United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division
MARTHA L. KILLION, Plaintiff,
TOM SKETERS, DBA TOMS 24 HOUR TOWING SERVICE, AND DONNA BLOODWORTH, Defendants.
MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
cause is before the Court on Defendant Donna Bloodworth's
Motion to Dismiss (d/e 10). Also before the Court is
Plaintiff Martha L. Killion's Motion for Costs of Service
and Attorney's Fees (d/e 14). Defendant Bloodworth's
Motion is GRANTED, and the claims against Defendant Donna
Bloodworth are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to
amend. Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.
action arises from claims of minimum wage violations under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Illinois
Minimum Page 1 of 13 Wage
Law (“Minimum Wage Law”), and the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act (“Wage Act”).
Accepting the allegations of the Complaint as true for the
purposes of resolving this motion, Plaintiff worked for
Defendant Tom Skeeters, d/b/a Tom's 24 Hour Towing
Service from roughly June 2014 to July 24, 2017. Compl.
¶ 9 (d/e 1). “Plaintiff worked Tuesday and
Thursday from 4:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. the next morning and
every other weekend from 4:30 p.m. on Friday until Monday
morning at 8:00 a.m.” Id. at ¶ 12. Her
duties “involved responding to customer requests,
coordinating towing service, and arranging for release of
towed vehicles in accordance with procedures approved by
Defendants.” Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff was
paid $25 for her weekday shifts and $125 for her weekend
shifts. Id. at ¶ 13. Defendant Donna Bloodworth
(“Bloodworth”), was Plaintiff's immediate
supervisor and performed payroll functions for Tom's 24
Hour Towing Service. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff
claims that both Defendants are her employers and that they
are owners and management officials.
filed her Complaint on August 18, 2017. Defendant Bloodworth
has moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing
that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Bloodworth
is an “employer” under the applicable law.
See Motion to Dismiss (d/e 10). Plaintiff opposes
the motion arguing that she had pleaded sufficient facts and
that it is premature to dismiss Defendant Bloodworth prior to
conducting discovery. See Response (d/e 11).
Defendant Bloodworth moves in the alternative for summary
judgment under Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(d), which provides that
“[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.” Id. The Court
declines to exercise its discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)
and will instead evaluate Defendant's Motion pursuant to
12(b)(6), excluding Defendant's attached affidavit from
also filed a Motion for Costs of Service and Attorney's
Fees (d/e 14) on November 7, 2017. Defendant has not opposed
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff
brings a claim based on the FLSA, a federal law. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is
proper because the events giving rise to the claim occurred
in Sangamon County, Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(2) (a civil action may be brought in a judicial
district where a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred).
Defendant Bloodworth's Motion to Dismiss is
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Christensen
v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). To
state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only provide a
short and plain statement of the claim showing he is entitled
to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of the claims.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true
and construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's
Plaintiff Failed to Allege that Defendant Bloodworth is
Plaintiff's Employer Under the FLSA
FLSA defines an employer as, “any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relationship to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
The FLSA defines the word “employer” broadly
enough “to permit naming another employee rather than
the employer as defendant, provided the defendant had
supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was
responsible in whole or part for the alleged
violation.” Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d
690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987). ...