United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
R. HERNDON, DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is defendant's Daubert motion
and motion in limine to exclude, or in the alternative limit,
the expert testimony of Dr. Rebecca Summary (Doc. 47).
Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 49). Based on the
following, the Court denies the motion. As noted in previous
Orders, Gauen alleges that the Board paid her less
compensation for her services as principal and assistant
principal than her male counterparts in violation of
Illinois' Equal Pay Act, the federal Equal Pay Act, and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
district court's decision to exclude expert testimony is
governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, as
construed by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d
469 (1993).” Brown v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 765 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2014); see also
Lewis v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th
Cir. 2009). Rule 702, governing the admissibility of expert
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.
short, the rule requires that the trial judge ensure that any
and all expert testimony or evidence admitted “is not
only relevant, but reliable.” Manpower, Inc. v.
Ins. Co. of Pa. 732 F.3d 796, 806 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786);
see also Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663
F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that ultimately,
the expert's opinion “must be reasoned and founded
on data [and] must also utilize the methods of the relevant
discipline”); Lees v. Carthage College, 714
F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining the current version
of Rule 702 essentially codified Daubert and
“remains the gold standard for evaluating the
reliability of expert testimony”). The Daubert
principles apply equally to scientific and non-scientific
expert testimony. See Manpower, Inc., 732 F.3d at
806 (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 147-49, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)).
the expert-testimony framework, courts perform the
gatekeeping function of determining whether the expert
testimony is both relevant and reliable prior to its
admission at trial. See Manpower, Inc., 732 F.3d at
806; Lees, 714 F.3d at 521; United States v.
Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2009) (“To
determine reliability, the court should consider the proposed
expert's full range of experience and training, as well
as the methodology used to arrive [at] a particular
conclusion.”). In doing so, courts “make the
following inquiries before admitting expert testimony: first,
the expert must be qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education; second, the
proposed expert must assist the trier of fact in determining
a relevant fact at issue in the case; third, the expert's
testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data and
reliable principles and methods; and fourth, the expert must
have reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.” Lees, 714 F.3d at 521-22;
see also Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d
753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013); Pansier, 576 F.3d at 737.
A district court's evaluation of expert testimony under
Daubert does not “take the place of the jury
to decide ultimate issues of credibility and accuracy.”
Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596). Once it is
determined that “the proposed expert testimony meets
the Daubert threshold of relevance and reliability,
the accuracy of the actual evidence is to be tested before
the jury with the familiar tools of ‘vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof.'”
Rule 403 states:
The Court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.
maintains that Dr. Summary's opinions do not meet the
minimum requirements for expert testimony; that her
methodology and factual basis for her opinions are unsound,
and that her opinions will not assist the trier of fact.
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing that defendant is
confusing liability issues with damage issues and that Dr.
Summary's testimony goes to the important issues of the
decline of her future pension due to unlawful discrimination.
Summary has a B.S., with honors, from Eastern Illinois
University (1975); a M.A., Economics, from Eastern Illinois
University (1976) and a Ph.D., Economics, from the University
of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign (1983). Currently, she is a
professor and chairperson of the Department of Economics at
the Department of Economics and Finance at Southeast Missouri
State University. In addition, since 1999, she is a forensic
economist consultant for her own company. She has
authored/co-written many publications from 1982 to 2015 and
has participated in various professional presentations from
1985 to 2011 in the field of economics. Reviewing Dr.
Summary's qualifications, it appears that she has
extensive experience in the field of economics. Further,
defendant does not seem to question her qualifications.
preparing her report, Dr. Summary noted that the purpose of
the report: “The purpose of this report is to present
the value of economic losses sustained by Dr. Karen Gauen as
a result of employment discrimination in pay on the basis of
her sex. Dr. Gauen's past losses are calculated from the
school year 2012/13 through 2015/16 and have no reduction for
present value. Dr. Gauen's future losses are calculated
from the school years 2016/17 through retirement, and are
reduced to present value.” (Doc. 45-3, p. 6; Dr.
Summary's Report, p. 1). In rendering her opinion, Dr.
Summary considered the employment records and compensation