United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
PERRY L. BROWN, Plaintiff,
MENARD PHYCHE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, and PHIP MARTIN COE, Defendants.
J. ROSENSTENGEL, United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on three motions filed by
Plaintiff, Perry Brown: (1) a Petition for Review (Doc. 39);
(2) a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 42); and (3) a
“motion” filed at Doc. 52. For the reasons
explained below, the Petition for Review is stricken, the
Motion to Appoint Counsel is denied, and the
“motion” is denied.
August 5, 2013, Brown filed suit by submitting a Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order to
the Court. On August 6, 2013, the Court denied the motion and
directed Brown to file a complaint to properly initiate an
action. Brown never filed a complaint, and so the Court
entered judgment in this case on September 13, 2013, more
than four years ago. (See Doc. 5). Brown filed
various documents he called complaints after that time, but
the Court struck all of them on various grounds.
(See Doc. 23). On March 4, 2016, Brown filed a
Notice of Appeal, presumably regarding the original September
2013 judgment (see Doc. 17); that appeal was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals (see Doc. 24) for
failure to pay a filing fee. Brown then filed another Notice
of Appeal on November 9, 2016 (Doc. 27), with the same
mandate of the Court of Appeals was issued on January 18,
2017. On August 23, 2017, Brown filed a third Late Notice of
Appeal. He also filed a motion for leave to appeal IFP, which
the Court denied as in bad faith (see Docs. 33, 36).
On December 6, 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Brown's most recent appeal on the grounds that it was
filed a “Petition for Review” on September 6,
2017. That document includes a “Motion to Recall the
Mandate, ” which despite its title requests no relief
and merely lists portions of the tests to invoke diversity
and federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts.
(Doc. 39, p. 2). The next section of the document is entitled
“Memorandum in support of PLRA motion for leave to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, ” but rather than
address that topic, Brown includes a two-paragraph excerpt
from what appears to be an appellate decision of an unknown
habeas proceeding. (Doc. 39, p. 3). The next section is a
copy of Brown's August 23, 2017 motion to proceed IFP,
which was denied prior to the filing of the “Petition,
” with the section regarding employment discrimination
underlined. (Doc. 39, pp. 4-6). Brown also submitted a copy
of Doc. 26. (Doc. 39, p. 8). Finally, Brown submitted an
affidavit, but that document is unintelligible-it raises
concerns about using generally accepted accounting principles
with respect to Brown's medication, post-retirement
benefits, and the Federal Communication Commission. (Doc. 39,
Motion to Appoint Counsel is a copy of Doc. 26 again, and a
copy of Doc. 17, in which Brown requests the appointment of
counsel to assist, amend, investigate, and present
petitioner's cognizable claims to the court. (Doc. 42).
this time, Brown also requested transcripts. (Doc. 41). As
this case was dismissed for want of a valid complaint, no
court proceedings were ever held and no transcripts created.
Thus there are no transcripts in this case.
December 21, 2017, Brown filed a “Motion.” (Doc.
52). It is as difficult to follow as Brown's other
filings. Brown's initial statement is “I think
it's unfair how the I.D.O.C. treatment for the walk
through of life to find that these alleged allegations are
not enough to find merit or claim and that its given me
thoughts to arrange myself to become a vital claim to
myself.” (Doc. 52, p. 1). Brown appears to be arguing
that it was unfair for the Court to deny him IFP when it
never made a determination about whether Brown's rights
were violated as a result of some treatment. Id. The
rest of the filings makes allusions to defendant's
medical treatment and mental health treatment, but devolves
into gibberish. (Doc. 52, p. 2) (“'Model year'
‘registration' inspection area'
‘performance of inspection.”) Brown also
includes an affidavit in which he alleges that he has been
given the drug Haloperidol for his disposition, but that the drug
was outlawed for “malpractice” and also because
it was used in lethal injection. (Doc. 52, p. 9).
“Petition” at Doc. 39 does not request any
relief, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b).
For this reason, it is not a proper motion, and it shall be
Motion to Appoint Counsel nominally requests counsel.
Unfortunately, however, the body of the motion is nothing
more than previously-filed documents; there is no new or
recent information in support of Brown's request. The
Motion is also deficient in that it fails to make the
required threshold showing. In determining whether to recruit
counsel, the Court is directed to make a two-fold inquiry:
“(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable
attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from
doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,
does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it
himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654
(7th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d
319, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1993)). The first prong of the analysis
is a threshold question. If a plaintiff has made no attempt
to obtain counsel on his own, the court should deny the
request. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655. Here, Brown
has not alleged that he has tried to recruit counsel on his
this case has been dismissed, and the Seventh Circuit has
recently found that Brown is past his time to appeal the
decision dismissing this case. Brown has provided no reason
for re-opening this case. It would not aid Brown to appoint
him an attorney at this time. There is nothing for an