United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division
G. Reinhard Judge.
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
 is granted. The court authorizes and orders the trust
fund officer at plaintiff's place of incarceration to
deduct $6.80 from plaintiff's account for payment to the
Clerk of Court as an initial partial payment of the filing
fee, and to continue making monthly deductions in accordance
with this order. However, the court summarily dismisses the
complaint on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A for failure to state a colorable federal claim. The
case is terminated. The court directs the Clerk of Court to
enter final judgment. This dismissal counts as one of
plaintiff's three allotted dismissals under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). Dismissal is without prejudice to pursuing
any avenue of relief that may be available in the state court
Jason Matherly, currently an inmate at the Kendall County
Jail, brings this pro se civil rights action
purportedly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
claims that he stumbled, fell, and injured himself while
exiting from a DeKalb County Jail transport vehicle.
Plaintiff faults the deputy who was escorting him, alleging
that the officer failed to raise the car seat for him. For
the reasons set forth in this order, the court grants
plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, but summarily dismisses the complaint on
initial review for failure to state an actionable federal
has demonstrated that he is unable to prepay the statutory
filing fee. The court therefore grants his application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) and (2), the court orders: (1)
plaintiff to immediately pay (and the facility having custody
of him to automatically remit) $6.80 to the Clerk of Court
for payment of the initial partial filing fee and (2)
plaintiff to pay (and the facility having custody of him to
automatically remit) to the Clerk of Court twenty percent of
the money he receives for each calendar month during which he
receives $10.00 or more, until the $350 filing fee is paid in
full. The court directs the Clerk of Court to ensure that a
copy of this order is mailed to each facility where plaintiff
is housed until the filing fee has been paid in full. All
payments shall be sent to the Clerk of Court, United States
District Court, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois
60604, attn: Cashier's Desk, 20th Floor, and shall
clearly identify plaintiff's name and the case number
assigned to this case.
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the
court is required to screen pro se prisoners'
complaints and dismiss the complaint, or any claims therein,
if the court determines that the complaint or claim is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See Jones v.
Bock, 199');">549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
screen prisoner litigation claims in the same manner as
ordinary motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir.
2011). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint. See Hallinan v. Fraternal
Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 11');">570 F.3d 811, 820
(7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2)
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “In reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard,
[courts] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as
true.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d
662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). Courts also construe pro
se complaints liberally. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 1 U.S. 89');">551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
plaintiff is not required to plead facts in the complaint to
anticipate and defeat affirmative defenses. Independent
Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Serv. Corp., 665 F.3d 930,
935 (7th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff can plead himself or
herself out of court by pleading facts that undermine the
allegations set forth in the complaint. See, e.g.,
Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted) (“A judicial admission trumps
evidence. This is the basis of the principle that a plaintiff
can plead himself out of court.”).
In the month of March 2017 I was returning from court in the
custody of Deputy Schults and two other inmates whos[e]
name[s] I do not know. When the other two inmat1es got out of
the mini-van, I was instructed by Deputy Schults to climb
through the seats instead of raising the seat like the deputy
was supposed to do. He left it down. So as I climbed out, my
shackle was caught by the seat, causing me to fall and smack
my head and shoulder on the ground, causing me to be in great
I feel that I should be fin[an]cially compensated for the
negligen[ce] of the officer and that any doctor bills related