrested without probable cause.
See Neita v. City of Chi., 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th
Cir. 2016) ("To prevail on a false-arrest claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable
cause for his arrest."); Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of
the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010)
(stating that the existence of "[p]robable cause is an
absolute bar to a claim of false arrest asserted under the
Fourth Amendment and section 1983"). "Probable
cause exists if, at the time of the arrest, the facts and
circumstances within the defendant's knowledge are
sufficient" to make a prudent person believe that the
suspect has committed an offense. Stokes, 599 F.3d
at 622 (quotation omitted). Defendants contend that plaintiff
was charged with obstructing a police officer and that the
complaint essentially admits the facts supporting the charge.
(See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF 14 at 4.)
are mistaken. The statute plaintiff says he was charged with
violating, 515 Ill. Comp Stat. 5/1-200 (see Compl.
¶ 54; Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF 14 at 4), does not
prohibit obstruction of the duties of police officers.
Rather, the statute makes it "unlawful for any person to
resist or obstruct any officer or employee of the Department
[of Natural Resources] in the discharge of his or her duties
under th[e] [Fish and Aquatic Life] Code." 515
Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/1-200; see 515 Ill.Comp.Stat.
5/1-1; 515 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/1-35. If that is true, and for the
purposes of this motion the Court must assume that it is,
then there is nothing in the complaint that suggests there
was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for this offense. For
example, nowhere in the complaint is there a suggestion that
Pope was employed by the Department of Natural Resources at
the time of the alleged incident. Accordingly, the Court
denies defendants' motion to dismiss Count
Count III, plaintiff asserts a Fourth Amendment claim for
malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide
what elements are required to state such a claim following
the Supreme Court's recognition of it in Manuel v.
City of Joliet, III,137 S.Ct. 911, 919 (2017). See
Id. ("If the complaint is that a form of legal
process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by
probable cause, then the right allegedly infringed lies in
the Fourth Amendment."). However, other circuits and
lower courts in this district have held that such a claim
requires allegations that defendants initiated a criminal
proceeding against the plaintiff, without probable cause,
which caused plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of liberty,
and the proceeding ended in plaintiffs ...