United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Reona J. Daly United States Magistrate Judge
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff Pierre
Jordan filed his complaint against C/O Weber for harassing
and retaliating against Plaintiff. More specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Weber violated his rights
under the First and/or Eighth Amendments by verbally and
sexually harassing him, intimidating him, and making
retaliatory threats toward him after he filed grievances
complaining about Weber's actions. Plaintiff's claims
against Weber were severed from Plaintiff's original
claims in Jordan v. Lamb, et al., Case No.
the filing of his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (Doc.
16). The matter has been referred to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge David R.
Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a
Report and Recommendation. It is RECOMMENDED
that the District Court ADOPT the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
DENY Plaintiff's Motion.
current motion for preliminary relief alleges that Warden
Lamb, Assistant Warden Brookhart, and Law Librarian Dunlap
are retaliating against him and denying him access to the
Courts at Lawrence Correctional Center
(“Lawrence”). He also alleges that ARB
Chairperson Sherri Benton has denied him due process. In
particular, Plaintiff alleges that once he transferred to
Lawrence, Brookhart allowed law clerks to look at his
confidential legal materials, instructed the law library to
not put him on the legal deadline list in order to visit the
law library, and closed the library for three weeks.
Plaintiff sent a request to Sherri Benton at the ARB
regarding the closure of the library, and it was later
opened. Despite the library re-opening, Plaintiff was deemed
to have too many legal materials in his legal box during a
was subsequently transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”), where he is currently incarcerated.
It appears that he has been unable to review materials from
his legal storage box while at Pontiac. Plaintiff argues that
Sherri Benton is biased against him and he seeks an order
against numerous individual officers and wardens at Lawrence
and Pontiac preventing them from denying his access to the
courts, using excessive force against him, and violating his
due process rights.
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) may issue
without notice only if: (1) specific facts in an affidavit or
verified complaint clearly show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (2)
the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts
made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be
required. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b).
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic
remedy” for which there must be a “clear
showing” that Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)
(quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R Miller, & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948 (5th ed.
1995)). The purpose of such an injunction is “to
minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate
resolution of the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v.
Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff
has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law; and
(3) irreparable harm absent the injunction. Planned
Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept.
Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). As to the
first hurdle, the Court must determine whether
“plaintiff has any likelihood of success - in other
words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.”
AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d
796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). If Plaintiff meets his burden, the
Court must then weigh “the balance of harm to the
parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also
evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public
interest.” Id. In addition, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act provides that a preliminary injunction
must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm . . ., ” and “be
the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a preliminary
injunction would bind only the parties, their officers or
agents, or persons in active concert with the parties or
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a
TRO and/or preliminary injunction is warranted in this case.
Notably, there is no apparent relationship between the facts
and allegations contained in Plaintiff's motion and those
in the Complaint. Indeed, the only defendant in this case is
Correctional Officer Weber, who is not mentioned in
Plaintiff's motion. As the main purpose of a preliminary
injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of
the parties until a trial on the merits can be held, ”
University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395
(1981), it is not clear how the relief Plaintiff seeks would
accomplish such purpose.
in order to demonstrate entitlement to preliminary relief,
Plaintiff would need to establish that irreparable harm will
result if injunctive relief does not issue. Because he does
not allege in ways specific to this case that his
lack of access to the law library or legal materials has
prevented him from pursuing his claims against Weber, he has
failed to meet his burden. To the contrary, his ability to
file his request for injunctive relief, as well as his
ability to maintain seven pending cases in this District
tends to suggest that his lack of access to materials is not
impeding his access to the courts at this juncture. The Court
also notes that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at
Lawrence. Therefore, an injunction directed at employees of
Lawrence would be ineffective to accomplish Plaintiff's
foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 16) be
DENIED, and that the Court adopt ...