United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HON.
JORGE L. ALONSO United States District Judge.
This
matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to
dismiss Counts VI and VII of plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons
set forth below, Markham's Motion to Dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
Lafayette Thomas, filed the instant action against the City
of Markham, Illinois (“Markham”) and two of its
police officers, Officer William Brazil and Officer Zakiya
Larry. Plaintiff alleges that, on March 17, 2016, he was
brutally attacked and assaulted by Officer Brazil during a
traffic stop and that Officer Larry watched the attack and
did nothing to stop it. Plaintiff alleges he was seriously
injured as a result.
Plaintiff
filed a complaint against defendants on August 16, 2016,
alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as other
state law claims. Counts I and II asserted Monell
claims against Markham, alleging that Markham's policies
of failing to train, supervise, and discipline its police
officers were the moving force behind the defendant
officers' injurious actions. In November 2016, Markham
moved to dismiss the Monell claims pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On September 29, 2017, this Court
granted Markham's motion to dismiss the Monell
claims without prejudice and gave plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint.[1]
On
November 1, 2017, plaintiff filed a First Amendment Complaint
(“FAC”). Plaintiff did not amend Counts I and II,
but he added two new state law claims. Count VI alleged
Markham was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising
its officers, and Count VII alleged Markham was willful and
wanton in hiring defendant Officer Brazil. Plaintiff alleges
that Officer Brazil had a checkered employment history prior
to joining Markham's police department. On December 5,
2017, Markham moved to dismiss Counts VI and VII again
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
LEGAL
STANDARD
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion “tests whether the complaint states a
claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v.
Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). To survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiff's complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim[s] showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The short
and plain statement must “give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (ellipsis omitted). Under federal
notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff's complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In ruling on a motion to
dismiss, courts must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, accepting as true all
well-pleaded facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff's favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
In
essence, Markham argues that Counts VI and VII of
plaintiff's FAC are barred for two reasons: (1) the
applicable statute of limitations has run on both claims and
(2) Markham is immune from the claims pursuant to Sections
2-109 and 2-201 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. The Court
disagrees and handles each argument in turn.
I.
Statute of Limitations
As both
parties acknowledge, the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense and “[a] plaintiff is not required
to negate an affirmative defense, such as the statute of
limitations, in his complaint.” Clark v. City of
Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2003). As such,
the statute of limitations is “rarely a good reason to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Reiser v. Residential
Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2004). But
a plaintiff can plead himself out of court if he
alleges facts that affirmatively show that his claims are
time-barred. Id.
Counts
VI and VII are state law claims, so the Court applies
Illinois law “regarding the statute of limitations and
any rules that are an integral part of the statute of
limitations, such as tolling and equitable estoppel.”
Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Markham
argues-and plaintiff does not contest-that the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act provides the applicable statute of limitations
here for plaintiffs' hiring claims. Section 8-101 of the
Act states that “[n]o civil action . . . may be
commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its
employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one
year from the date that the injury was received or the cause
of action accrued.” 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a). Markham
argues that the statute of limitations on plaintiff's
hiring claims began to run on March 17, 2016-the day that
defendant Officer Brazil allegedly injured ...