United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Defendants Benton, Keane, Taylor and the
Illinois Department of Correction's (“IDOC”)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 125). For the following
reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
and Background Facts
Marc Norfleet is an inmate who uses a wheelchair for his
mobility. On November 17, 2015, Norfleet filed the instant
action, alleging violations of his constitutional and
statutory rights while he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”) (Doc. 1).
Norfleet's claims stem from being housed in a four-person
cell with another wheelchair bound inmate and two
non-disabled inmates. The Court reviewed Norfleet's
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and he was
allowed to proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: Defendants Keane, Taylor and Benton
subjected Norfleet to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment when they knowingly and
with deliberate indifference forced Plaintiff to live in an
Count 2: Defendant IDOC violated Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., when it forced
Norfleet to live in an overcrowded cell.
(Doc. 5, pp. 3, 12).
was incarcerated at Pinckneyville at all times relevant to
this action (Doc. 125, ¶ 1). It is undisputed that
IDOC's policies require placement of disabled inmates in
ADA cells (Doc. 126, p. 10) and the ADA cells at
Pinckneyville house four people (See Doc. 126, p.
14). It is also undisputed that the ADA cells are larger than
other cells at Pinckneyville and contain grab rails near the
toilets (Doc. 126-1, pp. 82-82).
testified in deposition, however, that the cells are not in
fact ADA compliant because by including the bunkbeds, four
people are forced to use space that was designed for two
disabled individuals (Doc. 126-1, 67:14-22). Norfleet's
cell contained two bunk beds, a desk, two chairs, a toilet,
sink and shelves that protrude from the wall (Doc. 126-1, pp.
70, 71, 72, 79). As a result of the additional individuals in
the cell, personal property could not be properly stored and
was therefore left in the middle of the floor or under the
desk or sink, making those spaces inaccessible (Doc. 126-1,
72:23-75:6). As a result, Norfleet had to ask other inmates
to move their belongings in order to use the toilet and sink
(Doc. 126-1, 41:9-13), or at times was simply unable to
access the toilet and was forced to urinate into an
“empty bottle” (Doc. 1, p. 12).
about October 28, 2014, Norfleet was attacked by one of his
non-disabled cellmates (Doc. 126-1,
48-21-49:12). He alleges that this incident was a direct
result of the overcrowding of the cell (Doc. 126-1,
admits that he never spoke with Defendants Keane, Taylor or
Benton directly about the overcrowding issue (Doc. 126-1,
113:5-7; 116:18-21; 110:8-21). It is undisputed, however,
that the denial of Norfleet's appeal regarding the
overcrowded cell was signed by both Taylor and Benton (Doc.
153-2, p. 120). Further, Defendant Keane admitted in
deposition that as the statewide ADA Compliance Officer for
IDOC, he takes an active consulting role whenever an offender
files a grievance stating he has an ADA issue (Doc. 153-2,
judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black
Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins.
Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the burden of establishing that no
material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the
existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the
moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 160 (1970); See also Lawrence v. Kenosha
County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the
non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to
which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323.
Amendment Conditions of Confinement
of confinement do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless
they constitute in effect the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 297 (1991). Two elements are required to establish a
violation of the Eighth Amendment due to conditions of
confinement. First, the plaintiff must show that the
conditions deny the inmate “the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities, ” creating an
excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Second,
the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a
subjectively culpable state of mind; specifically, ...