United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL United States District Judge.
before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Corey Bump. (Doc. 85). For the reasons set forth
below, the motion is denied.
24, 2013 Plaintiff Jermaine Craddock was awoken from his
sleep by his cellmate Frederick Pigram repeatedly stabbing
him with a “shiv” (homemade weapon). (Doc. 88, p.
1). Craddock had been housed with Pigram for approximately
eight days, from June 17 to June 24, 2013. (Doc. 86-1, pp. 4,
6). Craddock testified the attack was preceded by multiple
days of verbal threats, including statements by Pigram that
he was going to “fuck me [Plaintiff] up” and
“fuck my [Plaintiff] bitch ass up.” (Doc. 86-1,
Correctional Officer Corey Bump, was the gallery officer at
the Menard Correctional Center where Craddock was housed at
the time. (Doc. 86-1, pp. 4, 6). On June 19, 2013 (the second
day he was housed with Pigram), Craddock stopped Bump at his
cell bars, “explained to him the situation, ” and
told him he “wanted to or needed to move out of the
cell . . ., that [he] and his guy [were] not getting along
and that, you know, the guy was saying things to [him] and
stuff like that.” (Doc. 86-1, pp. 6, 8). In response,
Officer Bump told him that there was nothing he could do
other than talk to his superiors. (Doc. 86-1, p. 6).
days later, Craddock spoke with Bump again at his bars and
told him he was being threatened by Pigram and needed to be
moved. (Doc. 86-1, p. 9-10). He specifically stated Pigram
was threatening to “fuck [him] up” if he
didn't change cells, that Pigram was acting strangely,
and that he required protective custody. (Doc. 86-1, p. 10).
Bump gave Craddock the appropriate form for protective
custody, which Craddock filled out and returned to Bump that
night. (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). Bump told Craddock he would report
the information to his lieutenant, would give the form to the
Major, and that Craddock should hear from the Major in the
morning. (Doc. 86-1, p. 10).
was never visited by the Major and was never transferred to
protective custody. (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). Several days later he
was attacked by Pigram with a shank. As a result of the
attack Craddock suffered stab and slash wounds (requiring
minor medical treatment) and psychological trauma. (Doc.
86-1, pp. 23-24). Officer Bump does not recall Craddock or
any of the events described above (Doc. 86-2, p. 1).
judgment is proper only where the moving party can
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir.
2005). All facts and reasonable inferences must be construed
in favor of the non-moving party. Blow v. Bijora,
Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing
Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 824 F.3d 645, 647-48
(7th Cir. 2016)).
Seventh Circuit has stated that summary judgment is
“the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a
party must show what evidence it has that would convince a
trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”
Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407
F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)). The
judge's role at summary judgment, however, is not to
weigh the evidence or assess the facts, but simply to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Id. at 259. The question is can there be only one
reasonable conclusion based on the evidence, or could
reasonable minds differ? Id. at 250-51.
raises two bases for summary judgment. First, he argues
Craddock has failed to produce evidence that he was aware of
a serious risk of danger to Craddock or that he was
deliberately indifferent to such a danger. (Doc. 85, p. 1).
Second, Bump alleges he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Failure to Protect
Supreme Court has been clear the Eighth Amendment creates a
duty on the part of prison officials to protect inmates from
violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To establish a
failure to protect claim, an inmate must first show he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
harm. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th
Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit has been clear the beating of
one inmate by another “clearly constitutes serious
harm.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th
Cir. 2005). Here, Craddock alleges, and Bump does not appear
to contest, that Pigram threatened to harm Craddock and
ultimately attacked him with a shiv. (Doc. 86-1, pp. 23-24).
Thus, the uncontested evidence is that there was a
substantial risk of harm.
the inmate must show the prison official had actual knowledge
of the risk. Gevas v. McLaughlin,798 F.3d 475, 480
(7th Cir. 2015). The official must “both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk or serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Evidence that the prisoner complained to prison officials
about a specific threat to his safety is often sufficient to
show the official ...