JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas,
Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment
1 Following the indictment and subsequent superseding
information against defendant, Fernando Casas, Jr., for
violation of bail bond, the circuit court of Du Page County
dismissed the information for failure to comply with the
statute of limitations, and the State appealed. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the information was timely and
that violation of bail bond was a continuing offense pursuant
to section 3-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/3-8
(West 2014)). 2016 IL App (2d) 150456. This court allowed
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S.Ct. R.
315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)). For the following reasons, we now
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand for
2 I. BACKGROUND
3 In 1996, defendant was indicted by the statewide grand jury
for the manufacture or delivery of cocaine in excess of 900
grams, a Class X felony. On October 16, 1996, the circuit
court of Du Page County admitted defendant to bail in the
amount of $750, 000; he posted a 10% cash bond of $75, 000.
Thereafter, defendant regularly appeared in court as required
for his case.
4 On June 9, 1998, however, defendant failed to appear in
court, and his bond was forfeited. During the next 30 days,
defendant did not surrender himself to authorities, and a
bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Also, a judgment was
entered in the amount of bail against defendant and for the
State. Within the next six months, defendant was tried in
absentia, found guilty of the Class X felony, and
sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.
5 On April 5, 2014, approximately 18 years after defendant
was first indicted, the police stopped defendant for a
traffic offense in Du Page County. During that stop,
defendant gave the police false identification. In subsequent
conversations with the police, defendant revealed his true
identity and admitted he had used false identities, including
one he purchased in Mexico, to avoid apprehension.
Subsequently, defendant began serving his 20-year sentence
for manufacture or delivery of cocaine.
6 Based on these facts, defendant was indicted in December
2014 for the violation of his 1996 bail bond. The State's
indictment alleged that defendant forfeited his bond by
failing to appear in court on June 9, 1998, and by knowingly
failing to surrender himself within 30 days of that date. The
offense was charged as a Class 1 felony because
defendant's underlying cocaine charge was a Class X
7 Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
prosecution for violation of his bail bond was time-barred.
More specifically, defendant claimed that, under the general
statute of limitations for felonies, the State had three
years, or until July 9, 2001, to bring the bail-bond charge
against him. Defendant noted that more than three years had
passed, and he asserted that the State did not allege any
facts in the charging instrument that would toll or extend
the three-year limitations period.
8 In response, the State filed a superseding information,
which alleged as follows:
"[O]n or about July 9, 1998, and continuing through and
until April 5, 2014, [defendant] committed the offense of
VIOLATION OF BAIL BOND, a Class 1 felony, in that ***
defendant, after having been admitted to bail on or about
October 16, 1996, for appearance in the Circuit Court of Du
Page County *** in case 96 CF 1920, and on or about June 9,
1998, he incurred a forfeiture of his bail and thereafter
knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully failed to surrender
himself within 30 days following the date of the forfeiture
of the bail, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/32-10(a)
of the Illinois Compiled Statutes; and because Violation of
Bail Bond should be considered a continuing offense, the
statute of limitations did not start running until April 5,
2014, when defendant was apprehended and admitted that he
used false identity to evade prosecution."
9 In a footnote, the State asserted that "[t]his Court
is bound by People v. Grogan, 197 Ill.App.3d 18, 143
Ill.Dec. 730, 554 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist.1990), which held that
violation of a bail bond is not a continuing
offense." (Emphasis in original.) The State then noted
that it, with the superseding information, was "mak[ing]
a good[-]faith argument that Grogan was improperly
decided and should be overruled."
10 The circuit court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding that, pursuant to Grogan, the
State's prosecution of defendant for violation of bail
bond was time-barred. The State appealed.
11 On appeal, the State argued that violation of bail bond is
a continuing offense and that Grogan was wrongly
decided. The appellate court agreed. 2016 IL App (2d) 150456,
12 The appellate court observed that Grogan held
"[t]he offense of violation of bail bond, unlike the
offense of escape of a convicted felon, is *** not the kind
of offense that poses a continuing threat to society, nor can
it *** be defined as a series of related acts constituting a
single [course] of conduct, such as conspiracy or
embezzlement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. ¶ 15.
13 The appellate court determined that the Grogan
court was wrong on both points and that it had misapprehended
the nature of the offense. Id. ¶ 17. The court
further "determin[ed] that the legislature intended
that, like escape, violation of bail bond would be treated as
a continuing offense. The nature of the offense is that the
offender has secured bond and fled. Like escape, wherever
else the bail-bond offender is, he is not where he is
lawfully supposed to be; he has breached his lawful custody
and obstructed justice." Id. ¶ 18.
14 The appellate court reversed the circuit court, holding
that violation of bail bond is a continuing offense and that
the superseding information filed within three years of
defendant's 2014 arrest was timely. The appellate court
explained that it could not overrule Grogan since it
was a court of equal stature; however, it expressed its view
that Grogan should no longer be followed.
Id. ¶ 23. The court declined to address the
State's alternative argument that the statute of
limitations had not expired while defendant was a fugitive
because he used a false identity and, thus, pursuant to
section 3-7(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012, defendant was
not usually and publicly resident within the State. 720 ILCS
5/3-7(a) (West 2014). Defendant appeals to this court.
15 II. ANALYSIS
16 Before this court, defendant assigns error to the
appellate court's determination that the legislature
intended violation of bail bond be treated as a continuing
offense. Defendant contends, inter alia, that
violation of bail bond is not a continuing offense and that
the State charged him after the statute of limitations had
expired. The State responds that violation of bail bond
should be considered a continuing offense and, as such, the
limitations period began to run once defendant was
apprehended. According to the State, since defendant was
charged with the bail-bond offense within three years from
the date of his 2014 arrest, the information was ...