United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. DOW, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court are the motion to dismiss  filed by Assistant
State's Attorney Paul Joyce and the County of Cook
(together, the “Cook County Defendants”) and the
motion to dismiss  filed by the Town of Cicero, Detective
Jason Stroud, Detective John Savage, Detective Eduardo
Zamora, Detective Alfred Auriemma, and Detective Attilio
Fiordirosa (together, the “Town Defendants”). For
the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions to
dismiss [25; 28] are granted. To the extent Plaintiff's
claims are dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff is given
until April 27, 2018 to file an amended complaint, if
Plaintiff believes he can cure the deficiencies identified
below. The case is set for status on May 2, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.
March 6, 2011, Plaintiff Luis Roldan was arrested by officers
of the Cicero Police Department and was later charged with
three counts of criminal sexual assault of J.T. [1, at ¶
16.] On the night of March 6, 2011, Plaintiff arrived at the
home of his friend's aunt, where his friend Abraham Ramos
and other individuals-including J.T.-had been drinking vodka.
Id. at ¶¶ 20-22. Plaintiff brought some
orange juice, which the group used to make mixed drinks.
Id. at ¶ 22. After the group played some
drinking games, id., Plaintiff, Ramos, J.T., and one
of J.T.'s friends went to Walgreens to get some more
orange juice. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff and J.T.
kissed inside of the Walgreens. Id. at ¶ 24.
J.T. then got into an argument with Ramos outside of the
Walgreens. Id. Plaintiff alleges that after this
fight, J.T. asked him to have sex with her, and they had sex
in his car. Id. at ¶ 25. J.T.'s friends
testified that she seemed fine when they subsequently
returned to the home of Ramos's aunt. Id. at
¶ 26. J.T. even made a video with one of her friends to
post on Facebook. Id. at ¶ 26. The video
indicated that J.T. was able to respond to her friend's
questions and to walk without difficulty. Id. J.T.
later had sex with Ramos in a bathroom. Id. at
¶ 28. Ramos testified that the sex was consensual.
Id. After J.T. left the bathroom, she went to lie
down in a bed in the home. Id. at ¶ 29. Her
parents found her a few minutes later-apparently unconscious
and wearing boy's pants-after they were contacted by
parents of one of J.T.'s friends.
and Ramos were charged with three counts of criminal sexual
assault, on the theory that J.T. was so intoxicated as to
render her unable to willingly consent. J.T. testified that
it was her first time drinking. People v. Ramos,
2016 WL 634864, at *1 (Ill.App.Ct. Feb. 16,
2016). J.T. also testified that she did not
remember anything after she fought with Ramos outside of the
Walgreens. Id. at ¶ 31.
January 7, 2013, after a bench trial, Plaintiff and Ramos
were both found guilty of criminal sexual assault.
Id. at ¶ 32. The Illinois Appellate Court
reversed both Plaintiff's and Ramos's convictions,
finding that the state presented insufficient evidence to
prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
17, 2017, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants under
§ 1983. Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief,
that J.T. had requested Assistant State's Attorney Paul
Joyce and/or another assistant state's attorney for
assistance in obtaining a U-Visa, which provides temporary
legal status and work eligibility in the United States for a
period of four years. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff
further alleges that Defendant Joyce, Detective Jason Stroud,
Detective John Savage, Detective Eduardo Zamora, Detective
Alfred Auriemma, and Detective Attilio Fiordirosa all knew
about this request but failed to disclose it to the judge or
the defense attorneys. Id. at ¶¶ 39-42.
Plaintiff purports to bring (1) a § 1983 claim for
deprivation of his right to a fair trial and for wrongful
conviction, (2) a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim for
malicious prosecution, (3) a Monell Claim against
the Town of Cicero, (4) a Monell Claim against Cook
County, and (5) state law claims. Before the Court are the
motions to dismiss filed by the Cook County Defendants 
and the Town Defendants .
survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
complaint first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given “fair notice
of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original). Second, the factual
allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the
possibility of relief above the “speculative
level.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or a
‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) is proper “when the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of
entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
558. In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiff's
well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Killingsworth v.
HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.
2007). However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the
well-pleaded facts of the complaint must allow the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
Langworthy v. Honeywell Life & Acc. Ins. Plan,
2009 WL 3464131, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2009) (citing
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
Cir. 2011)). Evaluating whether a “claim is
sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is
‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.'” Id. (quoting McCauley,
671 F.3d at 616).
preliminary matter, there appears to be some confusion among
the parties as to what claims are raised by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff brings claims titled “Deprivation of Right to
Fair Trial and for Wrongful Conviction” (Count I), and
“Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Malicious
Prosecution” (Count II). Defendant Joyce argues that
Count I of the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim, asserting that there is no cause of action for
“wrongful conviction.” All the individual
Defendants argue that Count II of the complaint should be
dismissed, as the Seventh Circuit presently does not
recognize a federal claim for malicious prosecution.
respect to Count I, Plaintiff responds that he sufficiently
has alleged a wrongful conviction claim because the complaint
alleges that Defendants failed to disclose material as
required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972), violating Plaintiff's right to a fair trial.
Rabe v. United Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 872
(7th Cir. 2011). Thus, regardless of how Count I is titled,
Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that he seeks to bring a
due process claim based on Defendants' alleged failure to
disclose information as required by Brady and
respect to Count II, Plaintiff argues that because of the
Supreme Court's decision in Manuel v. City of Joliet,
Illinois et al., 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017), federal claims
for malicious prosecution are now viable in the Seventh
Circuit. Before Manuel, Seventh Circuit precedent
held that pretrial detention following the start of the legal
process could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim.
Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.
2001). Although such claims could be brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a plaintiff
bringing such a due process claim would have to show that
state law failed to provide an adequate remedy. Fox v.
Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). The
availability of a state-law claim for malicious prosecution
foreclosed such a finding. Id. In Manuel,
the Supreme Court held that “pretrial detention can
violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but
also when it follows, the start of the legal process in a
criminal case.” 137 S.Ct. at 918. However, the Supreme
Court did not hold that there is a federal claim for
malicious prosecution. Rather, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Seventh Circuit to determine the elements of, or
rules applicable to, a Fourth Amendment claim challenging
pretrial detention after the start of the legal process.
Id. at 922. Contrary to Plaintiff's position,
the Seventh Circuit has concluded that “nothing in
Manuel changed the general rule that the federal
constitution does not codify state tort law.” Hurt
v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831, 843 (7th Cir. 2018). In any
event, the fact that Plaintiff has used the terminology
“malicious prosecution” is of no moment. What
matters is whether Plaintiff has identified the
constitutional right at issue. Based on the allegations in
the complaint, it appears Plaintiff is seeking to bring a
Fourth Amendment claim challenging his arrest and continued
addition to the claims raised in Counts I and II against the
individual Defendants, Plaintiff also brings Monell
claims (Counts III and IV) and state-law claims (Counts V and
VI) against the Town of Cicero and Cook County. The Court
addresses the arguments raised for dismissing each of these
claims in turn.
Due Process ...