United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Herndon United States District Judge.
currently incarcerated in the USP-Marion, brings this habeas
corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge
the constitutionality of his confinement. He asserts that in
light of Mathis v. United States, -- U.S. --, 136
S.Ct. 2243, 2250 (2016), he should not have been subject to
the career-offender enhancement under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) based on his 2
previous Illinois drug-related convictions. (Doc. 1).
case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in United States District Courts. Rule 4 provides
that upon preliminary consideration by the district court
judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives this Court
the authority to apply the rules to other habeas corpus
cases, such as this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. After
carefully reviewing the Petition, the Court concludes that
this action is subject to dismissal.
18, 1997, in the Southern District of Iowa, Petitioner was
sentenced to 351 months imprisonment for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine base, and for distribution. (Doc. 239,
United States v. Gadison, Simmons, et al., No.
96-cr-112-CRW (S.D. Iowa). The sentencing court noted that it
applied the 360-month guideline sentence, and subtracted the
9 months that Petitioner had already served in the State of
Illinois. This sentence was to run concurrently with the
Illinois sentence Petitioner was then serving in a 1995 case.
states that his advisory sentencing guideline range was
increased to the 360-month-to-life level under Section
4B1.1(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“USSG”), because he had 2 prior convictions in
Illinois for delivery of cocaine and cocaine base. (Doc. 1,
pp. 2, 6, 9). Without that career-offender enhancement, his
guideline range would have been only 235-293 months. (Doc. 1,
p. 9). He argues that Section 4B1.2 of the USSG was
misconstrued to include his previous Illinois convictions as
predicate offenses for the career offender designation, when
in fact those Illinois convictions contain different elements
and do not qualify as “controlled substance
offenses” within the meaning of the USSG. (Doc. 1, pp.
6, 7). He does not further articulate this argument.
previously challenged his conviction and sentence without
success, on direct appeal, United States v. Puckett, et
al., 147 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1998); and with a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He was denied permission to
bring a successive § 2255 motion in 2014 (No. 14-cv-128,
S.D. Iowa), and on November 6, 2017 (8th Circuit No.
17-2364). He brought an earlier petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 in the Central District of Illinois, which was
dismissed. Simmons v. Hastings, No. 03-cv-1277 (C.D.
Ill. Aug. 26, 2003).
general matter, “28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 provide federal prisoners with distinct forms of
collateral relief. Section 2255 applies to challenges to the
validity of convictions and sentences, whereas § 2241
applies to challenges to the fact or duration of
confinement.” Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644,
645 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Walker v. O'Brien,
216 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Brown v.
Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012); Valona v.
United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Here,
Petitioner is attacking his conviction and sentence, which
points to § 2255 as the proper avenue for relief.
very limited circumstances, a prisoner may employ § 2241
to challenge his federal conviction or sentence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which
authorizes a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition
where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e). See Hill, 695 F.3d at 648
(“‘Inadequate or ineffective' means that
‘a legal theory that could not have been presented
under § 2255 establishes the petitioner's actual
innocence.'”) (citing Taylor v. Gilkey,
314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002). See also United States
v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002);
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir.
1998) (§ 2255 limitation on filing successive motions
does not render it an inadequate remedy for a prisoner who
had filed a prior § 2255 motion).
Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within
the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner
must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he
relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a
constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on
a decision that he could not have invoked in his first §
2255 motion, and that case must apply retroactively.
Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has been a
“fundamental defect” in his conviction or
sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of
justice. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th
Cir. 2013). See also Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638,
640 (7th Cir. 2012).
Court has found that a collateral attack invoking Mathis
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2250
(2016), facially satisfies the three conditions which would
allow consideration in a § 2241 proceeding under the
savings clause of § 2255(e). See e.g., Hoskins v.
Werlich, No. 17-cv-652-DRH (S.D. Ill. July 28, 2017);
Wadlington v. Werlich, No. 17-cv-449-DRH (S.D. Ill.
July 17, 2017); Davis v. USA, 17-cv-379-DRH (S.D.
Ill. June 14, 2017); Warren v. Werlich, No.
17-cv-84-DRH (S.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2017). However, the Seventh
Circuit on November 8, 2017, issued an opinion squarely
rejecting the very argument raised by Petitioner herein.
United States v. Redden, 875 F.3d 374 (7th Cir.
2017) (career offender enhancement of sentence based on
Illinois controlled substance convictions was proper,
distinguishing United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569
(5th Cir. 2016)). Under this authority, the instant Petition
must be dismissed.
Redden court, referencing the Illinois statute's
definitions relating to controlled substance offenses,
The definition that underlies the offense established by 720
ILCS 570/401 tells us that “deliver” and
“delivery” mean an “actual, constructive or
attempted transfer”. 720 ILCS 570/102(h). Any conduct
meeting the state's definition of “delivery”
comes within § 4B1.2(b) ...