United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE United States District Judge.
Mark Cordrey, currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional
Center (“Lawrence”), brings this pro se
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need
for medical treatment after he was attacked by his cellmate.
The Complaint is now before the Court for a preliminary
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
§ 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner
complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion
of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks
for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that “no
reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.”
Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on
its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir.
2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be
liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d
742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff's
claims survive threshold review under § 1915A.
September 1, 2016, Plaintiff's cellmate attacked and
stabbed him with a pen, injuring his left arm, right hand,
and left leg. (Doc. 1 p. 7). Plaintiff pressed the panic
button in his cell repeatedly during the attack, but nobody
responded. At around 8:30 p.m., Plaintiff was called out of
his cell to receive medication and the wing officer noticed
that Plaintiff had blood on him from the wounds. However, the
officer (whom Plaintiff identifies later in the Complaint as
Goble),  delayed calling for help until the nurse
departed. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8).
told the nurse (Jane Doe 1) who issued his medications about
his injuries, but she ignored him. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8). After
this nurse left, Plaintiff was taken to the Health Care Unit
where he was treated and photographs were taken, but he was
never given any pain medication. (Doc. 1, p. 13). When
Plaintiff returned from Health Care, he was placed in
segregation under investigation status. (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 13,
remained in segregation for about a week. During that time,
he was denied all access to sick call, even when he submitted
request slips directly to a nurse/medical technician (Jane
Doe 2). (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8, 13). Despite his daily requests for
medical care, Plaintiff was given no treatment for his pain
or for the wounds while in segregation. His bandages were
never changed, and the wounds were not cleaned. (Doc. 1, p.
7). The tip of the pen had broken off and was still embedded
in Plaintiff's arm. He had to dig it out himself because
he was never seen by a medical provider for follow-up
treatment. (Doc. 1, p. 13).
also complains that he was denied protection from his
cellmate and that officers failed to react in a reasonable
time when he called for help during the assault. (Doc. 1, p.
7). Plaintiff believes that Lt. Daco was the “reporting
officer, ” Harris was the shift supervisor, and Jenny
(whom he refers to as “Jennings” in the body of
the Complaint) was the reviewing officer. (Doc. 1, p. 8). It
appears that Plaintiff is naming these defendants as the
officers on duty on the night he was attacked. Lamb and Gouns
were wardens at Lawrence. Plaintiff alleges that they were
deliberately indifferent to the actions of other staff who
violated his rights. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Finally, Plaintiff
asserts that he was denied his right to seek redress through
the prison's grievance system, and claims that Lamb
“retaliated” against him
“unlawfully.” (Doc. 1, p. 8).
seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to divide the pro se action into
the following counts. The parties and the Court will use
these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as
to their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in the
Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
considered dismissed without prejudice.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against all
Defendants, for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's
need for medical treatment of his stab wounds and pain after
the September 1, 2016, attack by his cellmate;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendants for failure to protect Plaintiff from his
Count 3: Claim for denial of access to the
prison's grievance ...