United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Terry Gray, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this
lawsuit on April 15, 2015 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while
he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”). Specifically, Gray alleges
that Defendant Hamilton injured his shoulder in October 2011
(Doc. 1). He proceeds on two Counts: (1) Hamilton responded
with excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
and (2) Hamilton exhibited deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment (Doc. 10).
matter is currently before the Court on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42). Plaintiff filed a
Response (Doc. 64). For the following reasons,
Defendant's motion is GRANTED as to both
Terry Gray was an inmate at Pinckneyville in October 2011
(Plaintiff's Deposition, Doc. 43-3 at 22). On an
unspecified date during that month, Gray tried to get the
attention of staff to address conditions in his cell,
particularly with respect to his mattress and water
temperature (Id. at 15-16). He tied a sheet to the
chuckhole from the bed to prevent the chuckhole from being
shut (Id. at 17).
alleges that Hamilton pulled his left arm through the
chuckhole and repeatedly jerked, pulled, and twisted it
(Id.). He further claims that Hamilton asked another
officer if he should break it (Id. at 63). Hamilton
held on to Grey's arm until a lieutenant came and cuffed
him (Id. at 68). After the lieutenant cuffed Gray,
Hamilton left and went downstairs (Id. at 75). The
lieutenant escorted Gray to the shower and then to the
healthcare unit (Id. at 77). The medical staff
examined Gray's arm but provided no treatment
(Id. at 83-85). Gray did not see any bruises or cuts
on his arm (Id. at 83-84).
October 25, 2011, Gray filed a grievance regarding the
conditions of his cell and the incident with Hamilton
grabbing and twisting his arm (Doc. 43-2 at 5-6). The
Counselor responded to the grievance on November 14, 2011,
stating that Gray's claims could not be substantiated
(Id.). The Grievance Officer's Report was filed
on May 1, 2012, recommending denial of the grievance because
he was unable to substantiate the claims (Id. at 4).
The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) sent a
letter dated January 7, 2013, stating that due to conflicting
information provided by Gray, they could not adequately
review the issue and recommended the grievance be denied
(Id. at 3). The letter was signed by IDOC Director,
S. A. Godinez, on January 10, 2013
was transferred from Pinckneyville to Graham Correctional
Center (“Graham”) in January 2013. He underwent
surgery on his shoulder in September 2013 (Plaintiff's
Complaint, Doc. 1 at 6).
judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate
of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In determining
a summary judgment motion, the district Court views the facts
in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965
(7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations and Plaintiff has presented no evidence to
support the claim for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff
concedes that there is insufficient evidence with respect to
his deliberate indifference claim, but argues that his
excessive force claim should be allowed to proceed.
1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, so
federal courts adopt the forum state's statute of
limitations for personal injury claims. Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, (1985); Ashafa v. City of
Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1998). In Illinois,
the limitations period for § 1983 cases is two years.
Kalimara v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 879
F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir.1989). However, the statute of
limitations is tolled while a prisoner exhausts
administrative remedies, as is required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir.
the procedures set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code,
an inmate must first attempt to resolve a complaint
informally with his Counselor. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20,
§ 504.810(a). If the complaint is not resolved, the
inmate may file a grievance within 60 after the discovery of
the incident, occurrence, or problem that gives rise to the
grievance. Id. § 504.810(b). The grievance
officer is required to advise the CAO at the facility in
writing of the findings on the grievance. Id. §
504.830(d). The CAO shall advise the inmate of the decision
on the grievance within two months of it having been filed.
Id. § 504.830(d). An inmate may appeal the
decision of the CAO in writing within 30 days to the ARB for
a final decision. Id. § 504.850(a). See
also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806-07 (7th Cir.
2006). An inmate's administrative remedies are not
exhausted until the appeal is ruled on by the ARB. See
Id. The ARB shall make a final determination of the
grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed
grievance, where reasonably feasible under the circumstances.
Id. § 504.850(f).
case, the two year statute of limitations began to run when
Gray exhausted his administrative remedies with the ARB. Gray
contends that there is a dispute as to when that exhaustion
occurred - when the letter was sent by the ARB (January 10,
2013), or when he received the letter (February 20, 2013).
But the dispute is inconsequential. Even if the Court were to
consider February 20, 2013 as the starting date for the
limitations period, the statute of ...