United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MICHAEL S. WILSON, Plaintiff,
PATRICIA RENSING, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Defendant Patricia Rensing's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docs. 53 & 54). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court grants the motion.
and Procedural Background
Michael Wilson (“Wilson”) brings this pro
se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, based on events that occurred while he was incarcerated
at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. The original Complaint
included fifteen separate counts against twenty-seven
different defendants (Doc. 10). The Court conducted a
preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. Following that review, the only claim that
remains in this case is Wilson's First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Patricia Rensing for
writing a disciplinary ticket in response to his verbal
complaint that she had violated a prison rule (Doc. 10, p.
2012, Wilson was an inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional
Center. On or around November 14, 2012, Wilson attempted to
get a replacement razor from Rensing (Doc. 54-1, p. 4), who
was the Supply Supervisor at Pinckneyville (Doc. 54, p. 2).
The parties disagree about whether Wilson was authorized to
get the razor, as well as whether he was aggressive or used
profanity during the incident (Doc. 54, p. 6; Doc. 58, p. 6).
It is undisputed, however, that when Rensing refused to give
him a replacement razor, Wilson took it upon himself to
verbally inform her she was violating prison policy (Doc. 54,
p. 6). It is also undisputed that Rensing issued Wilson a
disciplinary ticket for unauthorized movement and insolence
(Doc. 54, p. 6). Wilson spent thirty days in segregation, but
admits that Rensing was not involved in any of the
disciplinary proceedings or disciplinary recommendations
resulting from the ticket she wrote (Doc. 54-1, p. 4; Doc.
58, p. 7).
judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir.
2005). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of
fact must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970);
Lawrence v. Kenosha Cnty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th
Seventh Circuit has stated that summary judgment is
“the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a
party must show what evidence it has that would convince a
trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”
Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407
F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)).
the burden is on the moving party to show entitlement to
summary judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)-(e),
requires the non-moving party to properly address another
party's assertion of fact.
asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support that
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or present of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B)
party fails to address any such assertion, the Court may
consider the facts undisputed and can grant summary judgment
if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts