United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law against the
City of Chicago and two of its police officers, Danielle
Deering and Cory Junious, Michael Chachere alleges that his
home was unlawfully searched, that he was unlawfully
arrested, detained, and prosecuted on groundless charges, and
that personal property seized upon his arrest was unlawfully
destroyed. Doc. 1. The court has dismissed the property
destruction claims. Docs. 39-40 (reported at 2017 WL 372306
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2017)). Defendants now move for summary
judgment on the remaining claims. Doc. 67. The motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
following facts are set forth as favorably to Chachere as the
record and Local Rule 56.1 permit. See Hanners v.
Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2012). On summary
judgment, the court must assume the truth of those facts, but
does not vouch for them. See Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am.,
LLC, 805 F.3d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 2015).
October 14, 2014, Sheila Shannon, a real estate agent,
contacted the police because she believed that intruders had
entered a home, located at 7646 South Perry Avenue in
Chicago, that she was responsible for selling. Doc. 71 at
¶¶ 12-13, 16. Officers Deering and Junious were
dispatched to investigate. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.
Upon arriving, they saw two people who matched a description
of the intruders. Id. at ¶ 7. One of the
individuals ran inside the house and shut the door.
Id. at ¶ 8. The officers tried to follow him
in, but the door was locked. Ibid.
point, Deering spoke with Shannon. Id. at
¶¶ 11-12, 19. The parties dispute the content and
even the existence of the conversation. Defendants assert
that Deering called Shannon after noticing her number on a
“For Sale” sign outside the home and that Shannon
gave the officers permission to search the home.
Ibid. In support, Defendants cite Shannon's
deposition testimony that she “authorized a search of
the house.” Doc. 69-3 at 8. Chachere asserts that
because Shannon cannot recall having received a call
from the police, no conversation occurred. Doc. 71 at ¶
11. However, Shannon and the officers testified that they
spoke, and Shannon testified that she called the police at
some point on October 14, id. at ¶¶ 11,
19; Doc. 69-3 at 6, so the record establishes that a
conversation did take place.
asserts that the officers, during their depositions,
identified only the home's owner, and not Shannon, as the
source of their consent to search the home. Doc. 71 at
¶¶ 11, 19. It is true that Junious mentioned only
the home's owner as the source of the consent.
Id. at pp. 227-228. But Deering testified that she
spoke with Shannon, who told her (Deering) that she (Shannon)
“wanted [the officers] to remove [any intruders]
… .” Id. at p. 281. Deering's
testimony favors Defendants, but it does no more than create
a genuine dispute as to whether Shannon consented to a broad
search of the home (as she testified) or merely told the
officers to remove any intruders (as Deering testified). This
dispute must be resolved in Chachere's favor, so for
purposes of summary judgment, Shannon told Deering that the
officers could enter the home to search for intruders, but
did not give them permission to conduct a broader search.
home's owner, in a call with Deering, also gave the
officers permission to enter and remove any individuals who
were inside. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21; see
id. at pp. 278-279. Chachere asserts that the owner
authorized the officers only to remove intruders, while
Defendants assert that the officers were given
“permission to investigate and to search the
residence.” Id. at ¶ 21. This dispute is
resolved in Chachere's favor. Junious testified that he
believed that the owner had consented to a search of her
home, but that information was relayed to him by Deering.
Id. at p. 228. And Deering testified that the owner
had told her only that “she didn't want anyone in
the house. If anyone was there … they needed to be
removed from the house.” Doc. 69-2 at 6. For purposes
of summary judgment, then, the owner authorized the officers
only to remove intruders from the home.
time later, the intruder who had entered the home came
outside. Doc. 71 at ¶ 22; Doc. 77 at ¶ 6. He was
detained along with the other individual the officers
observed when they arrived. Doc. 77 at ¶¶ 6, 9.
Both men stated that they lived at the home. Id. at
¶ 9. The officers then decided to enter the home without
a search warrant. Doc. 71 at ¶ 26; Doc. 77 at
entering, the officers learned that there might be guns in
the home. Doc. 71 at ¶ 18. (That fact is supported by
this testimony from Junious: “The way it was related to
me from the phone calls was that no one was supposed to be
there. And that-whoever is there, there might be guns in the
house. So from that, we wanted to search the house.”
Doc. 69-1 at 12. Chachere provides no reason to doubt his
testimony.) The officers also were told that Chachere was the
only person permitted in the home. Doc. 71 at ¶ 17.
(Citing the officers' testimony, Defendants assert that
they were told that Chachere's girlfriend might be
staying with him, but that there should not be any
“young people staying at the residence.”
Ibid. Chachere counters with Shannon's testimony
that she informed the police that “no one is supposed
to be [in the house] except the guy Michael.”
Ibid. (citing Doc. 71 at p. 42). On summary
judgment, this dispute is resolved in Chachere's favor.)
entering the home, which has four bedrooms and is
“pretty big, ” the officers conducted an initial
search to see if anybody was present. Id. at ¶
26; Doc. 77 at ¶¶ 11, 25-26. “[A]fter
determining no one else was in the home, ” they
conducted a broader search for evidence of a crime. Doc. 71
at ¶¶ 26-27. During that search, the officers found
two firearms. Id. at ¶ 28. They also found
ammunition in an upstairs bedroom, spent casings and a
bulletproof vest in the basement, and mail linking Chachere
to the residence. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.
returned home after the searches had been completed.
Id. at ¶ 31. He provided the officers with his
identification, which listed his as 7646 South Perry Avenue.
Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. Chachere told the
officers that the two detained individuals were his
girlfriend's children and that they lived at the home.
Doc. 77 at ¶ 10. One of the officers ran Chachere's
name and learned he was a convicted felon. Doc. 71 at ¶
officers arrested Chachere because, as a convicted felon, he
could not legally possess firearms. Id. at ¶
38. The officers then “created official police reports
containing the false claims that [Chachere]
‘spontaneously uttered upon his arrival “I'm
a security guard and the guns are mine, ”' that
[Chachere] was given Miranda warnings, and that [Chachere]
then stated again, ‘I'm a security guard and the
guns are mine.'” Doc. 77 at ¶ 15. Chachere did
not, in fact, say those things. Id. at ¶¶
was charged with two counts of being an armed habitual
criminal and three counts of unlawful use of a weapon. Doc.
71 at ¶ 39. He spent some four months in pretrial
detention at Cook County Jail. Doc. 77 at ¶ 30. The
state trial court granted Chachere's motion to quash and
suppress evidence on the ground that any exigent
circumstances that could have justified the officers'
warrantless search of the home had dissipated by the time
they entered. Doc. 71 at ¶ 39. ...