United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Raydale Mitchell filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc. 1) challenging the
enhancement of his sentence as a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. He purports to rely on Mathis v.
United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). See, Memorandum in
Support, Doc. 5.
filed a response at Doc. 11, and petitioner filed a reply at
Facts and Procedural History
to a written plea agreement, Mitchell pleaded guilty to one
count of distribution of heroin in the Western District of
Wisconsin. The agreement did not include a waiver of appeal
rights. On June 1, 2012, he was sentenced to 168 months
imprisonment. United States v. Mitchell, Case No.
11-cr-00083-jdp, Docs. 25. & 51.
filed a direct appeal. In its non-precedential order
affirming the conviction and sentence, the Seventh Circuit
Two prior felony convictions involving a crime of violence
made Mitchell a career offender, see U.S.S.G. §§
4B1.1(a), (b)(3), which gave him an offense level of 29 after
a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see
Id. § 3E1.1, and yielded a guidelines sentence
of 151 to 188 months. The probation officer who prepared the
presentence report determined that, without the
career-offender analysis, Mitchell would be subject to an
identical guidelines range based on the amount of heroin
attributable to him, see Id. §§
2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(5), and a 2-level increase because Mitchell
had acted as an organizer by paying his brother to deliver
some of the heroin for him, see Id. § 3B1.1(c).
United States v. Mitchell, 525 Fed.Appx. 479, 480
(7th Cir. 2013).
also filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued
ineffectiveness of counsel and that his classification as a
career offender was no longer valid after Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The motion was
denied in October 2016. Case No. 14-cr-00473-jdp, Doc. 12.
Standards Applicable to Section 2241
petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in
conviction or sentencing, but are limited to challenges
regarding the execution of a sentence. See, Valona v.
United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.1998).
prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally
limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by
bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the
court which sentenced him. A motion under §2255 is
ordinarily the “exclusive means for a federal prisoner
to attack his conviction.” Kramer v. Olson,
347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is
generally limited to bringing only one motion under
§2255. A prisoner may not file a “second or
successive” motion unless a panel of the appropriate
court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either
1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense,
” or 2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C.
it is possible, under very limited circumstances, for a
prisoner to challenge his federal conviction or sentence
under §2241. 28 U.S.C. §2255(e) contains a
“savings clause” which authorizes a federal
prisoner to file a §2241 petition where the remedy under
§2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit
construed the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147
F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): “A procedure for
postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it
is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any
opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a
defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a
Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within
the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner
must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he
relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a
constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on
a decision that he could not have invoked in his first
§2255 motion and that case must apply
retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has
been a “fundamental defect” in his conviction or
sentence that is grave enough to be ...