United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
Charles R. Norgle Judge.
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
 is granted. The Court orders the trust fund officer at
Plaintiffs place of incarceration to deduct $24.07 from
Plaintiffs account for payment to the Clerk of Court as an
initial partial payment of the filing fee and to continue
making monthly deductions in accordance with this order. The
Court directs the Clerk of Court to electronically send a
copy of this order to the Supervisor of the Inmate Trust Fund
Accounts at the Cook County Jail. Summonses shall not,
however issue at this time. Plaintiffs complaint  is
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff must 5-31-18, 2018,
submit: (1) an amended complaint that rectifies the
deficiencies explained below; and (2) a completed USM-285
(Marshals Service) form for each Defendant named in the
amended complaint. Plaintiffs failure to comply with this
order by that date will result in dismissal of this case. The
Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff a civil rights
amended complaint form and one USM-285 (Marshals Service)
form, along with a copy of this order. Plaintiffs motion for
attorney representation  is denied without prejudice to
later renewal if this case progresses.
Milton Presley, a Cook County Jail detainee, brings this
pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, against the Cook County Jail and Sheriff Thomas
J. Dart, regarding several incidents that have occurred
during his detention. Before the Court are Plaintiffs
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
complaint for initial review, and motion for attorney
Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
has demonstrated that he cannot prepay the filing fee, and
thus, his application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1), (2), the Court orders: (1) Plaintiff to
immediately pay (and the facility having custody of him to
automatically remit) $24.07 to the Clerk of Court for payment
of the initial partial filing fee and (2) Plaintiff to pay
(and the facility having custody of him to automatically
remit) to the Clerk of Court twenty percent of the money he
receives for each calendar month during which he receives
$10.00 or more, until the $350 filing fee is paid in full.
Plaintiff must pay twenty percent of his covered monthly
income toward each filing fee he has incurred.
See Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S.Ct. 627, 632 (2016)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). As this is Plaintiffs
second case in this district in which leave to proceed in
forma pauperis has been granted, see Presley v.
Chicago Police Dep't, 18 C 0145 (Dkt. 8), 40% of his
monthly income must be devoted toward his filing fees, where
that income meets the requirements of the PLRA. The Court
directs the Clerk to ensure that a copy of this order is
mailed to each facility where Plaintiff is housed until the
filing fee has been paid in full. All payments shall be sent
to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 219
South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn:
Cashier's Desk, 20th Floor, and should clearly identify
Plaintiffs name and the case number assigned to this case.
Review of Plaintiff's Complaint
Court next considers Plaintiffs complaint. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoners'
complaints and dismiss the complaint, or any claims therein,
if the Court determines that the complaint or claim is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an
immune defendant. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
214 (2007); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649
(7th Cir. 2013). Courts screen prisoners' complaints in
the same manner they review motions to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Maddox v. Love,
655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).
complaint must include "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain
statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomhly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted). The statement also must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face, " which
means that the pleaded facts must show there is "more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). When screening a pro se plaintiffs
complaint, courts construe the plaintiffs allegations
liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam). Courts also must "accept all
well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inference in
the plaintiffs favor." Roberts v. City of
Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
performing its review of an inmate's complaint, the Court
must "be alert to th[e] problem" of litigants
pursuing a "scattershot strategy" of
"toss[ing] into a single complaint a mishmash of
unrelated allegations against unrelated defendants."
Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017).
In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2007), the Seventh Circuit explained:
A party asserting a claim to relief... may join, either as
independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal,
equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing
party. Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine,
but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with
unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims
against different defendants belong in different suits ....
507 F.3d at 607. Here, Plaintiff attempts to assert claims
arising from no fewer than six issues that have arisen during
his detention, which appear to be separate and attributable
to different potential Defendants: (1) Plaintiff allegedly
should be, but is not, apparently due to a decision by a
medical screener at intake, housed in "a medical housing
unit" due to a seizure condition; (2) Plaintiff had a
seizure when a correctional officer sprayed him with mace,
and the officer then wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket;
(3) Plaintiff had an infected tooth that he believes was not
treated appropriately by medical personnel at the jail; (4)
correctional officials shackled Plaintiff hand and foot by
while he was undergoing an oral surgery; (5) Plaintiff
"had an altercation with another detainee, " who
bit him, and Plaintiff "wasn't given proper medical
treatment" or the chance to press charges; and (6) he
has submitted grievances because medical personnel generally
"are not very good at their job."
attempts to raise these issues in a single lawsuit,
presumably under a theory that Sheriff Thomas Dart-the only
individual defendant to this action-is vicariously liable for
the complained-of conduct. Supervisors, however, are not
liable merely because they oversee others who allegedly
violate an inmate's rights. See Kinslow v.
Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Instead, to
be held liable under section 1983, an individual must have
caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.
Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012);
Pepper v. Vill. of Oak Park 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th
Cir. 2005). Accordingly, supervisors can only be held
responsible for the constitutional violations of their
subordinates only if the violation occurred at the
supervisor's direction or with his or her knowledge and
consent. See Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of
Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus,
for example, Sheriff Dart cannot be held liable under section
1983 merely because he oversees jail operations, as Plaintiff
appears to seek to do; there is no suggestion (and it does
not appear at all likely) that Dart was personally involved
in each incident Plaintiff mentions.
allegations of the complaint also do not permit an inference
that any single individual is responsible for all events
Plaintiff listed. On the contrary, those events appear not to
be related in a legal sense insofar as they involve distinct
and separate conduct performed by different individuals or
categories of individuals. For example, the individuals
responsible for medical care are different from the
individuals responsible for dental care, spraying Plaintiff
with a chemical agent, shackling Plaintiff during dental
treatment, or determining his housing placement. It is also
often the case that an inmate sees different medical
personnel on different dates or for different ailments, so it
is not even proper in all instances, under George,
to include all medical treatment issues, which might
otherwise seem to be "related, " within in the same
case. Applying the rationale of George, any claim
Plaintiff has against the individuals responsible for medical
care for a particular issue may not be pursued in the same
lawsuit as any claim he has against different individuals
responsible for treating a different medical issue, providing
dental care, spraying Plaintiff with a chemical agent,
shackling Plaintiff, or determining his housing placement.
SeeGeorge, 507 F.3d at 607; Wheeler v.
Talbot,695 Fed.Appx. 151, 152 (7th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that unrelated claims should not be joined in
same lawsuit); Vermillion v. Levenhagen, No.
14-2327, 2015 WL 927356, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015)
(discussing analysis concerning joinder of parties and claims
and also explaining that district court has discretion to
sever any "discrete and ...