United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
ADMASSU REGASSA, No. 09303-007, Plaintiff,
K. SANDERS, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Phil Gilbert U.S. District Judge
matter is before the Court for case management. Plaintiff
Admassu Regassa, presently incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois ("USP Marion"),
filed a pro se action for deprivations of his
constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of
federal authority pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
and the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1346, 2671-2680. The original Complaint, which asserted
claims against 116 defendants at three different institutions
(USP Marion (Illinois), USP Lewisburg (Pennsylvania), and FCC
Allenwood (Pennsylvania)) for conduct that spans
approximately five years, was dismissed without prejudice and
with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 16) on December 5, 2017. The Amended Complaint is
awaiting preliminary review.
January 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO").
(Doc. 18). Plaintiff sought issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction prohibiting officials at Marion from
transferring him to another facility. Id. Without
providing any specific information, Plaintiff claimed that
any such transfer would be an act of retaliation for the
above captioned action. Id. On January 5, 2018, the
Court denied the Motion without prejudice.
January 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of his
Motion, alleging additional facts and argument pertaining to
the pending transfer. Plaintiff opens his briefing by
suggesting that he has been the victim of a campaign of
retaliation since filing the instant action. (Doc. 20, p. 2).
Most recently, Plaintiff claims, a correctional officer filed
a false disciplinary report against him that resulted in,
among other things, the revocation of good conduct credit.
Id. Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff learned that
officials at Marion are in the process of transferring him to
another facility. Id. Officials have informed him
that his pending transfer is for disciplinary reasons. For
instance, one official told Plaintiff he was being
transferred for his "misbehavior the whole time [he has
been] in the SHU." (Doc. 20, p. 4). He was also told that
he is being transferred because of "repeated incident
reports." (Doc. 20, p. 5).
Plaintiffs initial generic references to retaliation, the
bulk of his briefing objects to the pending transfer for
other reasons. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the Court
should intervene to stop the pending transfer because: (1)
some of the incident reports have been expunged from his
record; (2) he has maintained "clear conduct" over
the last few years; (3) it is in his "best
interest" to remain at USP Marion, so he can complete
the SOTP-R program and have a better shot at early parole;
(4) the DHO did not order a transfer in connection with his
recent disciplinary ticket; and/or (5) he has had only one
incident report in the last 4 years.
briefing does not alter the Court's original decision.
Plaintiff still has not established that the pending transfer
will result in immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage. In essence, Plaintiff is arguing that the reasoning
in support of his pending transfer and/or the procedures
followed with regard to the same are flawed (e.g.,
officials are wrongfully relying on expunged incident
reports, officials have failed to recognize Plaintiffs recent
"clear conduct" over the years, or the DHO did not
order the pending transfer). But, "prisoners possess
neither liberty nor property in their classifications and
prison assignments. States may move their charges to any
prison in the system." DeTomaso v. McGinnis,
970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976)). Additionally, the only
alleged harm in Plaintiffs briefing is that he is
"better off at Marion and will have a better chance of
obtaining parole. However, as the Court previously explained,
convicted prisoners have no expectation that they will remain
in any particular facility, and prison officials have broad
authority to transfer prisoners from one facility to another.
See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Shango
v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1982).
this backdrop, the Court remains convinced that a TRO or
preliminary injunction should not issue at this time; there
is no indication of an immediate and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction
and/or TRO is DENIED without prejudice.
IS SO ORDERED.
 The Motion indicated that it was being
filed with a brief in support. However, no such brief was
included. Regardless, because Plaintiff requested a TRO, the
Court immediately considered the motion. See Wheeler v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.
 "SHU" refers to the Special