United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
ORDER
AMY J.
ST. EVE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
The
Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss brought
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) with
prejudice. [16]. Because the Board of Education for the City
of Chicago is the proper Defendant as Plaintiff's
employer, the Court dismisses the State of Illinois, the
School Directors of Dist. 299, and Cook County as named
Defendants in this matter. See Hearne v. Bd. of Educ. of
City of Chicago, 185 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999). All
pending dates and deadlines are stricken. Civil case
terminated.
STATEMENT
After
granting Defendants' first motion to dismiss without
prejudice, [1] on November 13, 2017, pro se Plaintiff
Anne Burton filed the present First Amended Complaint against
her former employer Defendant Board of Education, along with
individual Defendants, alleging violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621,
et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq. Plaintiff also brings a race
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on her
former employment with the Board as a substitute teacher at
Lane Technical High School in Chicago.
Before
the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss brought
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the
Court grants Defendants' motion with prejudice because
Plaintiff cannot bring ADEA, ADA, Title VII, and
Rehabilitation Act claims against the individual Defendants
as a matter of law and the official capacity claims against
them are redundant to her claims against the Board. Further,
the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss with
prejudice because the Court has already granted Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint in which she failed to
cure the deficiencies made in her original complaint. See
Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, No. 17-CV-00748, 2018 WL
497284, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2018).
LEGAL
STANDARD
“A
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing
that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers,
Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also
Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863
(7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a
plaintiff's “factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). When determining the sufficiency of a complaint under
the plausibility standard, courts must “accept all
well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in
the plaintiffs' favor.” Park Pet Shop, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2017).
BACKGROUND
Construing
her pro se First Amended Complaint and EEOC Charge liberally,
see Echols v. Craig, 855 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.
2017), Plaintiff alleges that she began her employment with
the Board of Education in September 2014 and her most recent
position was substitute teacher at Lane Technical High School
(“Lane Tech”) in Chicago. She further states that
during her employment she was subjected to harassment and
that Defendants discriminated against her because of her
race, age, and disability. More specifically, in her First
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims against the Board
of Education, along with the following Defendants in their
individual capacities: (1) Damir Ara, Assistant Principal at
Lane Tech; (2) Mollie Hart, Human Resources; (3) Mary
Ernesti, Human Resources; and (4) Gabriela Gonzalez,
“Lunchroom Lady.” Plaintiff alleges that these
individuals, along with the Board of Education, terminated
her employment in November 2016, failed to reasonably
accommodate her disabilities, failed to stop harassment, and
retaliated against her because she did something to assert
her rights protected by Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
In
particular, Plaintiff alleges that Assistant Principal Ara
“committed egregious fraud and waste by using his
government position.” Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
that Assistant Principal Ara “intentionally and
knowingly refused to ensure that a public school student
receive[d] proper medical care for a bleeding complication,
ensure that fire codes were not violated by the misuse of
government property by the lunchroom personnel and to ensure
the protection and safety operation of the building and
personnel at Lane Tech.” She also alleges that
Defendants “Ara and Gonzalez falsely imprisoned
Plaintiff and more than 35 Chicago Public School children of
color” and that “Lunchroom Lady Gonzalez
contributed to the head injuries sustained by the female
student on or about May 24, 2016 at Lane Tech High
School[.]” Plaintiff asserts that “Lunchroom Lady
Gonzalez further endangered the safety of the female student
by obstructing her right to medical care[.]” Plaintiff
states that Assistant Principal Ara “further endangered
the safety of the students by leaving the Chicago Public
School students unsupervised and exposing the other over 1,
000 children to further child endangerment” and that
“he failed to provide medical care for the injured
white female student for blood borne pathogens.”
Plaintiff
alleges that when she complained of these egregious
violations, including fire code violations and violations of
the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, 325 ILCS 5/1,
she was “fired, harassed, lied on, and called the
‘n' word.” Plaintiff maintains that the Board
immediately suspended her because she invoked her civil
rights under the federal constitution and then terminated her
employment because she required disability medication. She
explains that the Board's response was “a
distraction from the real criminal activities that appeared
to be instituted by Damir Ara and Lunch Lady Gonzalez.”
Plaintiff further asserts that “Plaintiff and Chicago
Public Schools children were confined to what seem like a
cage, prison because of Plaintiff's race, disability and
age.”
Moreover,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hart and Ernesti
“appeared to have conspired with Defendant Gonzalez and
Damir Ara by subjecting Plaintiff and the Chicago Public
School children to Jim Crow an educational
environment.” She further states that the “Board
should not use federal, state and City of Chicago tax
payer's revenue to represent the Defendant Damir Ara,
Defendant Mollie Hart, Defendant Mary Ernesti, Defendant
Gabriel Gonzalez whom Plaintiff believe[s] have committed
criminal and Jim crow acts against children and children of
color at Chicago Public School[s].” Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants' “conduct has caused irreparable
damages to Plaintiff and perhaps to Chicago Public School
students.”
ANALYSIS
I.
ADEA, ADA, Title VII, and ...