Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Davidsonn v. Baldwin

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

February 21, 2018

LANCE DAVIDSON, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN BALDWIN, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL, United States District Judge.

         Plaintiff Lance Davidson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently housed at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation and immediate release from custody.

         This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

(a) Screening - The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

         An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility. “ID. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

         Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; this action is subject to summary dismissal.

         The Complaint

         Plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced to three years in IDOC custody on June 28, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2). The sentence was to be served at 50% with one year mandatory supervised release. Id. Plaintiff also was awarded 128 days credit for time served in the Montgomery County Jail. Id. Plaintiff filed several post-trial motions and, on July 28, 2017, Judge James Roberts signed an amended judgment which sentenced Plaintiff to two years' time in the IDOC and one year supervised release with 128 days' credit for time served, time to be served at 50%. Id. Plaintiff contends that this adjustment means that he should have been released on February 25, 2017. Id. Plaintiff believes that the IDOC should have given him credit for the time period of February 25 through August 4, 2017. Id.

         Discussion

         As an initial matter, Plaintiff has asked for immediate release as part of his relief. Plaintiff cannot seek that relief as part of a § 1983 action. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper route, “[i]f the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level of custody-whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and financial constraints of bond or parole or probation.” Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991). If, however, the prisoner “is seeking a different program or location or environment, then he is challenging the conditions rather than the fact of confinement and his remedy is under civil rights law.” Id.; see also Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). Section 1983 jurisdiction is displaced if the habeas corpus remedy applies. Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff cannot bring a request for habeas relief and a request for relief pursuant to § 1983 in the same lawsuit. As Plaintiff's Complaint affirmatively states that he is proceeding under § 1983 and makes no mention of habeas, the Court will dismiss the habeas request from this action. Plaintiff may file a separate habeas action, if necessary.

         As currently pleaded, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff alleges that the IDOC refuses to award him credit for the time period between February 25, 2017 and August 4, 2017, which he is due because a state court judge issued an order reducing his sentence. The fact that the time at issue has been awarded by a judge after a post-trial motion suggests that Plaintiff has cleared the bar set ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.