United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division
TERRY C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
ABDI TINWALLA, et al. Defendants.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Court's
grant of summary judgment in Defendant's favor and
remanded the case. See Johnson v. Tinwalla, 855 F.3d
747 (2017). The Court subsequently appointed counsel for
Plaintiff and reopened discovery to allow Plaintiff's
counsel an opportunity to further investigate the claims in
this case. The matter is before the Court for ruling on
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability. (Doc. 127). The motion is denied.
MOTION TO CORRECT HIS REPLY (DOC. 138)
filed a motion seeking to refile a corrected version of his
reply to Defendant's response to his motion for summary
judgment. The motion is granted. The Court will consider
Plaintiff's corrected reply for purposes of this ruling.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v.
Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a
“genuine” issue, there must be more than
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
is civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and Detention
Facility (“Rushville” or “TDF”), a
secure residential treatment center operated by the Illinois
Department of Human Services (“IDHS”). UMF 1, 2.
Defendant is a psychiatrist employed by Wexford Health
Services, a private company contracted to provide health
services at Rushville. UMF 3. In his capacity as a
psychiatrist, Defendant sees patients and prescribes
medication. UMF 5.
23, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Defendant an anger problem,
feelings of hopelessness, and irritability. UMF 31, 32.
Plaintiff also expressed a desire to assault a staff member.
At that time, however, Defendant did not believe that
Plaintiff would imminently hurt a staff member, or that
Plaintiff was a danger to others. UMF 33, 34, 36. Defendant
noted that Plaintiff was calm, alert and oriented, able to
express himself well, and that Plaintiff's thought
processes were logical with no racing thoughts or
hallucinations. UMF 35. Defendant did not believe
Plaintiff's situation was an emergency, or that Plaintiff
was gravely disabled. UMF 37, 38.
the appointment, Defendant suggested a prescription for
Risperdal, a psychotropic medication. UMF 39. Defendant
informed Plaintiff of the side effects of the medication,
including weight gain, increased body temperature, kidney
failure, increased cholesterol, tremors, shakes, abnormal
movements, upset stomach, constipation, nausea, and vomiting.
UMF 40. Defendant also discussed the risks and benefits of
Risperdal, alternative medications, and no treatment. UMF 41.
Plaintiff initially signed the consent form for Risperdal,
but crossed out his signature upon Defendant's mention of
the possibility of forced medication. UMF 42-44. Defendant
noted on the consent form that Plaintiff had “refused
consent after signing.” UMF 46.
testified in his deposition that, after Plaintiff scratched
out his name, Defendant told Plaintiff he was
“prescribing him the medication…and providing
access to the medication so [Plaintiff] can take it if he
wants to.” Tinwalla Dep. 96:24-97:6. Defendant
testified further: “then after I ordered the
prescription, I took the chart to the nurses. Of course, as
common practice, after the order is written, I would take the
chart to the nurses' station and let them know that
I'm starting so and so on a medication. So the nurses are
aware to take that order down, sign off on it and fax the
prescription to the pharmacy.” Id. 139:4-12.
Defendant did not follow the procedure outlined in the
Illinois Administrative Code related to the forced
administration of psychotropic medications prior to
prescribing the medication.
took Risperdal daily with his other prescribed medications
for approximately the next six (6) weeks. UMF 49-52, 64.
Plaintiff testified that he did not know he was taking
Risperdal until he received a notice of such on August 4,
2013. Pl.'s Dep. 28:4-6. Upon Plaintiff's inquiry,
the nurse distributing the medications replied that she was
not aware that Plaintiff was taking Risperdal. Id.
28:8-9. However, she was able to immediately confirm the
prescription. Id. 28:9-12 (“I gave her the
papers. She went back there, and she said yes, you have been
on Risperdal since June the 23rd, 2013.”). Thereafter,
nurses removed the Risperdal from Plaintiff's daily
medications upon Plaintiff's request. Id.
28:13-16 (“I was like every time I go to med line[, ] I
am like which one of them-take that Risperdal out, and the
nurse would take it out.”).
Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate
who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs
against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
interest.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
227 (1990). Factual disputes ...