United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
KENEZ K. PARKS, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PHIL GILBERT DISTRICT JUDGE.
Kenez K. Parks filed this motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
alleging that the Court should not have applied the career
offender enhancement to him during sentencing. (Doc. 1.)
Parks bases his argument on the Supreme Court's holding
in Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016),
which interpreted Iowa's burglary statute as having a
broader element that the generic form of burglary-meaning it
could not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career
Criminal Act. The Government has made a number of arguments
in opposition to Parks's motion, and the Court allowed
Parks to file an oversized brief in reply to the
Government's response. (Docs. 7, 14.)
Court must grant the § 2255 motion if Parks's
“sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
This form of relief, however, is available “only
‘in extraordinary situations, such as an error of
constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a
fundamental defect has occurred which results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.'” United States v.
Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th
Cir. 2013)). It is proper to deny a § 2255 motion
without an evidentiary hearing if “the motion and the
files and records of the case conclusively demonstrate that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(b); see Sandoval v. United States, 574
F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009).
§ 2255 fails for a very simple reason: he did not file
his motion within the one-year statute of limitations set
forth in § 2255(f). Prisoners used to be able to file
motions under § 2255 at any time during their sentences.
In 1996, however, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, tit. I, § 106 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244(a) & (b), 2255(f)), which added a
one-year limitations period for a motion attacking a
sentence. The one-year limitations period runs from the
latest of four events:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
Parks pled guilty to three counts of distributing crack
cocaine, and the Court sentenced him to 162 months in prison
on February 25, 2015. (No. 14-cr-40052-JPG, Docs. 32.) The
Court entered judgment on March 5, 2015. (No.
14-cr-40052-JPG, Doc. 33.) But Parks did not file his §
2255 until nearly two years later, on January 17, 2017. Parks
asserts that his petition based on Mathis is timely
because the exception in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(f)(3)
applies-the Supreme Court decided Mathis in June
2016, so Parks says his January 2017 petition is within the
one-year limitations period-but Parks misunderstands the
scope of the Mathis holding. The Seventh Circuit has
clearly stated that “Mathis interprets the
statutory word ‘burglary' and does not depend on or
announce any novel principle of constitutional law.”
Holt v. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir.
2016); see also Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d
549, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that Mathis
is a case of statutory interpretation and did not announce a
new rule of constitutional law). Accordingly, the exception
in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) does not apply, and the Court
must dismiss Parks's motion as untimely. Because this
issue is dispositive, the Court need not reach the merits of
Parks's Mathis argument or the validity of the
collateral attack waiver in Parks's plea agreement.
denied the petitioner's motion, the Court must grant or
deny a certificate of appealability. See Rule 11(a)
of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the
United States District Courts; 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Section 2253(c)(2) provides that a certificate of
appealability may issue only if a petitioner has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
The petitioner has made no such showing. Therefore, the Court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Pursuant to
Rule 11(a), the petitioner may not appeal the denial of a
certificate of appealability, but he may seek a certificate
from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES
Parks's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) and
DECLINES to issue him a certificate of
appealability. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk
of Court to enter judgment accordingly.