United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
G. WILKERSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
“Second Motion for Remedies Sought to be
Exhausted” (Doc. 134); “Third Motion - Exhaustion
of Remedies” (Doc. 135); and “Fourth Motion -
Exhaustion of Remedies” (Doc. 139) are pending before
the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are
Marc Norfleet is a prisoner who uses a wheelchair for his
mobility. On November 17, 2015, Norfleet filed a complaint
alleging violation of his constitutional and statutory rights
while he was incarcerated at Pickneyville Correctional Center
(Doc. 1). The Court reviewed Norfleet's Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and he was allowed to
proceed on two counts relating to allegations that he was
forced to live in an overcrowded cell that did not
accommodate his wheelchair (Doc. 5, pp. 3, 12).
exactly two years later, Norfleet filed the three pending
motions, all of which raise new legal claims. Specifically,
Norfleet alleges he was denied access to outdoor yard
activities and the use of a coat due to his disability (Doc.
134, p. 3; Doc. 135, pp. 1, 3; Doc. 139, p. 1). Although
Norfleet has titled these motions as relating to
“exhaustion of administrative remedies, ” the
Court construes them to actually be a request by Norfleet to
supplement his pleadings.
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
leave to amend, as a matter of course, shall be freely given
to a party when justice so requires. The Seventh Circuit has
adopted a “liberal policy” respecting amendments
to pleadings so that cases may be decided on their merits and
not on the basis of technicalities. Stern v. Gypsum,
Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1977). Additionally,
“the complaint merely serves to put the defendant on
notice and is to be freely amended or constructively amended
as the case develops, as long as amendments do not unfairly
surprise or prejudice the defendant.” Toth v. USX
Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989). The district
court's decision to grant or deny a motion for leave to
file an amended pleading is “a matter purely within the
sound discretion of the district court. Guise v. BWM
Mortg., LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting
J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935
F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir.1991)). However, a court may deny a
party leave to amend in the presence of undue delay,
futility, bad faith, prejudice, or dilatory motive.
Indiana Funeral Directors Ins. Trust v. Trustmark Ins.
Corp., 347 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also: Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972,
980 (7th Cir. 2002). Undue prejudice has been found in cases
where the amendment creates entirely new and separate claims,
adds new parties, or would require expensive and
time-consuming new discovery. Conroy v. Datsun Ltd. v.
Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 506 F.Supp. 1051, 1054
(N.D. Ill. 1980); See also Murphy v. White Hen Pantry
Co., 691 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1982) (district court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs
to amend their complaint where motion was filed after parties
had completed discovery and where motion would inject an
entirely new theory into the litigation).
the new allegations raised by Norfleet are alleged to have
taken place at a completely different prison, involve
completely different factual allegations, and are brought
against completely different individuals (Doc. 134, pp. 5-9).
Thus, if the Court were to allow Norfleet to supplement the
pleadings, the parties would quite literally be back at the
start of litigation. This is particularly problematic given
that discovery has already been completed and the deadline
for dispositive motions has passed (Doc. 95).
Court finds, therefore, that allowing Norfleet to supplement
the pleadings at this stage in the litigation would cause
undue hardship. As a result, Norfleet's “Second
Motion for Remedies Sought to be Exhausted” (Doc. 134),
“Third Motion - Exhaustion of Remedies” (Doc.
135), and “Fourth Motion - Exhaustion of
Remedies” (Doc. 139) are DENIED. The
Court clarifies, however, that nothing in this Order prevents
Norfleet from filing these allegations as a new and separate
 Count 1 claims Norfleet's rights
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
were violated by Defendants Keane, Taylor and Benton; Count 2
was claims Norfleet's rights under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. were violated by
Defendant IDOC (Doc. 5, p. 12).
 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d), addresses when
pleadings may be supplemented due to events that occurred
after filing of the original pleadings. See Glatt v.
Chicago Park Dist.,87 F.3d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1996).
The same standard applies to motions to ...