United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE U.S. District Judge
matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration. (Doc. 17). Plaintiff originally filed this
action on September 20, 2017. (Doc. 1). The Court screened
the Complaint on November 27, 2017, dismissing some claims
and allowing others to proceed. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed the
instant Motion for Reconsideration as to rulings in the
Court's Threshold Order. (Doc. 17). For the reasons
explained below, the Motion is DENIED.
first raises the Court's disposition of his claim against
Wexford based on respondeat superior. He states that if
“Monell is overturned during the pending
litigation of the case sub judice, Plaintiff will move to
reinstate said claim against Wexford, alternatively
Plaintiff's objection preserves the issue for
appeal.” (Doc. 17, p. 3).
Plaintiff contends that the Court abused its discretion by
dismissing Dr. Shearing from Counts 2 and 4 on statute of
limitations grounds. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that the defense was not apparent on the face of the
Complaint; that the Court disregarded the law on construing
pro se complaints Id.; that the date Dr. Shearing
left his employment is irrelevant to the statute of
limitations determination (Doc. 17, p. 4); and that the Court
should have considered the discovery rule in analyzing the
statute of limitations question (Doc. 17, p. 5). Plaintiff
also maintains that the Court improperly considered the issue
of exhaustion when determining whether the statute of
limitations should be tolled. (Doc. 17, pp. 6-7).
third ground for reconsideration is that the Court should not
have dismissed Dr. Sutterer because he clearly delayed
providing Plaintiff with adequate care. (Doc. 17, p. 7).
also takes issue with the Court's dismissal of his
retaliation claim. (Doc. 17, p. 8). He first argues that it
was improper for the Court to dismiss Wexford because Wexford
had a policy, practice, or custom of turning a blind eye to
retaliatory action of others. Id. He also asserts
that Dr. Shearing should not have been dismissed on statute
of limitations grounds for the same reasons discussed above.
Id. Finally, as to Defendant Walls' dismissal,
Plaintiff states that he will file an amended complaint.
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
any order . . . which adjudicates fewer than all of the
claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims . . . and the order . . . is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment. . . .
this rule, a court may reconsider its own orders that dispose
of less than the entire case prior to final judgment.
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp, 460
U.S. 1 (1983). The Court may, sua sponte or on
motion, correct clear errors of fact or law in an
interlocutory order. Diaz v. Indian Head Inc., 686
F.2d 558, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1982).
purpose of a motion to reconsider is to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI
Indus. Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996).
Reconsideration is also appropriate where “the Court
has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision
outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the
parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of
apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese
Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990) (citing
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc.,
99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va.1983)). “A manifest error is
not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party,
instead it is the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or
failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.
initial matter, Plaintiff's stated intention to move to
reinstate his respondeat superior claims against Wexford,
should the law in the Seventh Circuit change, requires no
analysis or action from this Court and will not be addressed
further. Plaintiff has also refers to other motions that he
intends to file, but future motions also require no
action from the Court at present.
of Dr. Shearing
regard to Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Shearing should
not have been dismissed from Counts 2 and 4 on statute of
limitations grounds because the defense is not apparent on
the face of the Complaint, the Court's decision to
dismiss Dr. Shearing rested in a large part on
Plaintiff's allegation in the Complaint that Dr. Shearing
was no longer working at Menard as of October 5, 2014.
Plaintiff argues that the Court did not liberally construe
the pro-se filing in his favor when it relied on this
statement. But this allegation is unambiguous and not subject
to more than one interpretation. Moreover, Plaintiff does not
argue that Shearing actually worked at Menard past that date.
While Plaintiff is correct that pro-se complaints must be
liberally construed with all facts taken in the light most
favorable to the ...