United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
STANLEY N. BESCHORNER, Plaintiff,
STEPHANIE WAGGONER, and JAMES BALDWIN, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Stanley Beschorner is a former inmate of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). He filed this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after
he was released from prison on parole. Plaintiff claims
that IDOC officials miscalculated his sentence and delayed
his release from Vandalia Correctional Center
(“Vandalia”) by 85 days. (Doc. 1). In connection
with this claim, Plaintiff names James Baldwin (IDOC
director) and Stephanie Waggoner (prison warden) as
defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 1). He seeks monetary damages. (Doc.
1, p. 6).
also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP Motion”) under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. (Doc. 2). Because he was on parole when he filed
this action, Plaintiff was not a “prisoner, ” as
that term is defined under the in forma pauperis
statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Section
1915(h) defines “prisoner” as “any person
incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of,
convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of
parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Even so, a federal
district court may allow a civil case to proceed without
prepayment of fees, if the movant “submits an affidavit
that includes a statement of all assets [he] possesses
[showing] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to
deny IFP and dismiss the Complaint at any time, however, if:
(1) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (2) the action is
frivolous; (3) the action fails to state a claim; or (4) the
action seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.
Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1018 (7th Cir. 2013). An action or claim is frivolous if
“it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is
obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see
Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some
factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that
they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's
claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.
2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as
adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of
action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At
the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro
se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821
(7th Cir. 2009).
reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the IFP Motion
and dismiss the Complaint. Plaintiff will have an opportunity
to renew his request for IFP, however, by filing an updated
IFP Motion. He also will have an opportunity to re-plead his
claims by filing an amended complaint.
did not submit a complete IFP application. (Doc. 2). He
answered most questions in the application from the
standpoint of an incarcerated person, despite the fact that
he filed this lawsuit six weeks after he was released on
parole. For example, Plaintiff disclosed income of $15.00 per
month as an inmate porter. (Doc. 2, p. 1). He disclosed
withdrawals from his institutional trust fund account
“only for commissary purpose[s].” (Doc. 2, p. 2).
Unfortunately, however, he did not provide a copy of his
trust fund account statement or information about his trust
fund balance, citing the fact that he was
“released.” (Doc. 2, p. 1). In his Motion for
Recruitment of Counsel, Plaintiff indicated that his
financial status has changed and warrants an amendment to his
IFP application. (Doc. 3, p. 2). Again, however, he did not
provide the Court with an amended application. Further,
Plaintiff described himself in the Complaint as a
“potential employee of Peoria Tube Forming Corp.”
(Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff indicates that he made $18.60 per
hour when he worked there prior to his incarceration and
seeks this amount as compensation for the 85 days he was held
beyond his correct parole date. Id. If he was
employed there-or anywhere else-after being released on
parole, Plaintiff should have disclosed this information.
his omission of all post-release financial information in the
IFP application, the Court is unable to determine whether
Plaintiff was indigent on February 14, 2018. For this reason,
the IFP Motion shall be denied without prejudice. Plaintiff
may either resubmit a properly completed IFP Motion or prepay
the full $400.00 filing fee for this action within 28 days,
if he wishes to proceed. Failure to do one or the other shall
result in dismissal of this action. See Fed. R. Civ.
Dismissal of Complaint Under § 1915(e)(2)
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (mandating
denial of IFP and dismissal of complaint under circumstances
that include the failure to state a claim for relief).
According to the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff was
convicted of driving with a revoked license in Woodford
County Case Nos. 15-CF-166 and 16-CF-86. (Doc. 1, p. 4). He
was sentenced to 18 months in IDOC custody and received 84
days of credit for time served in Woodford County Case No.
15-CF-166. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 10). He received a sentence of 18
months in IDOC custody, 85 days of credit for time served,
and one year of mandatory supervised release in Woodford
County Case No. 16-CF-86. Id. Plaintiff served his
sentence at Vandalia beginning on October 18, 2016. (Doc. 1,
alleges that IDOC officials failed to follow the state
court's sentencing order when calculating his sentence.
(Doc. 1, p. 4). Approximately two months after he arrived at
Vandalia, Plaintiff learned that he was only given credit for
85 days, when he should have received credit for 85 days
against one sentence and 84 days against the other. (Doc. 1,
p. 5). When Plaintiff attempted to address the matter through
the grievance process, he was initially unsuccessful.
Id. The Administrative Review Board
(“A.R.B.”) allegedly denied his grievance and
appeal as untimely. Id.
filed a motion seeking clarification of the sentencing order
in state court, and a hearing was scheduled on April 25,
2017. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-23). The trial judge explained that he
“entered an order indicating that the two consecutive
sentences imposed upon [Plaintiff] are to be - are to run
consecutive as the order previously states, and that the
credit afforded to [Plaintiff] for time previously served
shall also be calculated in that manner, i.e., as two
separate sentences.” (Doc. 1, pp. 12, 17).
filed what appears to be a second round of grievances
beginning on or around September 20, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 9). In
a response dated September 22, 2017, a prison grievance
counselor indicated that the IDOC was in the process of
seeking clarification from the court and could not resolve
the grievance at that time. Id. On November 7, 2017,
Plaintiff's appeal was subsequently denied because it was
still considered untimely and because Plaintiff provided no
additional “justification . . . for additional
consideration” by the A.R.B. (Doc. 1, p. ...