United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
WILLIAM E. HAWKINS, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
William E. Hawkins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 17, 2018. (Doc.
1). The petition was dismissed on January 26, 2018 (Doc. 4),
and he filed an Amended Petition on March 9, 2018. (Doc. 8)
In the amended petition, petitioner once again seeks early
termination of his parole imposed in relation to Count 2 of
his criminal case, United States of America v.
Hawkins, No. 90-cr-30067-DRH (S.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2018)
(“Criminal Case”). (Doc. 4). As discussed in more
detail below, the Court concludes that the Amended Petition
survives preliminary review under Rule 4 and Rule 1(b) of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
Criminal Case, petitioner sought early termination of his
supervised release and parole in late 2017. Criminal Case,
Docs. 638, 641, 647. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1),
the Court granted petitioner's request to terminate his
supervised release, finding that supervision could not offer
him or the public anything further given his demonstrated
rehabilitation. Criminal Case, Doc. 651. The Court denied
petitioner's request for termination of his parole,
imposed in association with Count 2 of his criminal case under
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), however, noting that it did not
have the authority to do so outside the context of a habeas
corpus proceeding. Id. at pp. 1-2.
response, petitioner filed this action on January 17, 2017.
(Doc. 1). In his original petition, petitioner referred to:
(1) his Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release,
filed October 19, 2017 in his Criminal Case, (2) his Pro Se
Motion to Terminate Supervised Release Term, filed October
23, 2017 in his Criminal Case, (3) his Addendum Motion for
Early Termination of Supervised Release Under Count 2, Old
Law Sentence, filed December 15, 2017 in his Criminal Case,
and (4) the Court's Memorandum and Order filed January 9,
2018 in his Criminal Case. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). These documents
were attached to the original petition as Exhibits 1-4,
Court dismissed the original petition for failure to present
grounds supporting petitioner's request for termination
of his parole, aside from his statement that the “Court
does not have the authority to terminate petitioner's
parole without the consideration of a habeas corpus
petition.” (Doc. 4). The Court gave petitioner leave to
file an amended petition, which he did. In it, petitioner
argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) grants the Court the
authority to terminate his parole. (Doc. 8).
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases in United States
District Courts provides that upon preliminary consideration
by the district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to
notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives
this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody
upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Parole is a
form of ‘custody', so it is proper to use §
2241 to contest its continuation.” See Valona v.
United States, 138 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1998). The
Seventh Circuit has suggested that district courts do not
have the authority to terminate terms of parole early outside
the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, despite their
ability pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) to terminate
a term of supervised release without one. See Kendrick v.
Hamblin, 606 Fed.Appx. 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2015).
amended petition, petitioner points to a district court that
found, in a situation similar to his, that “[t]he
weight of authority confirms that § 3583(e)(1)
authorizes termination of statutorily mandated term of
supervised release resulting from a pre-2002 conviction under
§ 841(a).” (Doc. 8, p. 2) (citing United
States v. Harris, 258 F.Supp.3d 137, 143 (D.D.C. 2017)
(citing United States v. Spinelle, 41 F.3d 1056,
1056-57, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.
McClister, No. 2:02-CR-87 TS, 2008 WL 153771, at *1-*2
(D. Utah Jan. 14, 2008); United States v. Scott, 362
F.Supp.2d 982, 983-84 (N.D. Ill. 2005); United States v.
Vargas, 564 F.3d 618, 622-23 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Simmons, No. 05 CR. 1049, 2010 WL
4922192, at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2010); U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release
35 (July 2010))).
the reasoning in Harris may apply to
petitioner's situation to enable him to seek termination
of his parole based on his pre-2002 § 841(a) conviction,
and Kendrick suggests that a habeas petition is the
appropriate avenue for this challenge, the Court declines at
this stage to find that petitioner is not entitled to habeas
relief. Further briefing from the parties is necessary before
the Court will make such a determination.
petitioner is on parole, the proper respondent for a habeas
action brought by him is the parole board, which has the
authority to impose conditions on his release. See Jones
v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). In this case,
petitioner is under the jurisdiction of the United States
Parole Commission. (Doc. 1, p. 39). Thus, the United States
of America will be dismissed as the respondent in this
action, and it will be replaced by the United States Parole