United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
JOSEPH FERENZI, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated members of the Chicago Police Department, Plaintiff,
CITY OF CHICAGO, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Z. LEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Joseph Ferenzi, an officer with the Chicago Police
Department, brings this action, claiming that Defendant City
of Chicago has failed to include a $350 Fitness Pay Incentive
in its computation of Ferenzi's regular hourly pay rate
and, as a result, has paid him less in overtime wages than
was due. Ferenzi contends that this conduct violates §
207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and Illinois Minimum
Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1,
et seq. Ferenzi has filed a motion for summary
judgment on Count I of his First Amended Complaint, which
seeks a declaratory judgment that the City's conduct
violates the FLSA. In turn, the City has filed a motion for
summary judgment as to all three counts in Ferenzi's
complaint. In addition, the City has filed a motion to strike
one of Ferenzi's exhibits. For the reasons given below,
the City's motion for summary judgment is granted, and
Ferenzi's motion is denied. The City's motion to
strike is stricken as moot.
Joseph Ferenzi is a City of Chicago police officer.
Def.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 4, ECF No. 119.
Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal corporation
organized under Illinois law, and it established the Chicago
Police Department. Id. ¶ 3.
is a union member subject to a collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”), and he is represented by the
Fraternal Order of Police. Id. ¶ 7; Pl.'s
LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 5, ECF No. 81. Under the CBA,
“non-probationary” officers such as Ferenzi are
entitled to a Physical Fitness Incentive (“FPI”)
of $350 paid annually as a lump sum if they voluntarily
satisfy certain physical fitness tests, including sit-ups,
running, and bench presses. Id. ¶¶ 11-13.
The test must be taken outside of customary working hours.
Def.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 13. A “Letter of
Understanding and Agreement Regarding Physical Fitness”
states that it is an “effort to promote physical
fitness” among covered officers. Pl.'s LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt., Ex. 1 at 2, ECF No. 81-2.
received the FPI payment in each of the past three years of
his employment. Def.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 14;
Pl.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 10. He signed a form
agreeing that participation in the FPI was voluntary, that he
was participating on his own time, and that it did not
constitute an on-duty activity. Id. The test
standards and results of the testing are not subject to the
grievance procedure in the CBA. Pl.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt.
City has not included the $350 FPI in its computation of
Ferenzi's regular rate of pay, for purposes of computing
what overtime rate he would be due under the
FLSA. The parties also agree that, for each of
the three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, Ferenzi
worked in excess of 171 hours in at least one 28-day period.
Def.'s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl.'s LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 15.
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Shell
v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015). To survive
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and
instead must “establish some genuine issue for trial
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her
favor.” Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674
F.3d 769, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2012).
evidence considered for summary judgment “must be
admissible if offered at trial, except that affidavits,
depositions, and other written forms of testimony can
substitute for live testimony.” Malin v. Hospira,
Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2014). The
Court gives the nonmoving party “the benefit of
conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences that
could be drawn from it.” Grochocinski v. Mayer
Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir.
Rule 56 “requires the district court to grant a motion
for summary judgment after discovery ‘against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.'” Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of
Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 743 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Once the moving party has
sufficiently demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the nonmoving party must then set forth
specific facts showing there are disputed material facts that
must be decided at trial. See id. at 321-22.
First Amended Complaint, Ferenzi alleges that the City
willfully failed to include the $350 FPI in its computation
of his regular hourly pay rate. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21,
ECF No. 42. According to the complaint, since the FLSA and
the IMWL require overtime payments of 1.5 times the regular
pay rate, his overtime pay was lower than required. In Count
I, he seeks a declaratory judgment that the City's
conduct willfully violates the FLSA, as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In Count II, he seeks monetary
damages for the alleged FLSA violation. In Count III, he
alleges a violation of the IMWL, and he seeks damages and
seeking summary judgment on these claims, the City argues
that Ferenzi has not presented any evidence that he has
standing to bring his FLSA and IMWL claims. Because ...