from the Circuit Court of the 9th Judicial Circuit, McDonough
County, Illinois, Circuit No. 13-CF-60 Honorable William E.
Poncin, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and
1 Defendant, Aaron Zetterlund, appeals his conviction
contending that the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS
150/3(b) (West 2012)) and other related statutes applicable
to sex offenders (collectively, the SORA statutory scheme)
are unconstitutional. We affirm.
3 The State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault
(720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2012)). The evidence at trial
established that on March 9, 2013, defendant was present at a
party with the victim and several other individuals. During
the course of the night, the victim became severely
intoxicated and lost consciousness. While the victim was
unconscious, defendant removed the victim's clothing and
performed vaginal intercourse on the victim. Defendant's
friend, Ethan Deyo, was present and recorded the assault on
his phone. The victim did not recall any of these events. The
next day, other individuals that were present at the party
told the victim what happened, and the victim went to the
hospital for a sexual assault examination. The victim stated
that she never consented to having sexual intercourse with
4 Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of criminal
sexual assault. The court sentenced defendant to six
years' imprisonment and an indeterminate term of three
years to life of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Because
of defendant's conviction, he is subject to the
restrictions and obligations set forth in the SORA statutory
scheme for the remainder of his life.
6 On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of
the SORA statutory scheme, which he is now subject to because
of his present conviction. We review de novo a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on appeal.
People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and in order to
overcome this strong presumption, defendant must
"clearly establish its invalidity." Id.
"A court will affirm the constitutionality of a statute
or ordinance if it is 'reasonably capable of such a
determination' and 'will resolve any doubt as to the
statute's construction in favor of its validity.'
" Jackson v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st)
111044, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. One 1998 GMC,
2011 IL 110236, ¶ 20).
7 Defendant makes two arguments to support his contention:
(1) the SORA statutory scheme violates the due process
clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§ 2) and (2) the SORA statutory scheme violates the
proportionate penalties guarantees of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 11).
8 Before analyzing each constitutional argument, we note that
our supreme court has upheld prior versions of the SORA
statutory scheme against similar constitutional challenges.
See People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178 (2004);
People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413 (2000).
Nevertheless, defendant contends that the SORA statutory
scheme is different than the prior versions determined to be
constitutional because recent additions have made the SORA
statutory scheme so onerous that it no longer satisfies
9 In support of his argument, defendant points out that the
current version of the SORA statutory scheme, which has not
been addressed by the supreme court, contains the following
additional restrictions and obligations: (1) specific
restrictions on where sex offenders may be present or live
(sections 11-9.3 and 11-9.4-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012
(720 ILCS 5/11-9.3, 11-9.4-1 (West 2012))), (2) prohibitions
against sex offenders working, at any time or any reason,
within 500 feet of a school or public park or within 100 feet
of a bus stop (id.), (3) requirements of annual
renewal of driver's licenses (section 5-3-3(o) of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(o) (West
2012))), (4) prohibitions against petitions for name change
(section 21-101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (735 ILCS
5/21-101 (West 2012))), (5) increases in the agencies with
which a registrant must register in person (section 3(a) of
the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/3(a), (d)
(West 2012))), (6) expansion of the information a registrant
must provide when reporting (id. § 3(a)), (7) a
shortening of the period in which a registrant must appear in
person (id. § 7), and (8) an increase in
initial and annual registration fees (id. §
3(c)(6)). With this background in mind, we turn to
defendant's constitutional claims.
10 I. Due Process
11 First, defendant argues that the SORA statutory scheme
violates the due process clauses of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1;
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Both the federal and
state constitutions provide that no individual shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due
process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Upon review, we find the SORA
statutory scheme satisfies substantive and procedural due