United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
DAVID W. CRITES, Petitioner,
MADISON COUNTY JAIL, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, DISTRICT JUDGE
David W. Crites filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on March 26, 2018. (Doc.
1). In the Petition, he seeks release from Madison County
Jail (“Jail”) in order to receive physical
therapy and treatment for various medical conditions.
Petitioner is presently confined at the Jail awaiting trial
on a charge of criminal trespass in Illinois v.
Crites, No. 2018-CF-000119 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 16,
2018). As discussed in more detail below, the Court concludes
that the Petition does not survive preliminary review under
Rule 4 and Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts.
requests a medical release from the Jail. (Doc. 1, p. 8). He
claims that he needs physical therapy due to a severe dog
bite. Id. He also seeks a court order for
diabetes-related seizure medication. Id. Petitioner
claims he is experiencing “[t]he same abuse and more
because of prior law suit.” Id. Petitioner
believes release is an appropriate remedy so that he can get
treatment from the Veteran's Administration or the
Illinois Department of Human Services. Id. He claims
he is having seizures and is not receiving medication.
Id. He also has a pending lawsuit in this District,
Crites v. Lakin, No. 15-cv-677-JPG-RJD (S.D. Ill.
June 19, 2015), in which he alleges certain Madison County
officials have been deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs, including those related to his diabetes.
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases in United States
District Courts provides that upon preliminary consideration
by the district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to
notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives
this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody
upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “If a
prisoner is not challenging the fact of his confinement, but
instead the conditions under which he is being held, [the
Seventh Circuit has] held that [he] must use a § 1983 or
Bivens theory.” Glaus v. Anderson,
408 F.3d 382, 386 (2005) (citing Graham v. Broglin,
922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)).
If the prisoner is seeking what can be fairly described as a
quantum change in the level of custody-whether outright
freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and
financial constraints of bond or parole or probation, . . .
then habeas corpus is his remedy. But if he is seeking a
different program or location or environment, then he is
challenging the conditions rather than the fact of his
confinement and his remedy is under civil rights law, even
if, as will usually be the case, the program or location or
environment that he is challenging is more restrictive than
the alternative he seeks.
Id. at 386-87. Though it is available in the context
of habeas proceedings, release is not an available remedy for
a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim. Glaus,
408 F.3d at 387. “If an inmate established that his
medical treatment amounts to cruel and unusual punishment [or
violates his due process rights], the appropriate remedy
would be to call for proper treatment, or to award him
damages; release from custody is not an option.”
Id. (citing Gomez v. United
States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1990);
Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 (9th Cir.
1979); Cook v. Hanberry, 596 F.2d 658, 660 (5th Cir.
his request for release, petitioner's claims focus solely
on the conditions, rather than the fact, of his confinement.
His only allegations involve his need for medical care and
the failure of Jail medical providers to treat him. He may
not proceed with his habeas corpus Petition based on these
claims. Glaus, 408 F.3d at 388.
in the past, courts sometimes construed a mistakenly-labeled
habeas corpus petition as a civil rights complaint, see,
e.g., Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir.
1991) (collecting cases), in more recent cases the Seventh
Circuit has held that district courts should not do this.
Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002);
Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 24 (7th Cir. 1997).
It would be particularly inappropriate to recast
petitioner's action here, because he would face obstacles
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Specifically,
petitioner is responsible for paying a much higher filing fee
of $400. Furthermore, petitioner might be assessed a
“strike” if the Court determined that his action
was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Therefore, the Court will not re-characterize the instant
habeas Petition as a complaint under the civil rights act.
petitioner is advised that the Madison County Jail is not a
proper respondent in a habeas action generally. The
respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding is the person who
has immediate custody over the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. §
2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35
(2004); Rules 2(a) and (b) of the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts. A jail or
institution is not a person. The only proper respondent in a
habeas action for an incarcerated prisoner is his
custodian-the warden of the prison or jail. See Hogan v.
Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Bridges v. Chambers, 425 F.3d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 2005)
(any respondent who is not the prisoner's custodian
should be dropped).
HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated above, the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice to
petitioner bringing another habeas claim based on his medical
issues, but without prejudice to ...