United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
JASON YOUNG, as Administrator of the Estate of Tyler. D. Young, Deceased, Plaintiff,
PEORIA COUNTY, ILLINOIS, MICHEAL MCCOY, Peoria County Sheriff, BRIAN ASBELL, Corrections Superintendent, MORGAN HANSE, ALEC MICHEL, MICHAEL SMITH, STAN KESTER, OLIVIA RADCLIFF-TISH, CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC. Respondents.
ORDER & OPINION
BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge
matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint filed by Olivia Radcliff-Tish, Correctional
Healthcare Companies, Inc., and Correct Care Solutions, Inc.
(the “Medical Defendants”) (Doc. 34) and
Corrections Superintendent Brian Asbell, Morgan Hanse, Stan
Kester, Peoria County Sheriff Michael McCoy, Alex Michel,
Michael Smith, and Peoria County (the “Correctional
Defendants”) (Doc. 42). The motions have been fully
briefed. For the reasons stated below, both motions are
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
October 12, 2014, the decedent, Tylor Young, committed
suicide in his jail cell at Peoria County Jail (the
“Jail”) (Doc. 31, ¶ 5). On September 30,
2016, Plaintiff Jason Young, as the administrator of Tylor
Young's estate, filed the instant civil rights suit
against Peoria County, Peoria County Sheriff Michael McCoy,
Corrections Superintendent Brian Asbell, Officer Morgan
Hanse, Officer Alex Michel, Officer Michael Smith, and
Officer Stan Kester (collectively referred to as the
“Correctional Defendants”), Correctional
Healthcare Companies (“CHC”), Correct Care
Solutions, LLC (“CCS”), and Nurse Olivia
Radcliff-Tish (collectively referred to as the “Medical
following facts are taken from Plaintiff's second amended
complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of
these motions to dismiss. See Murphy v. Walker, 51
F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995). On October 6, 2014, Young was
booked into the Jail on a charge of failure to appear. (Doc.
31, ¶ 25). Prior to and at the time of his arrest, Young
was struggling with heroin addiction, asthma, depression,
anxiety, and other mental health issues. Id. ¶
26. Upon arrival at the Jail on October 6, 2014, Young was
examined and evaluated. Id. ¶ 30. Young was
identified as suffering from heroin abuse, opioid withdrawal,
asthma, mental health problems, and he was deemed a suicide
risk and a medical alert as a pre-trial detainee.
Id. ¶¶ 30, 36, 38. At that time, Young was
participating in a Narcotic Treatment Program
(“NTP”) and taking methadone daily as part of his
treatment. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Young was
exhibiting severe symptoms of opioid withdrawal including
nausea, vomiting, and sweats. Id. ¶ 31.
Young's evaluation at booking, he was placed into the
Jail's general population, in a section called the
“F-Pod.” Id. ¶ 53. The
“F-Pod” did not have suicide-proof cells and did
not allow for adequate supervision of “at-risk”
inmates like Young. Id. ¶ 54. After booking and
through his stay at the Jail, Young was denied access to or
was not given methadone despite exhibiting withdrawal
symptoms and severe mental distress. Id. ¶ 46.
October 10, 2014, the Medical Defendants discharged Young
from observation despite knowing that he was not receiving
methadone treatment for his opioid addiction, and having
observed that Young was exhibiting withdrawal symptoms,
verbal and non-verbal behaviors and other characteristics
associated with mental illness and distress including
anxiety, appetite change, and refusal to communicate or
cooperate with Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 47, 50.
That same day, Young placed a recorded phone call to his
grandparents during which he expressed his intent to kill
himself if they did not bond him out of Jail. Id.
at the Jail are required to make cell checks on all inmates
at least every fifteen minutes. Id. ¶ 79. On
October 12, 2014, Officer Michel was assigned to work on
“F-Pod's” first shift. Id. ¶
80. He completed an inmate check at 10:15 A.M. Id.
At approximately 10:29 A.M., Officer Michel took his lunch
break; he did not perform another inmate check before taking
his lunch break. Id. ¶ 81. Officer Smith was
also on duty and in the guard station that covered
“F-Pod.” Id. ¶ 82. Officer Smith
did not perform an inmate check while Officer Michel at was
lunch. Id. ¶ 83. When Officer Michel returned
from lunch, Officer Smith went to perform an inmate check at
11:05 A.M. Id. ¶ 86. At that time, Young was
found to have committed suicide by hanging in his cell.
Id. ¶ 87.
I-IV of the second amended complaint allege
individual-capacity deliberate indifference claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff McCoy,
Superintendent Asbell, the Sheriff's Employees, and the
Medical Defendants. Counts V and VI allege official-capacity
Monell claims against Sheriff McCoy, Superintendent
Asbell, the Sheriff's Employees, CHC and CCS. Count VII
alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, by Sheriff McCoy
and Superintendent Asbell. Count VIII alleges Illinois
Wrongful Death claims against the Medical Defendants, and
Count IX alleges indemnification against Peoria County.
October 9, 2017, the Medical Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, and on November 13, 2017, the Correctional
Defendants did the same. Plaintiff has responded to both
motions, and this matter is ripe for decision.
ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
“the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as
true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.” In re marchFIRST Inc., 589
F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint must contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's complaint must
contain sufficient detail to give defendant notice of the
claim, and the allegations must “plausibly suggest that
the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility
above a ‘speculative level.'” EEOC v.
Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard requires
enough facts to “present a story that holds together,
” but does not require a determination of probability.
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th
Cir. 2010). Though detailed factual allegations are not
needed, a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
Medical Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim against them under § 1983, Monell, or the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act. The Correctional Defendants also
argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them
under § 1983 and Monell. The Correctional
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim under the ADA against Superintendent Asbell, and that
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are barred by the Illinois
Tort Immunity Act and the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's Individual-Capacity Section 1983
purports to bring individual-capacity § 1983 claims
against the Nurse Radcliff-Tish, CCS, CHC, Sheriff McCoy,
Superintendent Asbell, and Officers Hanse, Kester, Smith, and
1983 imposes liability when a defendant acts under color of
state law and violates a plaintiff's rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. §
1983. “Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on
personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability
does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.'”
Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.1996),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997) (quoting
Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th
Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995)).
Medical providers who contract with jails to perform the
public function of providing medical services to inmates are
treated the same as municipalities for liability purposes of
a § 1983 claim. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d
824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010). As such, there is no question that
CHC, CCS, and nurse Radcliff-Tish are state actors for
purposes of this case. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the
individual Correctional Defendants were acting in their
capacities as state actors. The only issue, then, is whether
Young was sufficiently pleaded that he was deprived by the
defendants of a right or an interest secured by the
well established that, while in the custody of state or local
authorities, a pretrial detainee must be afforded certain
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment, including access
to adequate medical care. See City of Revere v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983);
Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1040-41
(7th Cir. 1998). “The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits ‘deliberate indifference
to the serious medical needs of pretrial
detainees.'” Pittman ex rel. Hamilton
v. Cty. of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir.
2014) (quoting Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285,
1289 (7th Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff claiming a constitutional
violation under § 1983 for denial of medical care must
meet two requirements. “First, he must show that his
medical condition was objectively serious.”
Id. “Second, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant officials had a sufficiently culpable state of
mind-that their ‘acts or omissions [were] sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference' to his
serious medical needs.” Id. (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The
Seventh Circuit has held that suicide qualifies as a serious
medical condition. See id.; Collins v.
Seeman,462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir.2006); Cavalieri