United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Charles R. Norgle Judge.
se Plaintiff Jason Allen Brown, filed this 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights action regarding his detainment and
arrest by the Chicago Police Department in September 2014.
Named as Defendants are Chicago Police Department employees
Sergeant Sanchez, Officer Bridges. Officer Konior, Officer
Louie, Officer Randolph. Officer Rattler. Sergeant
O'Donnell, Sergeant Garvey, and Lt. Robinson. This matter
is now before the Court for ruling on Defendants' partial
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 94). For the reasons stated
herein, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied
Standard A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), this Court
''shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."' To establish that a material fact is
undisputed, a party "must support the assertion by . . .
citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . .
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials."
Rule 56(c)(1). "The court need consider only the cited
materials, but it may consider other materials in the
record." Rule 56(c)(3). Courts must "construe all
facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party." Van den Bosch v. Raemisch,
658 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2011), citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the
absence of a disputed issue of material fact, "the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of
specific facts creating a genuine dispute." Carroll
v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The
non-movant must go beyond the allegations of his complaint
and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Hannemann v. Southern Door
County School Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2012).
A genuine issue of material fact exists only if there is
evidence "to permit a jury to return a verdict for"
the nonmoving party. Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriffs
Dept., 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2010);
Carroll, 698 F.3d at 564 ("[m]ere metaphysical
doubt" about material facts is not enough).
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
Rule 56.1 "is designed, in part, to aid the district
court, 'which does not have the advantage of the
parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot
afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the
relevant information, ' in determining whether a trial is
necessary." Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d
895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Under Local Rule
56.1(a)(3), the moving party must provide "a statement
of material facts as to which the moving party contends there
is no genuine issue." Ammons v. Aramark Unif.
Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting
N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The opposing party must then "file 'a
response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's
statement, including, in the case of any disagreement,
specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record,
and other supporting materials relied upon.'"
Cracco v. Vitran, Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625. 632 (7th
Cir. 2009) (quoting N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). The
opposing party may also present a separate statement of
additional facts that requires the denial of summary
judgment. See Ciomber v. Coop. Plus. Inc., 527 F.3d
635, 643 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing N.D. III. L.R.
56.1(b)(3)(C)). A court may consider true any uncontested
fact in the movant's Rule 56.1 Statement that is
supported by the record and is not addressed by the opposing
party. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600. 608
(7th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C).
submitted Statements of Uncontested Facts, (Dkt. 98), to
which Plaintiff responded. (Dkt. 104). Plaintiff also
submitted a memorandum (Dkt. 103) responding to
Defendants' legal memorandum (Dkt. 95).
argue in their reply brief that Plaintiffs response to their
Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts is improper in several
ways, in that Plaintiff: (1) in some instances fails to
provide specific references to the record; and (2) offers
nothing more than legal arguments or conclusions. Defendants
contend that because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local
Rule 56.1. their statement of facts should be deemed
the extent Plaintiff failed to completely comply with Local
Rule 56.1, it would not "automatically result in
judgment for the movant, " asi-[t]he ultimate
burden of persuasion remains with [the movant] to show that
[he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th
Cir. 2006). Where Defendants' statements are properly
supported by the cited materials and are not otherwise
disputed by evidence Plaintiff raises, including his
deposition testimony (Dkt. 98-4), the Court will consider
those statements as undisputed. See Local Rule 56.
1(b)(3)(C). But, where Plaintiff has pointed to evidence
contrary to Defendants* statements of fact in in the record
or could properly testify himself about the matters asserted,
the Court will consider that evidence. See Sistrunk v.
Khan, 931 F.Supp.2d 849, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2013);
Fed.R.Evid. 602. The Court will, however, not dig through the
record to identify disputed issues of fact that are not
otherwise supported. See Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com,
Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) ("In
considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court
is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to
defeat the motion; the nonmoving party must identify with
reasonable particularity the evidence upon which the party
relies.") see also Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line.
Inc., No. 08-cv-2902, 2013 WL 80367. at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 7, 2013) ("[C]ourts are not required to 'wade
through improper denials and legal arguments in search of a
genuinely disputed fact.*") (quoting Bordelon v.
Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs.. 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th
Cir. 2000)). And, of course, the Court will not consider
factual statements as refuted by purely legal arguments,
incomplete responses that lack evidentiary support, or
responses that are inconsistent with deposition testimony.
these guidelines established, the Court turns to the facts of
September 9, 2014, Defendants Officers Bridges, Louie,
Konior, Sanchez, Rattler, Randolph and Lt. Robinson were part
of a narcotics team that conducted controlled narcotics
purchases. (Dkt. 98, DSOF at ¶¶ 6-11, 14-20.) On
this date, the Defendant officers were working in the area of
16th and Lawndale, an area well-known for narcotics sales.
(DSOF at ¶¶ 21.) The officers had set up on the
block and conducted surveillance on a group of male
individuals suspected of selling narcotics. (DSOF at
¶¶ 24-25.) Officer Bridges, who was working in an
undercover capacity, approached one of the men and purchased
two bags of heroin in exchange for a twenty dollar bill of
pre-recorded 1505 funds. (DSOF at ¶¶ [ 28, 30.)
Officers Louie, Randolph, Rattler, and Lt. Robinson observed
this narcotics transaction. (DSOF at ¶ 35.) Each of
these officers identified Plaintiff, Jason Allen Brown, as
the person who sold narcotics to Officer Bridges. (DSOF at
the narcotics sale, the subject left the scene and proceeded
to another location to retrieve additional narcotics. (DSOF
at ¶¶ 37, 30.) Officers Randolph, Rattler, and Lt.
Robinson followed the subject and when he reemerged from a
residence at 1910 S. Ridgeway, Lt. Robinson ordered Officers
Konior and Sanchez to detain him. DSOF at ¶¶
38-40.) Based on the representations of the surveillance
officers. Officers Konior and Sanchez detained Plaintiff at
3729 W. 19th street. (DSOF at ¶ 40.) As Officers Bridges
and Louie drove by, Officer Bridges, communicated that
Plaintiff was the person that had just engaged in a narcotics
transaction with the officer. (DSOF at ¶ 41.) Officers
Sanchez and Konier then placed Plaintiff under arrest, and
Officer Konier conducted a custodial search, finding the
pre-recorded funds on Plaintiffs person. (DSOF at
¶¶ 42-43.) Those funds were inventoried. (DSOF
Plaintiff was arrested, Officers Sanchez and Konier drove him
from 3729 W. 19th Street to the address on his driver's
license, 1910 S. Ridgeway in Chicago, where Officer Sanchez
gave Plaintiffs belongings to one of Plaintiff s neighbors.
(DSOF at ¶ 49.) Officers Sanchez and Konier then drove
Plaintiff from 1910 S. Ridgeway to the police station located
at Homan Avenue and Fillmore Avenue, in Chicago. (DSOF at
¶ 50.) Plaintiff arrived at the police station and was
handcuffed to a bench. (DSOF at ¶54.) At this point,
Plaintiff did not have any further contact with officers
Konier, Bridges, Louie, Rattler, Randolph, or Lt. Robinson.
(DSOF at ¶ 55.) Officer Sanchez conducted an additional
custodial search of Plaintiff at the police station. (Dkt.